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As part of recent efforts to improve overall management
within the Department of Defense, most Contract Administration
functions (other than Navy Supervisors of Shipbuilding) have
been consolidated within a new organization named the Defense
Contract Management Command (DCMC) . Individual Services
formerly controlled their own Plant Representative Offices
(PROs) for Contract Administration. These have now been
consolidated into the DCMC and are now referred to as Defense
Plant Representative Offices (DPROs) . Procuring Contracting
Officer (PCO) functions have remained with each individual
Service Hardware Systems Command. The DPROs still perform
Administrative Contracting Officer (ACO) functions, but
operate under new management guidance. The Naval Air Systems
Command (NAVAIR) PCO/DCMC ACO organizations exist to provide
contractual support to military customers. In his first
policy guidance memorandum, dated 11 April 1990, the new head
of DCMC (Major General Henry) stated, "As we create a new
order of doing Contract Management, we should keep the
customers (Program Managers (PMs) and PCOs) in sharp focus.
Simply stated, they are the reason for our being! " (Ref. 1)
This thesis is oriented toward customer support. PCO, ACO and
industry perspectives on changes in customer support will be
analyzed.
Since the transition of Naval Plant Representative
Offices (NAVPROs) into DCMC, the previous, long-standing
relationship between NAVAIR and the PROs has changed
significantly. The changes include what appear to be major
differences in organizational priorities . Specifically, the
Navy and the DPROs seem to disagree on how DPRO pricing
actions and def initizations are prioritized. The Navy
generally required that the NAVPROs definitize the largest
dollar orders first. There also appeared to be a strong PCO
influence on ACO work priorities. DPROs, however, definitize
orders on more of a first-in, first-out basis regardless of
dollar value or other considerations. DPROs are driven by
Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) timeliness goals or "bogies"
which require def initization of any order within 180 days of
assignment.
Another apparent area of Navy concern, regarded changes
in roles and responsibilities between NAVAIR and the PROs.
The problem appeared to primarily involve issuance of
Provisioned Item (PIO) and Basic Ordering Agreement (BOA)
orders. The NAVPROs were previously responsible for issuing
these orders, however, DCMC had not accepted that
responsibility until recently. This necessitated the
establishment of Navy Technical Representative Detachments
(NTRDs) at the DPRO sites for the purpose of issuing PIO and
BOA orders. This problem has recently been resolved through
a joint Navy/DLA memorandum of agreement. Under this
agreement, the DPROs will now issue the orders themselves.
The DPROs were also allowed to absorb the NTRD personnel. In
the case of DPRO McDonnell Douglas, this meant five additional
1102 Series personnel. (Ref. 2)
This study provides interested Acguisition Managers with
a thorough background on the evolution of the DCMC
organization. The thesis examines the views of Contract
Administration process owners regarding their perceptions of
customer support before and after the NAVPRO/DPRO transition.
Process owner recommendations for continuous improvement are
also provided. These perceptions and recommendations may
serve senior decision makers as a basis for assessment of the
intended results of consolidation against actual impacts.
B. OBJECTIVE OF THE RESEARCH
The objective of this research effort was to characterize
recent changes in relationships between Naval Air Systems
Command (NAVAIR) Procuring Contracting Officer (PCO) functions
and the Defense Contract Management Command (DCMC)
Administrative Contracting Officer (ACO) functions as they
impact support of Navy programs. Specifically, the research
focuses on organizational relationship changes resulting from
implementation of Defense Management Report Decision (DMRD)
916. DMRD 916 has integrated former Naval Plant
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Representative Offices (NAVPROs) into a newly created
organization, the Defense Contract Management Command (DCMC)
.
Based on DMRD implementation correspondence, there were
obvious differences in orientation between the former Defense
Contract Administration Services (DCAS) and military Service
Plant Representative Offices. For instance, Program Office
orientation is perceived to have been stronger within the
NAVPROs. As a result their customers expected certain
services and rapid responses. (Ref. 3)
As pointed out in DMRD 916, "The Services do not believe
that DLA is responsive to their requirements." The new
Defense Contract Management Command which has taken over all
Service plant representative offices is a command within DLA.
DCMC is consolidating contract administration and making
massive reductions in Contract Administration personnel.
Dramatic changes in PCO/ACO personnel relationships seem
inevitable in this environment. DCMC management seems keenly
aware of the challenges they face in satisfying their
customers. The new Commander of DCMC, Major General Charles
Henry is optimistic. He sees:
. . .major benefits from consolidating - to industry as
well as Government. Industry will be dealing with one
organization that offers uniform policies and procedures.
And we are now structured better to support program
managers
.
He goes on to say:
A principal difference in structure is that our districts
now have a program and technical support office to ensure
responsive support to program managers." (Ref 4., p. 20)
C. THE RESEARCH QUESTION
In an effort to accomplish the objective of this
research, the following question was studied:
How well is the Navy/DCMC organizational relationship
supporting the needs of Navy and Industrial customers?
Subsidiary questions which support this research effort
are as follows:
1. What are the key differences between DCMC Contract
Administration methods and those formerly used by the
Navy?
2. What impacts are DCMC ' s methods of Contract Admin-
istration having on their Navy customers and Industry?
3. What are the key differences between DCMC and Navy
organizational priorities and perceived roles concerning
Contract Administration?
4. What can be done to bring DCMC and Navy Contract
Administration organizational priorities into accord?
5. What can be done to improve the relationship between
the Navy and DCMC Contract Administration organizations?
D. SCOPE, LIMITATIONS AND ASSUMPTIONS
The scope of this thesis is limited to analysis of the
state of NAVAIR/DPRO relations and an assessment of the impact
of the DCMC transition on customer support. This thesis
concentrates only on the relationships between NAVAIR, NAVAIR
Prime Contractors and the DPROs which were formerly (NAVPROs)
.
This study focuses specifically on those NAVPROs which
were under the cognizance of the Naval Air Systems Command
(NAVAIR), Washington, D.C., and have now transitioned into
DCMC as Defense Plant Representative Offices (DPROs) . These
include plant offices with McDonnell-Douglas Corp. , St. Louis,
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MO; Grumman Aerospace Corp., Bethpage, N.Y.; General Electric
Company (Aircraft Engine Business Group) , Lynn, MA; and
Sikorsky Aircraft Division (United Technologies) , Stratford,
CT. A NAVPRO with Lockheed, Burbank was closed and that work
was consolidated with a former Air Force Plant Representative
Office (AFPRO) in Marietta, GA. Primary responsibility for
Contract Administration has been and continues to reside with
the Administrative Contracting Officers (ACOs) at these
locations. This responsibility is delegated to them by the
Procuring Contracting Officers (PCOs) and is in accordance
with the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR), Part 42.
Other Service PROs , former Defense Contract Administra-
tion Services Plant Representative Offices (DCASPROs) and
other Systems Commands are excluded from study. The thesis
examines differences in NAVPRO and DPRO policies, and changes
in roles and responsibilities. The thesis makes recommen-
dations on how the NAVAIR/DPRO/ industry relationship might be
improved as part of improving customer support.
Another limitation in scope is that this thesis focuses
primarily on the Contract Operations functions of the PROs,
although in most of the offices being examined a large part of
the work relates to on-site program management as well as
quality assurance. Despite this limitation, PM reactions to
the Contract Administration Services (CAS) consolidation are
examined as well.
E. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
The methodology used for this thesis included a detailed
examination of pertinent directives, Contract Administration
operating guidance, DCMC policy and implementation guidance,
and feedback from ACOs, PCOs, PMs and industry representatives
via written surveys. The PCO, ACO and industry survey
questions were designed to elicit maximum discussion of issues
addressed by the primary and subsidiary research questions.
The PM survey was formatted using a six point Likert Scale,
requesting PMs to rate their agreement with various statements
concerning the PRO transition. An initial round of ACO and
PCO surveys were completed in May of 1991, during the DCMC
transition process. A second round of surveys, which included
PCOs, ACOs, PMs and industry was conducted during the December
1991- February 1992 time-frame. Telephone interviews were
also conducted with various individuals. A telephone
conference was also conducted with a group of ACOs at a large
DPRO.
Many of the individuals responding to early questions for
this paper indicated it was still too early to pass judgment
on how the transition was working out. Based on early
comments received, it appeared that the perceived success of
the DPRO consolidation would depend greatly on how the PIO/BOA
ordering issue was handled. It would also depend on whether
DCMC would cooperate in meeting the Navy's needs in
establishing priorities for order def initizations
.
F. ORGANIZATION OF STUDY
Input was solicited from the field both in May 1991 and
December 1991 - February 1992. Many of the changes which were
still in process in May, had evolved to a greater extent by
December. Where appropriate, early reactions to the
transition are discussed, followed by later reactions to the
same areas of concern. Chapter II provides a detailed
background on the evolution of DCMC, and how the transition
from NAVPROs to DPROs has occurred.
Chapter III provides the results of surveys sent to DPRO
ACOs, NAVAIR PCOs, industry and NAVAIR PMs . Reasons for the
various questions are discussed, along with findings and
sample responses.
Chapter IV Compares the Contract Administration methods,
structure, roles and responsibilities, operating guidance,
Management Information Systems (MIS) /Control Systems,
reporting requirements, and organizational priorities of the
DPRO organization to those of the previous NAVPRO
organization. The differences are analyzed, and impacts of
the changes are assessed.
Chapter V provides answers to the research questions and
recommendations for further research.
II. BACKGROUND: HOW THE TRANSITION HAS OCCURRED
A. INTRODUCTION
The Department of Defense has recently undertaken efforts
to improve its procurement process in response to a 1989
directive from the President to the Secretary of Defense to
"develop a plan to accomplish full implementation of the
recommendations of the Packard Commission and to realize
substantial improvements. .. in defense management overall."
(Ref . 5, p. 1) This directive, along with rapidly declining
budgets has compelled DoD to seek ways of enhancing
procurement management, while also making substantial cost
reductions. Changes are being implemented in response to
Defense Management Report Decisions (DMRDs) as they are made
by the department. One of the primary ways the DMRDs seek to
streamline operations in areas such as Contract Administration
and Inventory Management is through consolidation of similar
activities
.
On 6 February 1990, as part of DMRD 916, the Deputy
Secretary of Defense directed the consolidation of nearly all
Contract Administration within the framework existing in the
Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) . DMRD 916 was implemented with
the expectation of greater efficiencies and achievement of
cost savings through economies of scale (Ref. 6, p. 35). This
new organization has been named the Defense Contract
Management Command (DCMC) . It is headed by a two-star flag
officer who reports directly to the DLA Director.
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The Deputy Secretary of Defense directed that:
The consolidated organization should promote uniform
interpretation of acquisition policy, provide a single
face to industry, eliminate unnecessary overhead
resulting from redundant functions and create a more
effective and efficient CAS organization.
(Ref. 7, p. 1)
Prior to DMRD 916, Contract Administration was performed
both by the DCAS organization, (a sub-agency) of the Defense
Logistics Agency, and, in some cases, by the individual
Services. In cases where the amount and complexity of
contracts with one particular contractor required a dedicated
team of Contract Administrators, a Plant Representative Office
(PRO) was established. When a PRO exists, it has total
responsibility for administration of all DoD contracts
performed at that location. Before examining the DCMC
organization in greater detail, some history of the evolution
of Contract Administration is appropriate.
B. THE BIRTH AND EVOLUTION OF DEFENSE CONTRACT
ADMINISTRATION
The Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) was formed
in 1947, followed by the Department of Defense (DOD) in 1949.
The formation of DOD may be attributed, at least partially, to
public and Administration discontentment with Defense
procurement practices. In the 1940s, each military Service
received annual appropriations directly from Congress. There
was no central Department responsible for integrating budget
requests or strategies for meeting military threats. Nor was
there any long range budgeting for hardware procurement. The
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budgets of individual Services and their respective hardware
budgets were also developed independently of each other.
Lacking coordination between the Services, the Administration
found Service budgets and hardware programs impinging on one
another, forcing untimely delays and cancellations of some
programs. The importance of centralizing control of the
Services was also emphasized by the fact that, for the first
time, a major U.S. Defense industry was forming. The
Government response to all of these factors was to:
...create a centralized defense authority, limit the
Services' power, and make both the Services and the Joint
Chiefs of Staff (JCS) more responsive to an overall DOD
perspective. (Ref. 8, p. 2)
To accomplish these objectives:
...the National Security Act of 1947 created the National
Security Council and the Office of the Secretary of
Defense...; the National Security Reorganization Act of
1949 made DOD an Executive Department and down graded the
Military Departments; Reorganization Plan No. 6 (1953)
expanded OSD's staff and authority; and, the
Reorganization Act of 1958 gave the Secretary of Defense
power to reorganize DOD. (Ref. 8, p. 2)
Procurement was governed under the regulations of The Armed
Services Procurement Act of 1947. Within these parameters,
DOD became responsible for ensuring overall efficiency in DOD
procurement. As the number of complex weapon systems being
procured increased, so did Government concern regarding
oversight of Defense Contractors.
Concerns regarding Government procurement continued to
mount in the 1950s. These included the perceived need to
refine and reduce costs in the procurement of items common to
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all of the Military Services. This included procurement in
areas such as electronics, fuels and construction. It was
felt that buying to specifications of minimum need could be
better accomplished through a central agency. Additionally,
costs could be reduced by taking advantage of large volume
buys . The Defense Supply Agency (DSA) was created on October
1, 1961, to perform this type of procurement, as well as
storage of supply stocks . The agency commenced actual
operations in January of 1962. (Ref. 9., p. 9) The birth of
DSA came early in the tenure of a Defense Secretary with
strong opinions toward Defense procurement.
Defense Secretary Robert McNamara, who served 1961
through 19 68, held a management philosophy that decisions
should be made at the lowest levels possible. He felt OSD
should only be involved in making top level decisions between
alternatives presented by the Services. Two particularly
significant effects of the McNamara era were that:
"quantitative measures of program performance became
increasingly important." and, "to enhance DOD's ability to
monitor the contractors and Services, McNamara increased data
reporting requirements" (Ref. 8, p. 3)
Secretary McNamara instituted many DOD improvement
initiatives. The initiative having the greatest effect on
Contract Administration was called Project 60. Project 60,
initiated in 1964, studied what were viewed by DOD as
inefficiencies and duplicative efforts in Government Contract
12
Administration and contract auditing. The pilot study was
conducted in a region of five mid-Atlantic states. All DOD
Contract Administration within this area was to be
consolidated.
Initially, under Project 60, DOD announced that to
preclude duplicative Contract Administration,
...the agency having the predominant number of contracts
with a specific contractor would have cognizance in that
its determinations regarding administration and audit
would govern the other defense agencies. (Ref. 10., p.
15)
Eventually, as a result of the Project 60 findings, the
Defense Contract Administration Services (DCAS) organization
was formed as a branch of DSA, assuming control of the
majority of existing Contract Administration work. Before
DSA/DCAS began performing Contract Administration, all such
activities were performed by the separate military Services,
each administering the contracts it awarded. Multiple
Services were simultaneously conducting unique versions of
Contract Administration with the same individual contractors.
Contractors were forced to equip themselves to comply with
each Services* unique requirements, which frequently
conflicted with one another. The Government considered this
practice costly, as well as unnecessarily duplicative. By
establishing DSA, and eventually the Defense Contract
Administration Services (DCAS) structure, the Government
sought to display "one face to industry", whereby each
contractor would have only one DCAS office to interact with.
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DCAS was also predicted to be more economical by allowing
larger volumes of actions to be administered per employee
(Ref. 11, p. 69). A major element of Secretary McNamara ' s
charter was to achieve large cost savings within DOD. By 1965
DOD was able to claim annual DSA savings amounting to $58
million in operating expenses and $506 million in inventory
costs.
DSA/DCAS became the single largest manager of both
Defense Department Supply stocks and Contract Administration.
Originally, DSA Headquarters "directed and coordinated the
activities of eight commodity-type and two service-type single
management centers." (Ref. 9, p, 9) Since then, the
organization has consolidated many activities, while divesting
some and gaining some others.
DLA, headquartered on Cameron Station, in Alexandria,
Virginia, became the largest Government Contract
Administration activity by any measure. As measured by
funding and personnel allocations, Contract Administration
became the largest part of DLA. The Contract Administration
Services (CAS) segment of DLA was responsible for providing
CAS to the Services, the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration (NASA) , other agencies of the Federal
Government, state organizations, and to foreign governments
under certain circumstances. (Ref. 9, p. 10)
The Director of DLA was established as a three star
military position, rotated between the Services. The
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Director reported directly to the Assistant Secretary of
Defense (Acquisition and Logistics) . DLA has two Deputy
Directors, one for Supply Operations, and the other for
Acquisition Management. Within the Deputy Directorate for
Acquisition are the Quality Assurance Directorate and the
Contract Management Directorate. These are the two major
directorates involved in Contract Administration.
Below the headquarters level, DLA was broken down
further, into nine DCAS Regions (DCASRs) . Each DCASR
contained functional Directorates in: Contract
Administration; Quality Assurance; Production; Financial
Management; and Plant Representative Offices. Initially,
Plant Representative Offices, located within contractor
plants, were not under DCAS cognizance, but many were later
added to the organization. (Ref. 10, p. 15) Each DCASR was
subdivided into DCAS Management Areas (DCASMAs) . Figure 1
diagrams the DLA/DCAS organizational structure.
Each DCASR was responsible to DLA Headquarters for
management of all assigned CAS within a geographic region. As
illustrated in Figure 2, the geographic locations of DCASR
headquarters offices included Los Angeles, Dallas, New York,
Boston, St. Louis, Philadelphia, Cleveland and Chicago.
Initially, there were eleven DCASRs, however, in 1976 two of
them (San Francisco and Detroit) were consolidated into the
Los Angeles and Cleveland DCASRs, respectively. (Ref. 10, p.
15)
15
Two of the DCASR Commanders were flag officers, while the
































Figure 1 DLA STRUCTURE
The DCASR Commander for a particular region tended to be from
the Service with the largest volume of active contracts in
that particular region. Each geographic region (DCASR) was
subdivided into smaller areas which were under the cognizance
of Defense Contract Administration Services Management Area
(DCASMA) offices. Each of these offices typically managed
thousands of contracts with hundreds of separate contractors.
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Most of the administration performed by the DCASMAs was done
remotely, and by the use of itinerant personnel who would make
occasional visits to contractor facilities. These offices,
were commanded by 05 and 06 level officers of the various




Figure 2 DCASR OFFICES
Each DCASR also had cognizance of several Defense
Contract Administration Services Plant Representative Offices
(DCASPROs) . DCASPROs were co-located with large defense
contractors when a very large volume of Defense business was
done with that particular contractor, or, when the complexity
of the weapon systems being produced by the contractor
demanded a dedicated, multi-disciplinary team of Government
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Contract Administration personnel. DCASPROs were responsible
for administering any DOD or NASA contracts held by their
respective contractors. (Ref. 12, p. 33) The largest
single group of existing PROs were DCASPROs, numbering 47,
however certain PROs were directly under the cognizance of
either the Navy, Air Force or Army (Ref. 5, p. 3). In cases
where a Service could establish to the Under Secretary of
Defense for Research and Engineering that a contract for the
manufacturing of a major weapon system required close and
continuing liaison of that Service with the contractor, and
that Contract Administration by any other agency was not in
the best interest of the Government, the Services were allowed
to establish their own PROs at those locations (Ref. 12, p.
34) .
DCASPROs were usually established within the plants of
contractors which were performing work for more than one
particular Military Service. In most cases, where Service
PROs existed, the work being performed was primarily for one
Service. The Service PROs tended to be larger than the
DCASPROs, and performed a wider range of functions than
exclusively Contract Administration. Commanders of these PROs
were typically more senior (06 level) than those found in the
DCASPROs. Whereas the DCASPRO Commanders were usually Staff
Officers with backgrounds in Contracting, the Service PRO
Commanders were primarily Line Officers with technical
backgrounds. Many of the DCASPROs administered contracts
18
issued by a mixture of military Services. At some DCASPROs,
however, the majority of contracts administered belonged to
one particular Service. In those cases, the DCASPRO Commander
position tended to be reserved exclusively for officers from
the Service concerned.


















Figure 3 TYPICAL DCASPRO
There were two primary Divisions within the DCASPRO: the
Contract Management Division, and the Quality Assurance
Division. These Divisions were normally headed by senior
civilian personnel (GM-14 level) , who reported to the DCASPRO
Commander. The Contract Management Division consisted of five
Branches, each headed by a civilian: Contract Operations;
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Financial Services; Production and Industrial Resources;
Systems and Engineering. The Quality Assurance Division
consisted of two primary Branches headed by civilians:
Operations, and Operations Support. Where applicable,
DCASPROs also had a Flight Operations Branch.
In examining the structure of the DCAS organization, and
particularly, the DCASPROs, it is important to realize what
Stanley Sherman points out in his text on Contract Management:
In organizing Contract Administration, government actions
have been guided by two factors: the effort to achieve
administrative economy, and efficiency and unwillingness
to rely on executive discretion. This has resulted in an
organization primarily designed to have checks and
oversight functions; the management of contracting work
is secondary. This orientation exists because the buying
process provides opportunities for poor judgment, error,
and fraudulent behavior. These opportunities are always
present because key decisions both before and after
contract award cannot be made on the basis of purely
objective criteria. ..
.
This is difficult for elected
public bodies, such as Congress, to accept . (Ref. 11, p.
69) (underline emphasis added)
Within DCASPROs, the ACO was responsible for ensuring
that assigned contracts were administered in accordance with
DCAS/Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement
(DFARS)/FAR guidelines, through the use of the DCASPRO
organizational structure. Functional responsibilities for
Divisions and Branches within DCASPROs were described in
Defense Logistics Agency Manual (DLAM) 5810.1 (Organization of
DLA Field Activities Manual) (Ref. 13). Some DCASPROs
briefly described the overall functions of each Division and
Branch in individual organization manuals tailored to that
particular office.
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One DCASPRO manual contained the following descriptions for
the Commander and the two primary Divisions:
Office of the Commander: Plans, organizes, directs and
controls the utilization of manpower and other resources
to ensure effective and efficient accomplishment of the
mission assigned to the DCASPRO by the Commander, DCASR.
Contract Management Division: Acts as principal advisor
and assistant to the Commander, DCASPRO in directing the
accomplishment of the following responsibilities in the
administration of contracts: Contract Administration,
evaluation and negotiation; cost/price analysis;
production surveillance and engineering; property
management; and other functions as assigned.
Quality Assurance Division: Acts as the principal
advisor and assistant to the Commander, DCASPRO in the
implementation of the guality and reliability assurance
policy, programs and related techniques. Provides
technical, engineering and operational assistance in the
accomplishment of the assigned quality and reliability
assurance functions. Provides operational and
specialized technical engineering support as required in
areas of all technical specialties and disciplines and in
the field of measurement of test equipment and
instrumentation programs to include preservation,
packaging and packing. (Ref. 14, p. 7-12)
More detailed descriptions were provided for the various
subordinate Branches. Within a DCASPRO, the ACOs were located
within the Contract Operations Branch. They reported to a
Branch Head, who in turn reported to the Contract Management
Division Head. ACOs typically had a small team of Contract
Administrators as assistants. To fulfill their administrative
and contractual duties, the ACOs were required to request
assistance from specialists within the various other
functional Branches. These included Financial Services (for
Cost/Price Analysis), Systems and Engineering (for Technical
Analysis of Cost Proposals)
.
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The ACO worked through the matrix of other branches, as well,
to accomplish various other tasks.
C. THE DEFENSE CONTRACT ADMINISTRATION SERVICES ORGANIZATION
BECOMES THE DEFENSE CONTRACT MANAGEMENT COMMAND
This chapter began by briefly explaining that DCMC was
formed as the result of Defense Management Report Decision
(DMRD) 916. This ultimate decision was the result of one of
the many recommendations provided by the Secretary of Defense
in his "Defense Management Report to the President" of July
1989. Rather than recommend the consolidation of Contract
Administration within DLA, however, the Defense Management
Report recommended the creation on an entirely new agency.
This agency was to be called the Defense Contract Management
Agency (DCMA) . As stated in DMRD 916:
That document (referring to the Defense Management
Report) says that the plan to establish the DCMA must
"seek to streamline existing CAS organizations, promote
uniform procurement policy, and upgrade the quality of
the CAS work force while eliminating overhead and
reducing payroll costs . The plan should make appropriate
provision for continued technical and other support to
program offices. It should also preserve the existing
regulatory division of responsibilities between those of
administrative contracting officers, to be exercised
within the DCMA and those of procuring contracting
officers, which will continue to be exercised within the
Military Departments." (Ref. 15, p. 2) (underline
emphasis added)
DMRD 916 was made based on recommended alternatives
provided by the DCMA Task Force. The Task Force, which was
chartered on 14 August 1989, consisted of eight military and
four civilian DOD contracting personnel (primarily Flag and
Senior Executive level) . The Task Force was assisted by an
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advisory group of very senior, retired military and civilian
personnel. Working level assistance was provided by an
additional eighty-three personnel assigned to an
Organization/Mission Working Group and several subgroups. The
DCMA Task Force Charter was signed by Mr. John Betti, Under
Secretary of Defense (Acguisition) . The following excerpts
from the Charter outline responsibilities assigned to the Task
Force:
...DCMA Task Force shall prepare a time-phased
implementation plan for establishing the DCMA for review
and approval no later than September 15, 1989, by the
Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition) (USD (A)) and the
Deputy Secretary of Defense; and forwarding by October 1,
1989, to the Secretary of Defense for decision...
Define the mission, organization and staffing structure
relationships, responsibilities, and authorities of the
DCMA.
This should address CAS support of the Program Manager
and Program Executive Officer elements of the Program
Management chain. .
.
Of current in-plant resources, identify those resources
to be applied to establishing and operating the DCMA,
those to be retained by the Services to perform essential
non-CAS functions in support of programs, and those that
can be applied to meeting the Secretary's established
reduction goal contained in the referenced report to the
President. .
.
...ensure continuance of essential uninterrupted




...Propose a headquarters site and FY91-95 operating
budget projection for the DCMA. .
.
...Decide on the course of action to be recommended to
the USD (A) and Secretary of Defense as a result of Task
Force deliberations.
..
(Ref . 16, p. 2-4)
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As instructed, the Task Force met and developed a
detailed DCMA Implementation Plan. The Implementation Plan
began by recapping the Task Force's understanding of the
Charter, including a reference to the Defense Management
Report which stated:
. . .all DoD Contract Administration Services (CAS)
,
including those currently performed in the Defense
Logistics Agency (DLA) and the Military Departments, will
be consolidated under a newly created Defense Contract
Management Agency (DCMA) , which will report to the USD/A
and be charged with more efficiently and effectively
performing the CAS function. (Ref. 5, p. 1) (underline
emphasis added)
The plan presented a recommended structure for the new
organization, along with four alternative structures which
were considered. As the plan points out, the recommended
alternative structure "maximizes the use of existing
management structures, ..." (Ref . 5, p. 9). The similarity to
the previous DCAS structure is illustrated by Figure 4.
The most apparent changes are in the number of District
Headquarters Offices (formerly Region Headquarters) , and the
creation of Engineering and Program Support elements within
the structure. Instead of the nine Regions/DCASRs as DCAS
had, DCMA would have five Districts/District Offices as shown
in Figure 4. Additionally, the plan emphasized that:
Enhanced responsiveness to the technical and programmatic
needs of the Services would be provided by the
establishment of an Engineering and Program Support
element at the Headquarters, Districts, MAs (Management
Areas) and PROs (Ref. 5, p. 9).
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The Task Force recommended that DCMA be located in the
Washington, D.C. area, primarily due to the proximity of USD/A






















Figure 4 DCMA RECOMMENDATION
The plan provided that at the DCMA Headquarters level there
would be three major staff elements: Contracts Management;
Quality Assurance; Engineering and Program Support. At the
District Office level, these same elements would be
established as functional directorates. Within the Management
Areas and PROs, these same major elements were to be called
functional divisions.
The plan did not specify which cities the District
Headquarters would be located in, however, it did provide a
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map showing recommended District areas. A reproduction of
this map is shown as Figure 5. It was recommended that
International CAS come under the cognizance of the
Northeastern District.
CAS - FAR EAST
CAS-
EUROPE
Figure 5 DCMA DISTRICTS
The plan provided detailed personnel and budget
projections. Plans for payment and Management Information
Systems were described. These included the use of the DLA
Finance Center (DFC) and the DCAS Mechanization of Contract
Administration Services (MOCAS) system. As stated in the
plan:
The DCMC plan is to transition all Contract
Administration workload to a standard automated system
that is basically MOCAS. (Ref. 5, p. 17)
The issue of providing adequate support to critical
weapon systems was discussed.
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The plan recommended establishment of a Program Integrator
(PI) function for this purpose. The plan recommends, that:
A Program Integrator, typically an engineer, will be
appointed at each DCMA field office administering major
or critical DoD programs to coordinate all technical
aspects of DCMA support... The Program Integrator's
principal responsibilities will be to work closely with
program offices to identify priorities and emphasis
areas; (Ref. 5, p. 19) (underline emphasis added)
The plan went on to recommend a transition timetable,
beginning with Secretary of Defense approval of the plan in
January 1990, and establishment of DCMA as a command in
October 1990. All CAS personnel from the Services were to
also be transferred into DCMA as of October 1990. A prototype
District was to be operating, with the remaining Districts
coming on line in fiscal year 91. The plan also included
personnel impact projections. Initial savings were projected
to be 827 personnel positions. (Ref. 17, p. 3)
In summary, the DCMA Implementation Plan provided a
thorough, yet concise compilation of Task Force evaluations
and recommendations. It provided several alternatives,
including the favored recommendation for the structure of the
new agency. Detailed budget exhibits for the recommended
alternative were provided. A viable plan for the
consolidation of CAS into a single, new agency was ready for
implementation.
The DCMA Task Force recommendations were evaluated and
discussed in Defense Management Report Decision (DRMD) 916.
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The DRMD noted that the Task Force plan would provide savings
of $422 million over five years. The DMRD noted that:
An additional $29.5 million could be saved over the five-
year period, if the Contract Administration consolidation
took place in DLA instead of creating a new agency. This
action would be less disruptive than the creation of the
new agency, and would provide the consolidation called
for by the DMR. . .
.
The primary benefit of the creation of a new agency is
one of perception. The Services do not believe that DLA
is responsive to their requirements. However, there is
no quantification of that perception. .
.
However, perceptions can be very important. The question
is: is improved perception worth the cost and disruption
that will result by the creation of a new agency, when
the same organization can be achieved within the existing
structure? (Ref. 15, p. 1-5)
The DRMD rationalized that, if, as the Task Force had assumed,
the current DLA staff was large enough that it could be split
into two agencies, it would therefore be too large if the
decision was made to keep CAS within DLA. The DMRD staffers
"estimated that a 15 percent savings in management overhead
costs will occur if the DCMA function is retained within DLA
vice creating a separate CAS agency." (Ref. 15, p. 6)
Based on the foregoing analysis, the final decision of
DMRD 916 was to consolidate CAS within the existing DLA
structure. (Ref. 15, p. 1) Most of the ideas generated and
published in the implementation plan were retained, even
though a separate new agency was not formed. (Ref. 18) On 22
June, 1990, a Master Memorandum of Agreement (MMOA) was signed
by the Secretary of the Navy and the Director, DLA. The
stated purpose of the MMOA was to "transfer responsibility for
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performance of Contract Administration Services (CAS)" for an
attached list of NAVPROs. The MMOA was very general,
addressing primarily personnel and financial transfers. Of
particular note, was a section of the MMOA which addressed the
transfer of Contract Disbursement functions. It stated, in
part:
Contracts currently administered by the thirteen Navy
Plant Representative Offices will be reassigned for
payment and data base maintenance to the DLA Finance
Center (DFC) or DCMR specified in each annex, in
accordance with the following guidelines:
(1) All new contracts and ordering agreements issued
after 23 June 1990, and contracts for which there have
been no deliveries or payments as of 23 June 1990 will be
assumed by DLA on that date.
(2) Contracts on which either deliveries or payments
have been made will continue to be paid by the Department
of the Navy and will be transferred to DLA as they are
reconciled.
.. (Ref . 19)
Transfer of Navy Contract Administration Services (CAS)
functions into DCMC was effective as of 24 June 1990 (Ref.
19) . The Navy did, however, maintain a presence at the
former NAVPROs by establishing what were called Navy Technical
Representative Detachments (NTRDs) . These detachments existed
to perform certain contract ordering tasks which DCMC did not
feel were normal CAS delegations under FAR Part 42.302. The
NTRDs were dissolved, however and a subsequent MMOA was signed
which specifically listed what delegations the DPROs would
accept. These, and other significant changes and impacts are
discussed in greater detail in Chapter IV.
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D. SUMMARY
The Defense Contract Administration organization
currently in existence is the result of many years of
evolution. Most of the evolutionary changes have been the
result of continuing Government efforts to operate
economically, while ensuring adeguate controls exist within
the CAS structure to deter fraud and poor judgment. The long-
term trend has been toward greater consolidation, ostensibly
as a means of gaining economies of scale, while establishing
a uniform, single face to industry. The DCAS organization,
which existed within DLA, exemplified this trend. DCAS was a
large, uniform organization. It performed in-plant CAS
functions at many locations through the use of DCASPROs.
Under special circumstances, military Services were allowed to
establish Service unigue PROs with certain major contractors.
These Service PROs often utilized policies and procedures
which were quite different from those of the other Service's
PROs and DCAS.
Most recently, further evolution has resulted in the
disestablishment of DCAS and the establishment of the DCMC.
The most recent changes were part of broad efforts to
implement the recommendations provided by the Secretary of
Defense in his "Defense Management Report to the President" of
July 1989. Those recommendations included the establishment
of a new, streamlined agency for Contract Administration,
while reducing costs, promoting uniform policies and providing
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program support. The DCMC was established within DLA, rather
than as a separate agency. Cost savings were cited as the
reason for not creating a new agency. The DCMC structure
resembles that which was proposed for the new agency. It also
resembles that of the former DCAS organization, but has fewer
geographic divisions (now referred to as Districts) . Another
major difference is a structural orientation toward the
support of program offices.
The following chapter contains the results of extensive
surveys of PCOs, ACOs, PMs and industry personnel concerning





Questionnaires were sent to NAVAIR PCOs, NAVAIR PMs, DPRO
ACOs and their industry counterparts. Distribution was
limited to those PCOs and PMs who worked with DPROs which were
formerly NAVAIR NAVPROs , ACOs of the DPROs which were formerly
NAVAIR NAVPROs, and corporate divisions subject to the on-site
cognizance of the former NAVPROs. The corporations and
related DPROs included: McDonnell-Douglas; Grumman Aerospace
Corp.; General Electric Company (Aircraft Engines Business
Group) ; and Sikorsky Aircraft Division. These individuals
were considered the "process owners" of field Contract
Administration for major NAVAIR contracts. The first round of
surveys, sent only to ACOs and PCOs in May 1991, is referred
to as the "early surveys". In the early surveys, there were
many PCO responses, however information was gathered from only
two DPROs. The second round of surveys went to PCOs, PMs,
ACOs and industry. Many PCOs, PMs and all DPROs surveyed
responded to the latest survey. Industry responses were
obtained through their respective DPROs, except for Grumman,
which was obtained directly from the corporation. The second
round, which was distributed in November 1991 is referred to
as the "latest surveys". The guestions for the early surveys
were derived through an extensive review of DLA and DCMC
internal correspondence regarding the development of DCMC and
the transition of Service PROs into DCMC. The early surveys
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were designed to elicit maximum discussion in order to isolate
any issues which might merit further research. The literature
review revealed a strong DCMC emphasis on forging a new,
streamlined Contract Management organization by restructuring
the previous DCAS organization and integrating the former
Service PROs into the new organization. The new organization
was intended to be more effective and efficient, despite major
reductions in aggregate personnel end strength. The premise
that Contract Administration support to customers would not be
degraded was prominent in descriptions of the new
organization.
The fact that NAVAIR was losing management control of its
PROs was sure to have implications for the PCO/ACO
relationship as it formerly existed. The research sought to
test how customers would actually characterize the impact of
the transition on their operations. ACOs within DCMC were
also asked to describe what they viewed as likely impacts on
their relationships with PCOs and their ability to support
them.
The latest survey questions focused on issues brought out
in responses to the early surveys, as well as issues gleaned
from pertinent literature. To gauge how attitudes were
evolving as the transition progressed, some of the questions
in the latest survey concerned subjects similar to those in
the early survey.
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The survey questions and results are listed below,
including a discussion of the basis of each question, the
results obtained and sample responses. In most cases, similar
responses are grouped, and displayed in descending order of
frequency on separate bar charts. In other cases, the
responses are simply listed. The early surveys are presented
first followed by the latest survey.
B. EARLY PROCURING CONTRACTING OFFICER SURVEYS
1. Question One: Impacts of Role Changes
In what ways do you feel the transition of NAVPROs
into DCMC will impact your role as PCO? (e.g., the effects on
efficiency and ability to prioritize workload within DPRO's
matrix management structure)
a. Discussion: Initial research via telephone
interviews indicated that the transition of the NAVPROs to
DPROs was causing PCOs to lose much of their previous ability
to influence NAVPRO ACO priorities (i.e. what to work on
first) to satisfy program needs. It was also apparent that a
Memorandum of Agreement detailing exactly what additional
Contract Administration functions (other than the normal
functions listed in FAR part 42.302) the DPROs would perform
had not been executed. At that time, DCMC was not agreeable
to issuing new Provisioned Item Orders or Basic Ordering
Agreement Orders. NAVAIR attempted to maintain the same type
of field services as had existed with the NAVPRO by
establishing NTRDs at the plants, ostensibly to perform the
functions which the DPRO would not. Question one was asked to
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obtain PCO views on impacts expected or actually experienced
from the NAVPRO/DPRO transition.
b. Results: Figure 6 graphically illustrates the
frequency of various impacts foreseen by PCOs questioned.
The most frequent response involved concern that
PCO workloads would be negatively impacted if the DPRO would
not agree to issue PIO and BOA orders as the NAVPRO had.
- PKD/BOA Order Responsibility
- No Impact
- Ability to Prioritize
-Don't know
- Reduced Support/Workforce
- Change in Pay Office
- Policy Conflicts
MOCAS Impacts on Workload
improved Mgmt by DCMC
Figure 6 13 RESPONDENTS/l 8 COMMENTS
This was related to concerns about the NTRD's ability to
perform the order issuing functions as illustrated by the
following sample responses:
. . .Everyone is concerned that the NTRDs are not going to
be able provide the extensive services with respect to
issuing orders that NAVPROs used to. This could cause
some workload problems at Headquarters.
The effect of the transition will vary depending on the
willingness of the DPRO to assume ordering tasks which
NAVAIR has traditionally delegated to the ACO.
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The next most frequent response was that there
was no foreseen impact to the PCO. The following is a sample
response:
Do not foresee any huge impact - have noticed nothing so
far.
The next most frequent response indicated that
the DPRO might be less responsive to Navy attempts to
prioritize DPRO work.
Sample PCO responses follow:
The NAVPRO was considered a F-14 team member and reacted
quickly to Program needs. Although it is too early to
comment now, we believe this relationship will erode with
time and responsiveness will diminish.
It will diminish, over time my ability to influence or
prioritize DPRO activities. In the short term, the DPRO
workforce continues to have an affinity for NAVAIR
priorities, however, this can be expected to dissipate as
DLA management asserts itself.
The remaining various comments to this question
indicated PCOs: didn't know what impacts to expect; expected
reduced support due to DCMC workforce reductions; were feeling
impacts in the way contracts had to be written, due to paying
offices changing; expected pricing policy conflicts between
the Navy and DCMC; were experiencing workload increases in
accommodating Mechanization of Contract Administration
Services (MOCAS) requirements; hoped for positive impacts
from DCMC management controls.
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2. Question Two: Effectiveness of Program Integrators
How effective will the new DPRO "Program
Integrators" be in meeting the needs of their external
customers?
a. Discussion: Early discussions with DCMC
personnel indicated that "Program Integrators" being
established within DCMC and the PROs would be chartered to
provide responsive program support. This was also indicated
in DLA correspondence which stated:
Enhanced responsiveness to the technical and programmatic
needs of the Services will be provided through a new
Engineering and Program Support element at the Command
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Figure 7 13 RESPONDENTS/ 13 COMMENTS
Question two was asked to determine PCO familiarity and
opinions (if any) regarding the value of "Program Integrators"
within the DPROs.
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b. Results: Figure 7 graphically displays the
results of this guestion.
The most common response indicated that the PCO
was not acguainted with a DPRO position called "Program
Integrator". One PCO asked: "What are they and what will
they do?" Some who were familiar with the concept did not
foresee any change resulting from establishment of the
position. As an example, one PCO indicated:
DPRO Program Integrators are well intentioned but will
not be able to motivate/get support from an increasingly
insulated/detached DPRO matrix.
Some expected a positive impact:
The integrators are effective in motivating both NAVAIR
to respond to the field and vice versa. A definite plus!
To date I have no experience in using the "Program
Integrators". It appears to be a step in the right
direction.
3. Question Three: Impacts on Working Relationships
How does (or will) your relationship with the DPRO
ACO differ from your previous NAVPRO ACO relationship? (e.g.
types of actions delegated before and after change)
a. Discussion: The fact that the PROs would no
longer be in the NAVAIR chain-of-command had implications for
existing PCO/ACO relationships. Question three was designed
to gather information on changes in the PCO/ACO relationship.
The researcher felt that identification of any problems would
facilitate recommendations for a smoother transition.
b. Results: Figure 8 graphically illustrates the
responses to this guestion.
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Most of the comments on the reduction in ACO
delegation acceptances referred to the issuance of PIO and BOA
orders. Some other issues were mentioned as well. The
following are sample responses:
The ACOs will not issue orders under BOAs or provisioned
items since DLA considers these new procurement.
Our observation has been that DPRO has divested itself
with any warranty administration and contract funding
monitoring responsibilities in addition to the issuance
of orders.
Subcontractor plans are now being sent here for approval.
Less Delegation Acceptance
No Change
Negative Effect of NTRD
Less Navy Priority/Support
wwwwwiwtwaauM
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Figure 8 13 RESPONDENTS/ 15 COMMENTS
Some PCOs identified the assumption of order
issuing responsibilities by the NTRDs as a negative change.
The following example illustrates:
ACO is no longer issuing orders. NTRDs have been
established for this purpose. I am fearful that NTRDs
will not be able to provide the "coordinated" services
that the ACO used to under NAVPRO.
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Other comments reflected concern with support
provided by the DPRO ACOs:
Navy work will not have priority as in the old system.
The DLA management reporting systems "grade" ACOs on the
time required to accomplish various Contract
Administration actions and not on the level of support
provided to PCOs and program of f ices. . . DLAM 8105.1
provides an internal focus to the Contract Administration
process.
4. Question Four: Impacts on Approval Requirements
Were there any ACO actions requiring PCO approval
that ceased after DCMC transition?
a. Discussion: Question four was designed to
gather information on whether DCMC had assumed responsibility
for any approvals which had formerly been made by NAVAIR PCOs.
b. Results: The only change noted was from a PCO
who stated:
Clearance approval for actions over $10M. These were
rare.
5. Question Five: Impacts on Priorities
Have you noticed a change in the ACO's priorities
since the transition to DCMC? (e.g., is Contract
Administration now a greater priority?)
a. Discussion: Question five was asked with the
assumption that ACO priorities might become oriented toward
the objectives of DCMC rather than the Navy. The question
sought to elicit information on what PCOs viewed as DCMC
priorities for ACOs.
b. Results: Figure 9 graphically illustrates the
results of this question. Most had seen no change in ACO
priorities. Most of those who did note changes identified
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DCMC management information reporting or the Mechanization of
Contract Administration Services system (MOCAS) as a new
priority for ACOs.
The following are sample responses:
Meeting the DLA management reporting goals is now the
primary focus.
Yes. The MOCAS system input is definitely a priority.
Another PCO noted:
The ACO is reguired to prioritize on a first in first out
basis. Apparently all actions have the same importance.
• No Change
• Mgmt. Info. Reports/MOCAS
- First-in First-out Work
Scheduling Method
• DCMC Mgmt Priorities
- Unknown
Figure 9 13 RESPONDENTS/ 13 COMMENTS
6. Question Six: Performance Appraisal Input
Did you have input to ACO performance appraisals
under NAVPRO? Does PCO have input since NAVPRO became DPRO?
a. Discussion: Question six made the assumption
that if the PCO had the opportunity to provide inputs into the
ACO performance appraisals, then an increase in responsiveness
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from the ACO could be expected. If an ACO had been receiving
performance appraisal inputs from a PCO, and that practice was
discontinued under DCMC, the PCO might see less responsiveness
as a result.
b. Results: All but two PCOs responded that they
did not have input to NAVPRO ACO performance appraisals.
Those two indicated that it was at their own option to provide
input. All PCOs indicated that they had no input into ACO
performance appraisals under DCMC.
7. Question Seven: Memorandums of Understanding
A. Is there a memorandum of understanding (MOU)
between the ACO/PCO? If so, what agreements does it make?
B. Was there a memorandum of understanding
previously with NAVPRO? What types of agreements were in
previous MOU?
a. Discussion: Questions seven (A) and (B) were
designed to determine what agreements, if any, the PCO has
with the ACO under DCMC and what agreements, if any the PCO
formerly had with the ACO under the NAVPRO. The question
sought to establish if there were/are any blanket agreements
or unique agreements between PCOs and ACOs. Such agreements
would help clarify the relationship between the organizations
and settle conflicts.
b. Results: All PCOs indicated there had been no
MOUs between them and the NAVPRO ACOs. However, one reported
that each program had a specific MOU with NAVPRO personnel
which included a Contract Administration section, addressing
such functions as ACO issuance of orders.
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With respect to a MOU with the DPRO ACO, two
PCOs indicated knowledge of a MOU being drafted, but could not
specify the contents. Another PCO reported that an
understanding had been reached with the DPRO related to which
contracts would be transferred to MOCAS.
8. Question Eight: Impacts on Audit Issue Policies
What differences exist between navpro and DPRO
policies regarding Defense Contract Audit Agency (DCAA)
issues?
a. Discussion: The researcher felt that a change
in emphasis on DCAA issues might impact the rapidity of DPRO
action on PCO delegated work. This question was asked to
gather information regarding perceived differences between
DCMC versus Navy emphasis on DCAA recommendations.
- None Noticed
- Don't know/not sure
- Observed Impacts on Processing or
Coordination of Reports
- Possible Differences Expected
- DPRO Less Resistant to DCAA
pllll Bit1
Figure 10 13 RESPONDENTS/ 13 COMMENTS
b. Results: Figure 10 graphically illustrates the
results of this question.
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Most respondents either perceived no changes or
didn't know of any. The remaining PCOs had either observed
some changes/ impacts or expected possible changes in PRO
policies regarding DCAA issues.
Sample responses follow:
There are differences in processing acceptances through
the MOCAS system.
The only difference is now DPRO pricing, in lieu of the
ACO, coordinates audit reports.
DPRO is less inclined to resist/act in contravention of
DCAA recommendations.
9. Question Nine: Use of Process Action Teams
Are there any joint NAVAIR/DPRO Process Action Teams
working on inter-office contracting issues?
a. Discussion: Question nine was asked in
consideration of the recent Defense Department emphasis on
Total Quality Management (TQM) . The consolidation of Contract
Administration Services into a new organization would appear
to be a prime candidate for the use of TQM methods.
b. Results: None of the PCOs reported any
knowledge of official Process Action Teams working the
transition. One agreed that it would be a good idea, and
another mentioned that unofficially efforts were being
conducted between the program office and the DPRO.
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10. Question Ten: Impacts on Cost/Schedule Monitoring
Do you foresee any impact of the transition on
Cost/Schedule Control Systems Criteria C/SCSC monitoring by
the DPRO?
a. Discussion: Question ten was based on an
assumption that less emphasis might be placed on Cost/Schedule
monitoring by DCMC, since it was not experienced in monitoring
the status of contracts as large as those being turned over by
the Navy. Also, the Navy, being the funding activity for the
major contracts, as well as the program manager, may have had
more of a vested interest in maintaining strict control of
costs/schedules than DCMC would.
b. Results: Figure 11 graphically displays the
results of this question.
Figure 11 13 RESPOND. /COMMENTS
Most PCOs either did not foresee an impact on
C/SCSC monitoring or didn't know whether there would be an
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impact. Some who did expect an improvement in monitoring
indicated recent problems with the A- 12 aircraft program were
behind the improvements.
Sample responses follow:
It will be difficult for the DPRO to maintain the
technical expertise in C/SCSC. The NAVPROs lost many-
senior engineers when they converted to DPROs
.
More hands on by DPRO due to A- 12 horrors - hopefully
fewer mistakes/more vigilance in the future.
Yes. . .technical assets (e.g. Industrial Engineers,
Engineers, Quality Assurance) and Cost Analyst assets are
going to be more attuned to program tracking.
Administrative monitoring is likely to draw time away
from program related contracting actions.
11. Question Eleven: Observed Industry Reactions
Please describe any industry reaction you have
observed regarding the NAVPRO/DPRO transition.
a. Discussion: The transition has forced industry
to discontinue long-term relationships with Service PROs which
were direct links to the Service program offices. A review of
associated correspondence revealed plans to "disengage from
contractor oversight where it makes sense." (Ref. 21, p.l)
A reduction of oversight might be expected to be
received favorably by industry. However, other correspondence
points up the "Need to address such things as: "Continued
support to a "worried" contractor" (Ref. 3). This question
was designed to obtain PCO views and insights regarding
industry reactions.
b. Results: Figure 12 graphically displays the
results of this question. Although the most common response
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was that PCOs had seen no reaction from industry, the
remainder provided a wide variety of reactions.
Sample responses follow:
Sikorsky is concerned with the backlog of actions
currently performed by the NTRDs who are not sufficient
in number to accommodate all of the actions on their
plate. Seem not to have support from DPRO or NAVAIR.
GAC was primarily concerned about prompt payment. NAVPRO
had been turning reguests around very guickly. Since the
transition, I haven't heard any complaints about this.
Sikorsky has taken advantage of the NAVPRO-DPRO
transition and the creation of the NTRD to sow confusion







Figure 12 13 RESPONDENTS/ 14 COMMENTS
12. Question Twelve: Suggestions
What suggestions would you make toward optimizing
the effectiveness of the new NAVAIR/DPRO contracting
relationship?
a. Discussion: This question was intended to
collect beneficial ideas from those closest to the contracting
process.
47
The ideas collected could then be synthesized into
recommendations linked to the primary conclusions of the
study.
b. Results: Figure 13 graphically displays the
results of this question. There were a wide variety of
suggestions provided in response to this question. The most
common responses suggested that improving communications is
the key to optimizing the NAVAIR/DPRO relationship. Some felt
that allowing the DPROs the discretion to accept whatever
types of delegated work within their capacity would provide
the best program support.
Sample responses follow:
To stress the importance of Post-award conferences. Use
these to sort out and correct contractual and
organizational problems.
Perhaps a MOU at DLA/NAVAIR level outlining what can and
cannot be delegated by NAVAIR, and if the former, what
NAVAIR will provide to ACO along with the delegation
(support documentation, etc.).
More communication. Have the DPRO comment on major draft
contracts before they are executed if the DPRO will be
administering. Many of these questions are premature.
I think in a year or two I would have better insight.
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- Communicate more. Conduct
Pre/post Award Conferences
•None
- ADow each DPRO flexibility to \
accept all delegations as possible
f
Concentrate order issuance
responsibility in one organization





woddoacyieadtime impact of order
issuance question
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Figure 13 13 RESPONDENTS/ 15 COMMENTS
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13. Summary
The early PCO surveys revealed several important
points. These points may be categorized as factors related to
two general areas of change. These include organizational
structure/roles, and organizational priorities. These points
are discussed below. Although PCO perceptions as DPRO
customers are important, ACOs are in perhaps the best position
to observe the changes brought about by the consolidation.
From their vantage point, ACOs probably in the best positions
to project future impacts of the transition. The following
section describes the results of early ACO surveys.
a. Structure and Roles
In the area of organizational structure and
roles, PCOs indicated considerable concern over the issue of
who would perform the role of issuing PIO and BOA orders.
They seemed particularly concerned that they might be forced
to add this function to their own workloads if a solution were
not found.
Another interesting finding in this area, was
that most PCOs were not familiar with the Program Integrator
function within the DPROs. This seemed unusual, considering
the importance DCMC had been attaching to the function in the
literature reviewed.
Significantly, no PCOs reported having MOUs with
their ACOs. Some form of MOU seems appropriate for the
purpose of clarifying working relationships.
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One PCO recommended a MOU at the NAVAIR/DLA level addressing
DPRO delegations.
Some PCOs indicated that the DPROs needed enough
organizational flexibility to accept as many types of
delegations as they can feasibly perform.
Perhaps the most significant finding related to
role relationships was that many PCOs felt that communications
were lacking. Some PCOs indicated that more emphasis needed




Many PCOs had noticed a change in organizational
priorities within the PRO. Most notably, the MOCAS system and
associated reporting requirements had been given high
priorities within the DPRO.
Another significant finding was the fact that
ACOs were apparently being required, as a new practice, to
prioritize their workloads on a first-in, first out basis.
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C. EARLY ADMINISTRATIVE CONTRACTING OFFICER SURVEY:
Early ACO questionnaire responses were only available
from two DPROs, Grumman and McDonnell-Douglas. Each of these
DPROs provided single responses containing an extensive
discussion of each question. The primary points brought out
in each response are presented below:
1. Question One: Impacts of Role Changes
In what ways do you feel the transition of NAVPROs
into DCMC will impact your role as ACO? (e.g., the effects on
efficiency and ability to prioritize workload within DPRO's
management structure)
a. Discussion: Question one was designed to obtain
information on role changes being experienced by ACOs. ACOs
who had previously worked in the NAVPRO organization would
likely have insight into the impact of role changes on their
ability to support programs.
b. Results: The major points emphasized in
response to this question were:
1. In the long-term, efficiency would be degraded due to:
a. Restructuring along functional lines.
Taking the "pricing" function out of ACO teams and moving
it to a Financial Services Branch, will result in delays
to negotiations due to the time it will now take to get
a pricing report. This will increase the undef initized
order backlog.
b. "Concentration on the age of orders only, and not the
age and dollar value."
The NAVPROs prioritized workload based on both the age,
and the dollar values of contractual actions. The DPROs
prioritize primarily on the basis of age.
2. Management has been enhanced through delegation of
ACO warrants to more personnel.
By issuing warrants to many more personnel below the
Branch Chief level, the Branch Chief may now spend less
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time reviewing and signing contractual actions, and more
time managing.
Sample responses follow:
...in the 1983-1985 timeframe this office (then a NAVPRO)
had an undef initized order backlog of over one billion
dollars. .. .This large backlog did not occur through poor
management, but rather as a factor of McAir being the
largest and only defense contractor with five major
programs. . .Because we had the latitude, under
NAVAIRSYSCOM, we were able to adjust/modify our ways of
doing business that best accomplished a drastic reduction
to the backlog over a period of years to the manageable
level of just under two hundred million dollars. The
biggest single contributor to the reduction was allowing
each program to do their own pricing.
The DCMC structure enables former NAVPRO ACOs (who were
also Branch Chiefs) to delegate routine ACO signatory
functions, in that it calls for ACO warrants at the
working level (GS-12). On the positive side , this
provides more time for management functions.
2. Question Two: Effectiveness of Program Integrators
How effective will establishment of the new DPRO
"Program Integrator" positions be in meeting the needs of
their external customers?
a. Discussion: Question two was asked to obtain
ACO opinions as to the value of establishing Program
Integrator functions in the DPRO as a means of ensuring strong
customer support.




No impact or apparent impact yet
.
2. Impact will not be evident to customers, since this
position already existed in the NAVPROs under the name




The effectiveness will be transparent to the customer.
The "Program Integrator" is not a new position, per se,
simply the renaming of a Navy position.
At the present time there is no discernable impact. Only
time will tell what the "value added" will be for program
Integrators.
3. Question Three: Impacts on Working Relationships
How does (or will) your relationship with the NAVAIR
PCO differ from the relationship prior to the NAVPRO becoming
a DPRO? (e.g. types of actions delegated before and after
change)
a. Discussion: The fact that the PROs would no
longer be in the NAVAIR chain-of-command had implications for
existing PCO/ACO relationships. Question three was designed
to gather information on changes in the PCO/ACO relationship.
Identification of any problems will facilitate recommendations
for a smoother transition.
b. Results: The primary points brought out in
response to this question follow:
1. Will not be issuing PIO/BOA orders.
Previously, the NAVPRO would receive taskings from NAVAIR
to issue Provisioned Item Orders (PIOs) against items
listed in NAVAIR annual contracts. These items included
spares, technical manuals, ground support equipment and
logistical support items. The NAVPRO would issue either
fully priced orders, or unpriced orders which would be
subsequently definitized.
2. More autonomy for ACOs
.
Since the DPRO is not a NAVAIR activity, ACOs may not be
under the same pressure to react to what some viewed as
crisis management by NAVAIR personnel. DPRO personnel
presumed this would allow them to plan their own workload
and thus, become more efficient.
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Sample responses follow:
The biggest impact will be that the ACO will not have any
provisioning delegations. We will not be writing orders
for new work, simply definitizing work already on
contract. Now the PCO will have to write the orders
directly or delegate the writing to... the NTRD. It does
not make sense to have extra personnel doing a task that
an in-house org already had the expertise to do.
More autonomy will presumably allow ACOs to act more
independently and efficiently than before.
4. Question Four: Impacts on Approval Requirements
Were there any ACO actions requiring PCO approval
that ceased after DCMC transition?
a. Discussion: Question four was designed to
gather information as to whether DCMC had assumed
responsibility for any approvals which had formerly been made
by NAVAIR PCOs.
b. Results: The primary points brought out in
response to this question are as follows:
1. PCO approval of Pre- and Post-negotiation positions
over $10 million formerly required PCO approval, now are
approved within DCMC.
2. Reduced efficiency due to review board requirements.
DCMC has lower thresholds at which contractual actions
must be approved by a review board. Since most of the
actions within the DPRO will meet the board threshold,
this requirement will cause delays.
A sample response follows:
The only ACO actions requiring PCO approval were the
processing of pre/post negotiation business clearances
over $10M. This ceased with the advent of DLA. Now,
even though local, the dollar threshold for approval
starts at $250,000. All cases involving dollars of
$500,000 or more are supposed to be presented to a board
of contract review. Since most cases (95%) at this
contractor exceed that amount, the board will be another
inefficiency or slow down to the process.
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5. Question Five: Impacts on Priorities
Have you noticed a change in organizational goals or
priorities since the transition to DCMC (e.g. number of UCAs,
delivery surveillance, etc.)
a. Discussion: Question five was asked with the
assumption that ACO priorities might become oriented toward
the objectives of DCMC rather than the Navy. The question
sought to elicit information on what ACOs viewed as DCMC
priorities.
b. Results: The major points brought out in
response to this question follow:
1. Delivery surveillance has become more of a priority
under DCMC.
2. Maintenance of the DCMC Mechanization of Contract
Administration Services system (MOCAS) is now a priority.
MOCAS enforces discipline needed to close-out contracts,
but is labor intensive.
3. NAVAIR emphasis was on dollars undef initized and
urgency of requirements. DCMC has shifted emphasis to
numbers of overaged, undef initized contracts, and
contracts requiring close-out. Close-outs were not a
major NAVAIR concern.
A sample response follows:
There has been a drastic change in goals... DLA bogies are
unrealistic at this size contractor. When you are
definitizing 200 to 300 orders a year valued between
$10,000 all the up to $50,000,000, it is unrealistic to
expect that orders over 180 days old can be kept under 4%
to 8% of your total orders on hand... As mentioned
earlier, the bogies don't even consider the dollar value
or the urgency of some requirements.
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6. Question Six: Impacts on Lines of Authority
How have your lines of authority within DPRO changed
since the transition? How do these changes impact your
effectiveness?
a. Discussion: Review of DCMC implementation plans
and related correspondence indicated changes were taking place
in the structure and lines of authority of the PROs . This
included the movement of Industrial Engineers and other
technical personnel into a new division to be called the
Program and Technical Support Division. Question six was
designed to obtain further information and ACO reactions to
the changes.
b. Results: The following changes were brought out
in response to this question:
1. NAVPRO had separate Negotiators and Contract
Administrators. DPRO Contract Administrators are all
tasked with both negotiating and routine administration
duties
.
2. NAVPRO had five major divisions. DPRO combines
functions into three major divisions. Some personnel
from the NAVPRO Industrial Divisions and Management
Support Divisions were subsumed by the Contracts
Management Division, making it much larger than before.
A Program and Technical Support Division was established.
3. Cost and Price analysis functions were previously
done by the negotiators. That function was entirely
segregated into a dedicated Financial Services Branch,
under the Contracts Management Division.
4. ACOs were reportedly receiving a high volume of
requests from DCMC for types of data which were proving
very difficult to provide.
Sample responses follow:
How do these changes sit with people? Some like having
the warrant and responsibility that go with it. The
complaints center around too many short-fused data calls
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(involving data that are sometimes difficult or nearly
impossible to generate: example: number of contract line
items with delinquent deliveries, when many of our pre-
June 1990 contracts are not in MOCAS) , too laborious a
database, and conflicting priorities between serving the
customer and answering the mail on administrative
matters.
7. Question Seven: Memorandums of Understanding
A. Is there a Memorandum Of Understanding between
the ACO/PCO? If so, what agreements does it make? Was there
a memorandum of understanding previously with NAVAIR?
B. What types of agreements were in previous MOU?
a. Discussion: Questions seven (A) and (B) were
designed to determine what agreements, if any, the PCO has
with the ACO under DCMC and what agreements, if any, the PCO
formerly had with the ACO under the NAVPRO . The question
sought to establish if there were/are any blanket agreements
or unique agreements between PCOs and ACOs . Such agreements
would help clarify the relationship between the organizations
and settle conflicts.
b. Results: The DPROs were not aware of any
present or previous MOUs.
8. Question Eight: Impacts on Audit Issue Policies
What differences exist between NAVPRO and DPRO
policies regarding DCAA issues?
a. Discussion: The researcher felt that a change
in emphasis on DCAA issues might impact the rapidity of DPRO
action on PCO delegated work.
b. Results: None noted.
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9. Question Nine: Uses of Process Action Teams
Are there any joint NAVAIR/DPRO Process Action Teams
working on inter-office contracting issues?
a. Discussion: Question nine was asked in
consideration of the recent Defense Department emphasis on
Total Quality Management (TQM) . The consolidation of Contract
Administration Services into a new organization would appear
to be a prime candidate for the use of TQM methods.
b. Results: No joint NAVAIR/DPRO Process Action
Teams were known to exist, however, internal NAVPRO/DPRO teams
existed, as well as joint NAVAIR/Contractor teams.
10. Question Ten: Impacts on Cost/Schedule Monitoring
Do you foresee any impact of the transition on
C/SCSC monitoring by the DPRO?
a. Discussion: Question ten was based on an
assumption that less emphasis might be placed on Cost/Schedule
monitoring by DCMC, since it was not experienced in monitoring
the status of contracts as large as those being turned over by
the Navy. Also, the Navy, as the funding activity/program
manager for the major contracts may have had more of a vested
interest in maintaining strict control of costs/schedules than
DCMC would.
b. Results: On programs where C/SCSC is reguired,
more aggressive monitoring is being practiced, probably more
as a result of the A-12 program problems than the transition.
The following is a sample response:
The C/SCSC monitoring by the DPRO has become more
intensified and centralized under our Program Integrator
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Division basically as a result of lessons learned on the
now defunct A- 12 program rather than being the result of
the NAVPRO/DPRO transition.
11. Question Eleven: Observed Industry Reactions
Please describe any industry reaction you have
observed regarding the NAVPRO/DPRO transition.
a. Discussion: The transition is forcing industry
to discontinue long-term relationships with Service PROs which
were direct links to the Service program offices. A review of
associated correspondence reveals plans to "disengage from
contractor oversight where it makes sense." (Ref. 21, p.l) A
reduction of oversight might be expected to be received
favorably by industry. However, other correspondence points
up the "Need to address such things as: Continued support to
a "worried" contractor". (Ref. 3) This question was designed
to obtain ACO views and insights regarding Industry reactions.
b. Results: Only one DPRO noted any contractor
reaction to the transition.
Observed Contractor reactions include:
1. Concern with DCMC's ability to act quickly on
progress payment requests and invoice billings.
2. Contractor prefers MOCAS method of electronic funds
transfer to manual payment method.
The following is a sample response:
This contractor sweats bullets over cash flow and the
time value of money, as I'm sure others do. DFAS has to
do as good or better than the former payment offices or
the contractor community will be howling.
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12. Question Twelve: Suggestions
What suggestions would you make toward optimizing
the effectiveness of the new NAVAIR/DPRO contracting
relationship?
a. Discussion: This question was intended to
collect beneficial ideas from those closest to the contracting
process. The ideas collected could then be synthesized into
recommendations linked to the primary conclusions of the
study.
b. Results: Suggestions included:
1. DLA recognition that the new DPROs are cognizant of
much larger contractors than DLA is used to overseeing.
2. That DLA realize that the DPROs cognizant of the
larger contractors must be allowed the flexibility to
operate differently than the smaller PROs
.
3. Resolution of the PIO ordering problem.
The following is a sample response:
With the loss of order writing and requirements placing,
NAVAIR has had to go to a layering of and in some
instances duplication of efforts at the PRO level. The
contractor is answering and coordinating with two
different organizations at the PRO level (DPRO and NTRD)
.
13. Summary
The early ACO surveys revealed several important
points. These points may be categorized as factors related to
three general areas of change. These include organizational
structure/roles, MIS/Control systems, and organizational
priorities. These points are discussed below. The sections
which follow this summary provide the results of the latest
surveys of PCOs, ACOs, industry and PMs, respectively.
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a. Structure and Roles
A major change in structure and roles was the
creation of Financial Services Branches within the new DPROs
for the purpose of performing all Cost and Price Analysis.
Previously the NAVPRO negotiators had performed these
functions themselves. Feedback from one DPRO indicated that
this was a negative change, since it would cause delays in
negotiations due to negotiators having to wait for pricing
reports from the Financial Services Branch.
In a related role change, DPRO feedback
indicated that previously, NAVPROs had separate groups of
personnel performing negotiations and routine Contract
Administrative functions. Under DCMC these roles were
combined, with Contract Administrators performing routine
Contract Administration, as well as negotiations. This
resulted in a greater degree of generalization among the
negotiators and administrators, and more specialization for
those who became Price Analysts.
ACO feedback also revealed the fact that the
PROs had gone from having five major divisions as NAVPROs, to
three divisions as DPROs. The Contracts Management Division
absorbed some personnel from the other divisions, the Quality
Assurance Division continued as before, and a new division was
formed from personnel of the former Engineering and Industrial
Divisions. The new Division was call the Program and
Technical Support Division. In addition to performing
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Engineering and Industrial Support functions, this new
division would manage the new Program Integrator positions.
Early ACO feedback regarding the establishment
of the Program Integrator function, as a means of supporting
external customers, indicated little actual effect. ACOs
viewed the new function as primarily a name change for a
position that had previously been known as the Program Manager
Representative (PMR) . One DPRO indicated it would take some
time before the true effects of the new position might be
realized.
The fact that the PRO would no longer be issuing
PIO/BOA orders was also mentioned in early ACO feedback. It
was also revealed that the Navy had established on-site
detachments which would continue to perform the orders issuing
functions. One DPRO noted that the function should remain
with the PRO, since they already had personnel skilled in
performing that function.
Another interesting finding was that despite
heavy emphasis on TQM within DoD, no Process Action Teams were
known to be working jointly with the NAVAIR customer, although
internal DPRO teams existed, as well as joint
NAVAIR/Contractor teams.
b. MIS/Control Systems
There was one comment regarding industry
reactions to the NAVPRO/DPRO transition. That DPRO indicated
contractor concerns over the ability of the DPRO to process
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progress payments. These concerns related to the fact that
invoice billings would have to be forwarded to a DCMC District
office for payment via the MOCAS system. The DPRO did
indicate, however, that the contractor preferred the
electronic payment capability afforded by MOCAS to manual
payment.
c. Organizational Priorities
A significant shift in workload prioritization
methods was brought out in the early ACO surveys. Whereas
NAVAIR had annual dollar goals for def initizations , DCMC sets
quantity goals for def initizations . Early ACO feedback
indicated that although NAVAIR gave some consideration to the
age of undef initized orders, the dollar amount and urgency
were most important in deciding what actions were given
priority. The ACO feedback indicated that the DCMC focus was
primarily on the age of orders, regardless of dollar value.
ACO feedback revealed that maintenance of DCMC '
s
Mechanization of Contract Administration Services (MOCAS)
system had become a high priority. This apparently related to
the greater emphasis placed on Contract Close-outs by DCMC.
This emphasis, in turn, affected the roles of Contract
Administrators, who became responsible for the upkeep of
MOCAS.
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D. LATEST PROCURING CONTRACTING OFFICER SURVEY
1. Question One: Key Differences in Methods
What do you perceive as the key differences between
DCMC Contract Administration Methods and those formerly used
by the NAVPRO? What impacts (positive and negative) are
DCMC's Contract Administration methods having on their ability
to support NAVAIR and Industry customers?
a. Discussion: This two-part question was designed
to elicit PCO perceptions of changes in Contract
Administration methods under DCMC. It was also intended to
obtain views regarding the research question: "What impacts
are DCMC's methods of Contract Administration having on their
Navy Customers and industry." Some individuals answered both
parts with a single response. The indicated differences in
methods are shown separately from indicated impacts.
b. Results: Figure 14 graphically displays the
responses related to changes in methods. The most common
response was from PCOs who felt that there was no noticeable
change in Contract Administration methods. Those who did
perceive changes indicated that DCMC possessed more
established methods, and was more oriented toward following
regulations than the NAVPRO had been.
Sample responses follow:
The key differences seem to be that DCMC has established
methods and procedures for situations normally faced by
ACOs whereas the former NAVPRO seemed to address contract
administration on an ad hoc basis.
Currently I perceive no difference in methods. My ACO is
still doing business with me almost identically to the
way he supported me in the past.
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NAVPRO Orientation - We will perform whatever contract
administration activity is required to support the
program, PM and PCO.
DPRO Orientation - We will perform only those contract
administration activities authorized by DCMC regulations,
unless we have a compelling reason not to.
- Few of no noticeable differences
• Orientation is now toward DCMC
Regs./DCMC has established methods,
NAVPRO was ad hoc
• Introduction of MOCAS for payments
• DCMC less focused • more broad based
- Not sure what methods are used for
Contract Administration
Figure 14 8 RESPONDENTS/ 8 COMMENTS
Key Differences
Figure 15 graphically displays responses related
to impacts of changes in management methods. The most common
response was from PCOs who perceived no impact from DCMC
methods. Those who perceived impacts felt that DCMC ' s "broad
based" coverage and "tighter" administration would have
positive impacts. Negative impacts were related the use of
MOCAS and flexibility.
Sample responses follow:
Key impact has been introduction/mandate of MOCAS in
paying contractor - has caused more work, confusion and
little value added. It also increases costs in re:
implementation.
Negative - Targeting specific issues is more difficult.
Positive - Coverage is very complete and broad based.
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These procedures should result in tighter administration
of contracts in the long term and thereby increase the
probability that the contract performance will reflect
the written contract.
• No perceived impact
- Positive impact from tighter
administration/very complete
coverage/broad based
• Negative impact: Targeting specific
issues more difficult/less flexibility
- Negative impact from MOCAS use in
Contractor payments










8 RESPONDENTS/ 9 COMMENTS
2. Question Two: Key Differences in Priorities
What do you perceive as the key differences between
the organizational priorities which existed when your Contract
Administration Office was a NAVPRO versus the priorities now
emphasized as a DPRO? Why do you feel DPRO priorities are
different than those of the NAVPRO? What impact are the
differing priorities likely to have on you as the Navy
customer?
a. Discussion: Early research revealed concerns by
PCOs and ACOs that the organizational priorities of the DPRO
might conflict with those of the Navy customer. This multi-
part question was designed to obtain updated PCO views
regarding changes in organizational priorities under DCMC. It
was intended to elicit information related to the research
question: "What are the key differences between DCMC and Navy
organizational priorities and perceived roles concerning
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Contract Administration?" The question was also intended to
obtain perceptions of the impacts of DCMC priorities on Navy
customers. Some individuals answered all parts of the
question with a sinqle response. The key differences are
shown separately from perceived impacts.
b. Results: Figure 16 graphically displays the
perceived key differences in organizational priorities.
- Pleasing DCMC first is now
priority
- Change almost transparent
- DCMC systematic VS Navy
Crisis Mgmt. approach
- Greater DCMC emphasis on
operating within defined
framework
Figure 16 8 RESPONDENTS/8 COMMENTS
Key Differences
Figure 17 graphically displays PCO perceived impacts of the
changes in priorities.
Most PCOs have recognized some change in
organizational priorities within the PRO since the transition.
The greatest common response was that satisfying the DCMC
organization is now the first priority. One felt that the
NAVPRO framework was more dynamic and accommodating of
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customer needs. Most PCOs also perceived impacts of changing
priorities. Some PCOs indicated somewhat negative effects
for the Navy customer, such as less responsiveness and
cooperation. Some indicated that the impact was that DCMC is
now the approving authority on what were formerly Navy
decisions.
Little impact observed yet
• Rigid adherence to framework, Less accomrDodating/Less
responsiveness, cooperation
- Fewer DPRO resources
Long-term impact staW be better Contract Administration
Figure 17 8 RESPONDENTS/ 9 COMMENTS
Sample responses follow:
NAVPRO priorities were to service Navy, particularly
NAVAIR. Priority seems to have shifted to
pleasing/impressing DCMC first (understandably). Now
everything has to be approved by DCMC rather than at
NAVAIR.
NAVPROs - Buying activities set the priorities.
Framework was dynamic.
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DPRO - DCMC establishes framework and buying activities
set priorities within this framework.
Priorities differed with framework. DCMC is more static
- only changes when change is fully supported. Driven
more by purple suit leadership. NAVPRO is dynamic. Navy
leadership methodology more applicable. Adjustments
often made to framework to accommodate customer without
regard to impact on framework.
"How will this look to the boss (DCMC)?" is now a
priority of the organization where the thought never
seemed before to exist... DPRO priorities are far more
likely to cause them to decide in favor of solutions
which make fewer waves in DCMC management VS one which
will best serve the Navy's need. .. Sometime, somewhere,
the Navy customer will be hurt by this prioritization.
...Why have DPRO ' s priorities changed? Who does your
performance evaluations?
DCMC seems to take a more systematic approach to
allocating resources and measuring workload, in contrast
to the management by crisis approach formerly employed.
The former NAVPRO seemed to determine its priorities
based on the latest pressures from the NAVAIR program
office. In the long term, this should result in better
contract administration.
Organizational priorities remain set by the PCO; when
problems have arisen, the PCO ' s voice was heard; we are
seen as the person in charge.
Change appears almost transparent. Grumman is the only
contractor having problems with transition.
3. Question Three: Impacts from Role Changes
What impacts have you felt from changes in ACO team
roles and responsibilities since the transition from NAVPRO to
DPRO? (e.g. price analysis responsibilities)
a. Discussion: Early research revealed the fact
that many role changes were taking place within the PRO
organizations. This question sought to determine what long-
term impacts may have occurred due to role changes.
It was also intended to elicit information related to the
research question: "What are the key differences between DCMC
70
and Navy organizational priorities and perceived roles
concerning Contract Administration?"
b. Results: Most PCOs reported no impact from
changes in ACO team roles and responsibilities. Both negative
and positive impacts were reported. However, the negative
impacts appeared minor compared to the positive impacts.
Figure 18 graphically illustrates the responses to this
question.
-None
- None yet. Expected eventually
- Less Flexible, but offset by broad-based
coverage
- Negative impact on repair/GFE ordering
due to DPRO lack of STARS access
• Recent reorganization has clarified lines
of authority/responsibility; facilitated
communications
Figure 18 8 RESPONDENTS/ 8 COMMENTS
Sample responses follow:
None yet, NAVPRO personnel are still in place,
time, loyalty to NAVAIR will dissipate.
Over
Initially felt the impact of having to set up NTRDs to
place orders for BOAs and Provisioning Line Items. Also
felt the impact of having to modify all active contract
vehicles for NTRD ordering vs ACO. Since DCMC agreed to
order placement have had to modify some vehicles back to
ACO vs NTRD, but expect to be back to normal.
DPRO lack of STARS access as NAVPRO had hurts repair/GFE
replacement ordering.
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The primary effect of the transition on ACO roles was to
cause a period of confusion over order placement. This
appears to have been resolved. The recent DPRO
reorganization has also clarified lines of
responsibility, has facilitated communication by
clarifying lines of authority.
4. Question Four (a): Memorandums of Understanding
Do you or your program office have a separate
Memorandum of Understanding with your ACO? If so, what major
agreements does it make?
a. Discussion: Early research revealed very few
Memorandums of Understanding (MOUs) with the DPRO. This
question sought to establish if any unique agreements between
PCOs and ACOs had been established since the first survey.
Such agreements would help clarify the relationship between
the organizations and settle conflicts.
b. Results: Half of the PCOs reported that
individual MOUs were in the process of negotiations with the
Yes, or in process
No. or N/A
Figure 19 8 RESPONDENTS/
8 COMMENTS
DPRO. The other half reported having no MOUs or plans for
them. There were various items being included in MOUs, as
discussed in the following sample responses:
Yes - one in process, but my familiarity is limited.
Major agreements include non - mandatory (but routine)
Contract Administration function delegations, plant visit
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security/program clearance understandings/guidelines,
agreements on engineering support requirements for
pending major E & MD program (ACAT I)
In draft form. It describes technical and contractual
support plus establishment of a Program Integrator.
No, only ACO duties assigned in NAVAIR H - clauses.
4. Question Four (b) : Impact on Delegations
Is there any type of authority you feel should be
delegated to the ACO which DCMC does not allow?
a. Discussion: Early research indicated that PCOs
were concerned that ACOs might not perform as many services
after the transition to DCMC. This question was related to
the previous question concerning MOUs in that an MOU would
probably be an appropriate vehicle for delegations.
b. Results: Although a Master Memorandum of
Agreement (MMOA) was signed between the Navy and DCMC in
November 1991, these January 1992 responses still indicated
uncertainty concerning DPRO acceptance of some delegations.
Figure 20 graphically displays the results of
this question. Most PCOs indicated some problems remain, or
that they are unclear as to what the MMOA agrees to.
Sample responses follow:
Issuance of change orders, provisioned orders, delivery
orders is a problem.
Yes - Def initization of other than unpriced orders. DCMC
accounting problems cause DPROs to decline accepting
requisitions for orders to be definitized prior to award.
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Assuming that the ACOs will be authorized to place provisioned
and BOA orders, none.
- No or none, assumrg ACOs wil place PIO/BOA orders
• Now that ordering is back, unsure of what is allowed
-
Definitization of other than unpriced orders
- Issuance of change orders, provtstoned orders and delivery orders
is a problem
Issuing of orders (although since covered by MMOA)
Figure 2 8 RESPONDENTS/ 8 COMMENTS
5. Question Five (a): Benefits for Industry
What benefits do you see the consolidation of
Contract Administration Services having for industry?
a. Discussion: This question was designed to help
answer the subsidiary research question "What impacts are
DCMC's methods of Contract Administration having on their Navy-
customers and industry?". Proponents of CAS consolidation
believe that industry is better off when the number of
separate Government entities providing direction is minimized.
In the case of some NAVPROs, the contractor was required to
interact with representatives of the Navy and Air Force.
Proponents also feel that, with consolidation under DCMC,
contractors will only have to learn one set of Contract
Administration rules.
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Without consolidation, contractors had to be equipped to
comply with rules that varied between the Services and DCAS
.
Another action with potential for impact to
industry was the consolidation of contractor payments through
the DLA Finance Center. Some contractors formerly dealt with
NAVPRO Disbursing offices within their own plant.
Further impact to industry may result from DCMC
initiatives to reduce contractor oversight. Referring to DPRO
staffing, a DCMC draft letter to the Under Secretary of
Defense (Acquisition) (USD(A)) stated:
The objective is to transition to the approach that will
result in increased efficiency and economy of operations
without sacrificing service and, hopefully, reduce the
Government's in-plant presence. (Ref. 22, p. 5)
(underline emphasis added)
PCO and ACO reactions to this question are
compared with industry perceptions of consolidation benefits
in Chapter IV.
b. Results: Figure 21 graphically illustrates the
results of this question. In the most common response, PCOs
agreed that uniformity of rules and treatment were the
greatest potential benefits to industry. Some PCOs were
skeptical that such benefits would actually accrue to
industry, however.
Sample responses follow:
Could have benefit of one face to industry if DCMC ever
has "one face" - Currently still behave like AFPROs,
DPROs, NAVPROs, etc.
...Increased responsiveness. This will be a result of
the necessary coordination between DPROs and buying
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commands. Both entities will see the benefits of greater
cooperation.
I question if there is any unless some contractors find
less responsive DPROs (vs NAVPRO) sometimes become less
intrusive and, thus, perhaps less successful in ferreting
out budding problems.
- "One Face to Industry/Uniform treatment/Less confusion
• Greater effectiveness/better understanding of Industry
- Increased responsiveness due to cooperation with Buying
Commands
- Doubtful of benefits
12 3
Figure 21 8 RESPONDENTS/ 10 COMMENTS
5. Question Five (b) : Interaction with Contractors
Have you noticed any change in your interaction with
the prime contractor since the transition?
a. Discussion: This second part of question 5 was
designed to supplement responses to the basic question of what
PCOs perceive as benefits to industry. If the contractor was
experiencing major benefits or problems from consolidation, it
might impact interactions with the Buying Command.
b. Results: Figure 22 graphically illustrates the
responses to this question. The largest number of responses
came from those PCOs who reported no changes to their
interactions with the contractor. Half of the respondents
did, however, see some minor changes.
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Sample responses follow:
Since the transition became imminent, the contractor has
paid more attention to negotiating the technical
requirements of the contracts.
Only Grumman, especially electronic transfer.
I had to intercede on his behalf to get a prompt payment
made when it was a material element of a settlement where





- PCO required to
intercede in problem
Figure 22 8 RESPOND. /8 COMMENTS
6. Question Six: Adoption of "Best Practices"
What functions were/are performed better by the
NAVPRO or the DPRO organization? What previous NAVPRO
practices should DCMC consider adopting?
a. Discussion: As in the ACO survey, this question
relates to the Best Practices program in that it sought to
elicit opinions from PCOs regarding the value of using certain
NAVPRO practices versus DPRO practices. Information obtained
through this question was used in the analysis and
recommendations sections of this study.
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b. Results: Figure 23 graphically illustrates the
results of this question. All responses are combined into one
figure. Several PCOs mentioned order issuing as a function
that was performed better by the NAVPRO. One mentioned
• NAVPRO: Issuing orders/systems
reviews/responsiveness
Too early to tell/No change
- DPRO: Broad CAS
coverage/Improved tracking/Agency jj §§§§
Figure 2 3 8 RESPONDENTS/
10 COMMENTS
systems reviews. Systems reviews are generally done less
frequently under DCMC.
Sample responses follow:
NAVPRO - Better review of contractor systems
purchasing, quality, proposal prep., etc.
DPRO - Broad coverage of all CAS areas and better
headquarters consolidated reporting. DPRO should have
more systems reviews.
You could count on NAVPRO responsiveness, but DPRO has a
different master, and it is not the Navy. I expect the
support I have become accustomed to may be impacted in
time.
Tracking of actions, training, and overall contract
administration all appear to be improving albeit slowly.
I can think of no previous NAVPRO practices which need to
be adopted, other than order placement.
78
7. Question Seven: Experiences with "Best Practices"
Please describe your experiences, if any, with the
DCMC "Best Practices" program and your impressions of its
success thus far.
a. Discussion: Early in the establishment of DCMC,
there was considerable discussion of the "Best Practices"
program. This program was to be used as a means of
synthesizing the best existing Contract Administration
practices of the Service PROs and DLA into a more effective,
efficient organization. This question was designed to
establish PCO familiarity with the DCMC "Best Practices"
program and their opinions of its success.
b. Results: In all cases, the PCOs were unfamiliar
with the program.
8. Question Eight: Alignment of Objectives
What further actions should be taken to bring Navy
and DCMC Contract Administration objectives into accord, while
keeping customer support in focus?
a. Discussion: This question was partially based
on the subsidiary research question: "What can be done to
bring DCMC and Navy Contract Administration organizational
priorities into accord." It was also following up on feedback
from early surveys which indicated that one of the primary
differences between the Navy and DCMC approaches to Contract
Administration was in the area of objectives. For example,
the Navy had given higher priority to objectives such as
reducing overall dollar values of UCAs, while DCMC was more
concerned with the quantities of UCAs definitized.
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Assuming the Navy had good reasons for the
objectives, it had established for the NAVPROs, any general
deviation from these objectives by DCMC could be expected to
run counter to NAVAIR interests. This question sought PCO
recommendations for melding DCMC/Navy objectives.
b. Results: Figure 24 graphically illustrates the
diversity of responses to this question. The largest single
-DPRO: Improve Systems
Reviews/accept wider range of
business/Increase customer
awareness
- Better communication/use of TQM
- None/Too early to tell





Figure 2 4 8 RESPONDENTS/ 9 COMMENTS
response category included PCOs who felt that DCMC should take
certain actions to improve customer support. Others
recommended mutual actions such as the use of Total Quality
Management (TQM) as a means of bringing objectives into




Make sure customer support also remains the number one
focus; ahead of appearance up the line.
Strive for TQM and excellence across the board.
Efficiency varies from DCMC to DCMC by location.
Buying activities must work closer with DPRO personnel.
View them as a valuable tool and team asset. They can be
helpful
.
DPRO must improve system reviews and establish mechanism
for accepting wider range of business.
9. Question Nine: Impacts on Government Relationships
What improvements have you observed in NAVAIR/DPRO
interaction since the consolidation took place?
a. Discussion: This question was asked with the
assumption that on-going efforts such as memorandums of
agreement would have lead to continuous improvement in
interactions since the consolidation.
b. Results: The results of this question are
graphically displayed in Figure 25. Most PCOs noted very few
- None
- Very few/Slow adaption
- DPRO: quicker turn-around
- DPRO: Increased travel funds
.mimmuum
Figure 25 8 RESPONDENTS/
8 COMMENTS
or no perceptible changes in interactions since the beginning
of the consolidation. This may be due to the fact that the
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interaction between NAVAIR and the DPRO is between essentially
the same leadership and personnel as before the transition.
Sample responses follow:
Very few. Previous status quo holding. Change
adaption is occurring slowly.
DPRO - Quicker turn/around and response time, in general.
10. Question Ten: Suggestions to Improve Relationships
What more can be done to improve the relationship
between the Navy and DCMC Contract Management organizations?
(e.g. methods of improving communications or becoming more
major systems oriented)
a. Discussion: This question sought to elicit
opinions related to the subsidiary research question: "What
can be done to improve the relationship between the Navy and
DCMC Contract Administration organizations?".
b. Results: The responses to this question are
graphically displayed in Figure 26. There were a variety of
recommendations for improving organizational relationships,
however, the largest single response group had no
recommendations. This may indicate that those PCOs were
essentially satisfied with their DPRO relationships,
especially since PIO/BOA ordering has been reinstated within
the PROs. The fact that they are still interacting with
essentially the same personnel in the DPROs may also account
for the lack of recommendations. Most recommendations




. . . Incentivize adaptation, discourage "old outlook"
Have DCMC monitor all locations to improve the less
responsive units.
Personnel Rotation/Exchange Programs/Awareness .__
of Mutual Roles
• DCMC monitoring of PRO responsiveness levels
• Greater use of electronic mail
• Involve PCOs in FPRA negotiations
2
Figure 26 8 RESPONDENTS/9 COMMENTS
11. Question Eleven (a): Impacts on Responsiveness
Have you observed any change in ACO responsiveness
or timeliness since the transition?
a. Discussion: Early research indicated PCOs
expected a decline in DPRO responsiveness as DCMC management
took control. The larger volume of administrative reporting
requirements was also expected to impinge on ACO timeliness.
This question sought PCO perceptions as to whether
responsiveness or timeliness had undergone any change.
b. Results: Responses to this question are
graphically displayed in Figure 27. Some felt responsiveness
had improved, while others felt that it had declined or may
decline in the future. The largest single response group
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consisted of those PCOs who reported no change, or "none yet".
These responses may reflect the possibility that long-standing
relationships remain intact between PCOs and DPRO personnel,
resulting in no immediate change in responsiveness. Many PCO
and ACO responses to various questions indicate a strong
loyalty of DPRO personnel to the Navy.








Figure 27 8 RESPONDENTS/
8 COMMENTS
Sample responses follow:
No, don't expect any until personnel turnover.
Some, due to concern about appearances to DCMC vs meeting
program needs. This is largely mitigated by personal
commitment of DPRO employees who are ex-NAVPRO folks.
11. Question Eleven (b) : Impacts on Program Orientation
Have you noticed any change in the amount of
"program orientation" of your ACO?
a. Discussion: As with the previous question,
early research indicated PCOs felt that the focus within the
PRO would shift from a program orientation, to a pre-
occupation with numerical management goals.
84
b. Results: Figure 28 graphically displays the
responses to this question. Most PCOs had not observed any
change in program orientation. One felt program orientation
had increased, but contractual emphasis had declined.
-No
- Somewhat/Needs to be
increased
- Greater program orientation,
less contractual
Figure 28 8 RESPONDENTS/
8 COMMENTS
A sample response follows:
No - but essentially because he didn't change when his
bosses did.
11. Question Eleven (c) : Impacts on Field Pricing
Has the usefulness of field pricing reports from the
PRO seemed to change since the transition? If so, to what do
you attribute the change?
a. Discussion: This question is based on the fact
that price analysis responsibility was shifted from the PRO
negotiators to a new Financial Services Division under DCMC.
Early feedback from ACOs indicated this change might result in
less timely pricing of proposals.
b. Results: All but one PCO had observed no
change, although one noted that it was too early to tell.
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The following are sample responses:
About the same, quicker turn-around though.
The usefulness of the reports, previously negligible, has
not yet improved significantly. However, DPRO has
acknowledged the problem and appears to be trying to
institute improvements.
No change - old ways still occurring.
12. Question Twelve: Impacts on Post-Award Conferences
Have you seen any change in the number of Post-Award
conferences held since the transition?
a. Discussion: Early PCO feedback indicated that
increased communications, particularly in the form of Post-
Award Conferences would be valuable. This question sought
information as to whether there had been any change in the
number of conferences.
b. Results: In all cases, PCOs said they had not
seen any change in the number of Post-Award conferences since
the transition.
13. Question Thirteen: Provisioned Item Ordering
Is your DPRO ACO now issuing Provisioned Item Orders
and/or BOA orders for you?
a. Discussion: In the early surveys, it was
revealed that the PROs were no longer issuing these types of
orders. A Master Memorandum of Agreement (MMOA) , signed by
the Navy and DLA in November 1991 agreed to certain additional
ordering delegations. This question sought to confirm whether
the previous problem had been resolved.
b. Results: All PCOs with ordering requirements
reported that the DPRO was placing orders for them. There
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were two caveats, however, as shown in the following sample
responses
:
Yes, though only those that were NAVPROs - others still
refuse to issue orders.
Only if unpriced. This area needs to be improved.
14. Question Fourteen: Reactions from Program Offices
Have you observed any reaction from your program
office to changes in your PRO relationship?
a. Discussion: This question sought information as
to whether PCOs had heard any reactions from their customers -
the Program Managers, regarding the success of the DCMC
takeover.
b. Results: As shown graphically in Figure 29,






None, except in understanding how Tech representatives
fit into the picture.
More concern over DPRO ' s willingness to work with us.
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Yes, they want me to make sure they feel nothing - either
by:
1) getting CAO to do all as before,
2) picking up the slack in my staff, or
3) coming up with substitute contracting
approach
15. Summary
The latest PCO surveys revealed several important
points. These points may be categorized as factors related to
three general areas of change. These include organizational
structure/roles, operating guidance, and organizational
priorities. These points are discussed below. The sections
which follow this summary provide the results of the latest
surveys of ACOs, industry and PMs , respectively.
a. Structure and Roles
Significantly, most PCOs did not list impacts
from changes in roles within the PROs, other than the PIO/BOA
ordering issue, which was since resolved. This was also
reflected by the fact that most PCOs perceived no change in
the usefulness of field pricing reports, despite the role
changes which have occurred in the Price Analysis area. As
one PCO commented, however, the negligible impact of role
changes on PCOs may be attributable to the fact that former
NAVPRO personnel, with loyalties to NAVAIR, are still in
place. It may also reflect a lack of awareness by PCOs of the
dramatic role changes that have occurred within the PROs.
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This was somewhat obvious in one PCO s comment which stated:
Roles are essentially the same. Under DCMC support
provided is more within a rigid criteria., i.e., less
flexible than DPRO. .
.
Similarly, most PCOs perceived very few, or no changes in
NAVAIR/DPRO interactions since the beginning of the
consolidation. This may also be due to the fact that many
PCOs are interacting with the same personnel within the DPRO
as they did prior to the consolidation.
Another interesting finding was the fact that
several PCOs reported that MOUs were being drafted between
PCOs or PMs and ACOs. This contrasted with early survey
findings which revealed the existence of virtually no MOUs.
b. Operating Guidance
Several PCOs perceived no difference between the
Contract Administration methods employed by the DPROs and the
former NAVPROs. Significantly, those who did perceive
differences in methods regarded DCMC methods as more
established, versus the ad hoc methods employed by the former
NAVPROs. Several PCOs also noted no impact from the methods
used by the DPROs.
Another significant finding was that several
PCOs felt that industry would probably benefit from the "One
Face to Industry" concept, whereby DCMC would provide
uniformity of rules and procedures for industry to comply
with.
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It was interesting to note that one PCO
mentioned systems reviews as a function performed better by
the former NAVPROs. This same point had been raised
previously by an individual within NAVAIR's management
structure.
It was also considered significant that no PCOs
were familiar with the DCMC "Best Practices" program.
c. Organizational Priorities
A significant finding in this area was that some
PCOs felt that DPRO support was constrained by the fact that
pleasing an organization other that the Navy customer (i.e.
DCMC) is a now a PRO priority. One PCO stated:
...DPRO priorities are far more likely to cause them to
decide in favor of solutions which make fewer waves in
DCMC management VS one which will best serve the Navy's
need. .
.
It was also considered significant that several
PCOs recommended that DCMC take certain actions toward
improving customer support.
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E. LATEST ADMINISTRATIVE CONTRACTING OFFICER SURVEY
1. Question One: Impacts on Customer Support
What impacts (positive and negative) are DCMC's
Contract Administration methods (as opposed to NAVPRO methods)
having on your ability to support your Navy customer and on
Industry?
a. Discussion: Question one was designed to obtain
ACO opinions as to how DCMC Contract Administration methods
had impacted their abilities to support Navy customers. The
question also sought ACO opinions regarding possible impacts
of DCMC methods on industry.
b. Results: Positive and negative responses were
received, and are displayed separately below. There were
approximately the same number of positive comments as
negative.
1. Positive: The positive feedback is
graphically displayed in Figure 30. The most common of the
positive opinions regarding DCMC methods were from ACOs who
preferred DCMC's established, structured approach to Contract
Administration. Several ACOs felt that the DLA regulations
and manuals provided more practical, definitive guidelines.
The second most frequent type of response was related to MOCAS
enhancements of Contract Administration through automation.
Some ACOs felt that there is better Payment Office
organization and better service under the consolidated Defense
Finance and Accounting Service (DFAS) office. Others noticed
less pressure from customers and less crisis management within
DCMC, partially due to the first-in first-out work scheduling
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practiced by DCMC. One ACO considered DCMC more "business-
like" with contractors, while another perceived no impact of
DCMC's methods on the ability to support customers.
Clearer Guidance/more Structure
Improved Admin, with MOCAS
Improved Payment Office Service
Less Pressure/Less Crisis Mgmt.
More Business-like w/ Contractor
No Impact
Figure 30 13 RESPONDENTS/ 15 COMMENTS
Sample responses follow:
Clearer, more definitive guidance is provided in the DLA
manuals and regulations.
DCMC Contract Administration more defined and better
structured than NAVPRO methods. Methods used by NAVPRO
sometimes appeared to be created as a result of a
particular issue appearing for a first time as opposed to
having a method already in place.
Once contracts are put into the "MOCAS" system, some
actions which were manual (i.e. progress payments) can be
automated.
. . .With the various NAVAIR PMA shops operating
independently of each other and, indeed, in actual
competition with each other for the limited time and
personnel assets of Contracts Division, we were forced to
scatter proposal negotiations around the Division rather
than allowing a specific ACO Team to handle the work of
a single PMA Shop/Aircraft Type ... DLA has instructed us
to:
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(a) Do work on a first in-first out (vice crisis
management) basis,
(b) accept no proposal packages with expired pricing, and
(c) structure the ACO Teams so that they work on specific
aircraft types, with a known workload schedule. This is,
in my opinion, a very good thing, although it requires
more planning and overall coordination on the part of the
customers than before.
. . .More business-like way of dealing with the contractor
(i.e. complete adherence to the contract terms,
consideration ($ or services) for waivers/deviations,
etc.) , less pressure from the customer to bend the rules.
2. Negative: The negative feedback is
graphically displayed in Figure 31. The largest category of
- More Reporting/Degrades Support
- Payment Process Problems
- Emphasis on Age vs Importance to
Customer
- No Impact
- Lack Understanding of Fleet Needs
' "" i
Figure 31 13 RESPONDENTS/ 11 COMMENTS
negative responses were concerned with a heavy increase in
reporting requirements, including MOCAS maintenance. Some
ACOs felt that the time spent on reporting impinged on the
support they provide to their Navy customer. Some commented
that the new payment process was slower and more difficult
than the previous system. Others felt that DCMC was
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inflexible, placing all emphasis on the age of actions, rather
than the importance of that action to the Navy customer. One
ACO saw no negative impact of DCMC methods on customer
support. Another felt that DCMC lacks understanding of Fleet
needs and the complexities of the aircraft industry.
Sample responses follow:
Increased paperwork and reporting reguirements take more
time away from the support I can provide to my program.
MOCAS reguires too many data bits to be entered into
mainframe.
The payment process has been slowed. It takes longer for
a DLA payment office to process an invoice than their Air
Force/Navy counterparts.
Extreme difficulties in getting contractor paid for
delivered goods.
The elimination of on-site paying office makes contractor
payment more cumbersome. Resolving payment problems is
now difficult and time consuming.
"Do it our way 100% or else" attitude from DLA. .
.
2. Question Two: Key Differences in Priorities
What do you perceive as the key differences between
the organizational priorities which existed when your office
was a NAVPRO versus the priorities now emphasized as a DPRO?
What impact are the differing priorities likely to
have on your Navy customer?
a. Discussion: In the early surveys, ACOs
identified some of the apparent DCMC organizational priorities
such as MOCAS maintenance. This guestion was designed to
elicit any further opinions on differing organizational
priorities that may have evolved since the earlier surveys.
This guestion also attempts to have the ACOs assess what
impact these differences may have on the Navy customer.
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b. Results: Figure 32 provides a graphic
illustration of the responses to this question.
In the most common responses, ACOs listed DCMC '
s
emphasis on work scheduling on a first-in first out (FIFO)
basis, and, quantities of actions taking precedence over
dollar value as the key differences between NAVPRO and DPRO
priorities. In the cases where impacts were opined, it was
felt that these priorities could conflict with Navy priorities
and could have adverse effects on the contractor's cash flow.
• FIFO work processing; emphasis on pv/mivvww^
quantities of actions over $ values j&£
• DCMC setting priorities, rather than P
customer; orientation with statistical
measures of success vice problem
solving
• Minimal differences
•DPRO deadlines for Contract
Close-out, Price Analysis
• Better definition of priorities by DPRO
[
More focus on details by DPRO
Increased emphasis on Progress
Payments by DCMC
m
Figure 32 13 RESPONDENTS/ 16 RESPONSES
The next largest category rated the fact that
DCMC places more emphasis on meeting statistical "bogies" over
solving customer problems. This category also includes the
observation that, as a NAVPRO, organizational priorities were
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set by the Navy customer, whereas now, it is the DCMC District
Office which sets priorities. This results in difficult ACO
decisions between satisfying the customer versus the District
Office. Some felt that DPRO priorities are better defined
than were those of the NAVPRO, resulting in better service to
the Navy. Some also saw the Navy receiving better service due
to an increased focus by DCMC on details.
3. Question Three: Key Differences in Roles
What are the key differences in the roles and
responsibilities for you and your ACO team members since the
transition from NAVPRO to DPRO?
a. Discussion: Question three was designed to
obtain further information on the role changes being
experienced by ACOs, and what ACOs felt were the most
significant changes. The types of duties emphasized should
have a significant bearing on the support realized by
customers of the DPRO.
b. Results: Figure 33 graphically displays the
results of this question.
The role change mentioned most frequently was
the fact that many of the personnel who formerly did primarily
Contract Administration now have been warranted and given more
responsibilities. They are now responsible for definitizing
undef initized contractual actions (UCAs) . This was previously




Similarly, the second most mentioned role change
is that some of the NAVPRO personnel who formerly did Price
Analysis and negotiated UCAs have been moved into a new branch
under DCMC. The new branch is called Financial Services, does
Price and Cost Analysis, but does no negotiating. Others
noted that their role has become more administrative,






• Emphasis on DLA Admin.
duties/MOCAS for Contract
Close-outs
ACQ can now assign work
in more orderly fashion




- More independent role of
ACQ in Progress Payments
1 2 3
Figure 33 13 RESPONDENTS/ 14 COMMENTS
The following are sample responses:
One of the biggest changes was that, under NAVAIR
"ownership", the price analysts in the Financial Services
Branch of the Contracts Division did the actual
negotiations, and the ACO Teams just wrote the
modifications and fine-tuned the paperwork; under the DLA
System price analysts only do financial reviews/pricing
reports. This change left us with ACOs/Contract
Administrators who were suddenly expected to negotiate
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proposals when they had no previous experience doing so.
The learning curve involved was painful to behold.
The transition has meant that ACO teams were formulated
and everyone is learning a new job with larger
responsibilities (for those who become ACOs especially)
with no increase in pay.
...The ACO was given many new duties and responsibilities
with none of the contracts reassigned. The workload is
staggering.
The key difference is that I am now under DLA a warranted
Contracting Officer, allowed to exercise the duties in
accordance with FAR 42.302. Working for the Navy the
administrators were mere figureheads with no authority to
really administer the contracts.
...a new and time consuming dimension has been added to
existing duties. Since DCMC has many automated systems,
we have spent considerable time learning the basics and
are moving towards more sophisticated management use of
the data bases available.
...the responsibility of all team members to become adept
at using an information system (MOCAS) as a vital tool in
the administration of a contract from award to close-out.
The independent role of the ACO in Progress Payment
administration is reinforced under DCMC. In a NAVPRO
environment, the PCO was allowed to play too significant
of a part in this process.
4. Question Four: Interaction with Program Integrators
How would you characterize your interaction with
your Program Integrator? Has the position of Program
Integrator improved your ability to support programs?
a. Discussion: Discussions with DCMC personnel and
DLA correspondence indicated that "Program Integrators" being
established within DCMC and the PROs would be chartered to
provide responsive program support. In early ACO surveys, the
prevailing opinion was that there would be little visible
impact from the institution of Program Integrators. This was
primarily because it as felt that the role of Program
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Integrator was simply a name change for the former Program
Manager Representatives (PMRs) within the NAVPRO
organizations. Question four was asked to determine whether
ACO opinions regarding the value of the Program Integrator
function have evolved along with the DCMC organization.
b. Results: There were a wide variety of responses
to this guestion. Most indicated that they viewed the
position of Program Integrator to be, at least in part, a name
change of the previous NAVPRO PMR position. One felt that it
was a name change for a role previously only played by the
ACO.
The responses have been broken out into two
separate graphic displays. The first displays ACO perceptions
regarding the nature of ACO/Program Integrator interaction.
The other displays ACO perceived impacts of the Program
Integrator function on the ACO ' s ability to support programs.
Figure 34 graphically displays responses which
commented on the nature of interactions with Program
integrators. The most common response was from ACOs who noted
little or no interaction with Program Integrators. Most of
those who did report interaction felt the relationship was
good, with a free flow of information between the ACO and
Program Integrator. One indicated that more information was
being provided by the Program Integrator, but by more formal
means.
99
Figure 35 displays responses which commented on
the nature of support impacts. Most who commented on support
impacts found either no change, or felt the only impact was
the incurrence of additional ACO reporting requirements. Some
felt the Program Integrator function was an impediment,
complicating the ACO * s interactions with the contractor.
Others mentioned the fact that Program Integrators must now




- ACO still interacts with





Figure 34 13 RESPONDENTS/ 9 COMMENTS
Sample responses follow:
Minimal interaction. We had program integrators (by
another name) all along, so there has been no real change
in this area.
My program integrator is still learning the job and
therefore I have no interaction. The program integrator
is an impediment at this juncture because he doesn't know
anything about the program.
The program integrator in a sole source environment just
gets in the way of the ACO when he or she is taking
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contractual action. The program integrator has not done
anything to improve the program.
We had Program Integrators before DCMC took over,
however, the program is more formal now. There are also
more formalized reporting requirements which provide more
up-to-date information on the program.
There is much interaction with the Program Integrator.
I am of the opinion that the Program Integrator's
position is a plus as far as DPRO program support is
concerned. However, it is not a new position - only a
renamed one (from Program Manager Representative) . PMRs
have been at the AFPRO/NAVPRO since the late 1970s.
The interaction is very good. This is a free flow of
information both ways which, I believe, has helped
improve our service to the customer.
The position, much ballyhooed as it was, seems to exist
in name only. Have yet to meet one. It has not yet
detracted from our ability to provide support.
No Change/Other impacts




A benefit for program
support





Figure 35 13 RESPONDENTS/ 11 COMMENTS
5. Question Five: Benefits for Industry
What benefits do you see the consolidation of
Contract Administration Services having for industry?
a. Discussion: The transition is forcing industry
to discontinue long-term relationships with Service PROs which
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were direct links to the Service program offices. Early PCO
surveys indicated contractors were concerned with backlogs
resulting from the establishment of NTRDs. They were also
concerned with how promptly the new organization could process
invoice payments. There was one report of a contractor taking
advantage of the confusion created by the transition. The
designers of DCMC foresaw benefits to industry in the form of
reduced oversight and uniform Government procedures. This
question was intended to elicit ACO perceptions of whether
these or any other benefits have been accruing to industry.
b. Results: Figure 36 graphically displays the
results of this question. Most of the ACOs responding felt
- Wording under one set of f/ l
Regs/One agency vice several §
»»•••••
• None or negative impacts
- Cost savings/Efficiencies
- On-line access to Finance
System/Improved cash flow
• Dealing with one Finance
Office vice several
4 5 6 7 9 10 11 12
Figure 36 13 RESPONDENTS/ 18 COMMENTS
that industry would benefit from the transition, due to the
fact that there will only be one agency to interact with
regarding Contract Administration matters, and only one set of
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regulations to be concerned with. Some felt there would be
no benefits, or possibly negative consequences to industry
from the transition. One felt DLA would simply be an obstacle
between the contractor and Navy customers. Some saw industry
attaining greater efficiencies and long-term cost savings.
Sample responses follow:
Compliance with a single set of Government requirements
should reduce confusion and allow for more efficient
management systems. For example, General Electric
Aircraft Engines (GEAE) was monitored by an AFPRO in Ohio
and a NAVPRO in Massachusetts. GEAE makes engines at
both locations, yet had to satisfy different
requirements. Also, major defense contractors will have
more leverage when they want to advance a position by
applying pressure on a single agency (DCMC) . Cash flow
should improve as automatic payments and electronic funds
transfers are made from the central payment office at
Columbus, Ohio. Also, contractors have on-line inquiry
access to monitor payment status of their invoices.
One centralized group of instructions and regulations
which hopefully will be applied in a consistent fashion
by the existing DLA regions.
Not many. The contractor still deals closely with the
customer (NAVAIR/Aviation Supply Office (ASO)/etc.) and
the takeover by DLA of the former Service-PROs just adds
another level of bureaucracy and paperwork.
Hopefully the "One Face to Industry" concept will come
about, with a common language and set of procedures to be
used.
6. Question Six: Adoption of "Best Practices"
What functions were/are performed better by the
NAVPRO or the DPRO organization? What previous NAVPRO
practices should DCMC consider adopting?
a. Discussion: Early in the establishment of DCMC,
there was considerable discussion of the "Best Practices"
program. This program was to be used as a means of
synthesizing the best existing Contract Administration
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practices of the Service PROs and DLA into a more effective,
efficient organization. This question relates to the Best
Practices program in that it sought to elicit opinions from
ACOs regarding the value of using certain NAVPRO practices
versus DPRO practices. Information obtained through this
question was used in the analysis and recommendations sections
of this study.
b. Results: Most ACOs responded to this question
by simply identifying one or more functions which they felt
were performed better by either the previous NAVPRO
organization or by the DPRO. Therefore, the results have been
divided between two displays, functions performed better by
NAVPROs, and those performed better by DPROs
.
Figure 37 graphically displays the responses
which indicated a function performed better by the NAVPRO
organization. Many of these responses made strong points
concerning the value of having one individual performing both
the price analysis and negotiations. The reasons given
included the fact that the person who performs the price
analysis is most familiar with a case. It was also pointed
out that the ACO teams who have overall cognizance of ongoing
negotiations, could prioritize their workload better when they
had control of the price analysis function. It was indicated
that having the negotiators also performing the pricing
results in more timely completion of negotiations.
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Some felt that the NAVPRO was able to process
invoices and progress payments quicker than the DPRO can. One
viewed the NAVPRO reporting methods as more straightforward
and less cumbersome than those practiced by DCMC. Another
indicated that the Navy saved labor and time by not requiring
a post-negotiation memorandum under certain conditions.









Warver of Post-Neg. Memos
Performed Better by NAVPRO
Figure 37 13 RESPONDENTS/ 17 COMMENTS
Sample responses follow:
The NAVPRO used to have the ACO Teams do their own price
analysis. By doing this the ACO Teams could prioritize
their pricing workload better. Now they have to rely on
a separate branch which has many priorities. By doing
their own pricing I believe the Contract Administrators




Price and Delivery Schedule negotiation was performed
exclusively by Price Analysts under NAVPRO compared to by
the Contract Administrator under DPRO. I feel the former
method, for the most part, and with the right personnel
would result in a more timely negotiation.
The NAVPRO paid the contractor quicker, reducing interest
costs which resulted in a lower cost to the Navy.
Negotiations could be conducted more expeditiously when
the personnel who priced proposals also negotiated them.
Additionally, the Navy waived requirements to write a
post negotiation memorandum when the pre-position was
attained within 60 days. (This saves a lot of paperwork)
Figure 38 graphically displays those responses
which indicated functions which are performed better by the
DPROs than the former NAVPROs The functions mentioned most
- Better Delivery Tracking and
Funds Status with MOCAS
- Better control of Government
Property
- Uniformity of Regulations/Single
Payment Office
- Most Contract Admin. Functions.
Performed Better by DPRO
—MM
L :,.-. ^-^.^
Figure 38 13 RESPONDENTS/ 5 COMMENTS
often as performed better by DPROs were cited as improvements
in the tracking of deliverables and funds status using MOCAS.
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Some ACOs also felt that the DPROs maintained better control
of Government Property.
Sample responses follow:
DLA has better control of Government Property and
surveillance of contract deliverables.
The introduction of MOCAS into the former NAVPRO has made
us better able to track deliveries and funding on
contracts, which enables customers to utilize excess
funds identified.
On the surface most contract administration functions
appear to be better performed by the DPRO. It is still
too early in the transition and I'm not sure sufficient
data exists to make a judgment regarding which is better.
One response indicated that the answer to this
question depends on which perspective the question is being
asked from. He notes that NAVAIR and DCMC have different
criteria for judging the success of the PRO organization.
This response contrasts Navy and DCMC concepts of success as
follows:
Success in the eyes of the Navy : Aircraft accepted,
parts produced to support Fleet requirements, fast turn-
around on overhaul/repair jobs, funds obligated/expended
by close of fiscal year. .
.
Success in the eyes of DCMC : Overage list down to DLA %
goals, contract completion data inputted in a timely
manner, terminations completed, MOCAS/Management
Information Reports (MIR) . .
.
7. Question Seven: Experiences with "Best Practices"
Please describe your experiences with the DCMC "Best
Practices" program and your impressions of its success thus
far.
a. Discussion: The Best Practices Program was
frequently mentioned in DLA/DCMC correspondence concerning the
consolidation of Contract Administration Services (CAS)
.
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In describing DCMC, the new DCMC Commander stated:
This new organization, called the Defense Contract
Management Command, amalgamates the best practices and
procedures of the Military Services' and DLA s Contract
Administration activities. It is not an updated version
of DCAS or the Air Forces ' s Contract Management Division
or an Army or Navy equivalent; rather, it is the best of
each of these. (Ref. 23, p. 1)
Over the last six months I have issued a number of
memorandums and guidance letters addressing Best
Practices ... Best Practices provides a structure for
systematically assessing corporate-wide processes as well
as processes that are locally owned... The Best Practices
Program offers us a unique opportunity to reassess our
traditional ways of doing business and take advantage of
improved concepts of operations. (Ref. 24, p. 2)
The Best Practices Program does not purport to define the
full depth and breadth of process improvement activities
in the Defense Contract Management Command (DCMC) . It
does provide a focus for Command directed efforts to
improve those processes that directly impact our ability
to optimize our external customers' satisfaction with the
services and products we provide to them. (Ref. 25, p. 1)
This question was designed to determine the
familiarity level of ACOs with the Best Practices Program, as
well as their opinions regarding the success of the program.
b. Results: Figure 39 graphically displays the
responses to this question. Most ACOs had heard of the Best
Practices Program, although several had not. Most of those
who had heard of the program had not seen any change from what




One felt the program was being used as a way to legitimize
management decisions.
• No change from traditional DLA
practices observed
• No experience or have never
heard of program
- Program used only to validate
preconceived management
decisions
Figure 39 13 RESPONDENTS/ 13 COMMENTS
Some sample responses follow:
I cannot think of one example wherein "Best Practices"
has been utilized. I cannot believe that anyone would
consider it a "program". It was a philosophy that was
never put into practice. The DLA way became the DCMC
way.
The phrase "Best Practices" has turned out to be a SCAM.
This is something the Services were told so the
transition would be accomplished without too much
struggle. In truth, DCMC is not interested in "Best
Practices". We have been made over in the DLA mold with
existing practices almost without exception.
No experience - we have heard of it, but have not been
asked to participate.
ACOs have never heard of the program
exempted or it's not much of a success.
- either we're
I have no direct experience with the "Best Practices"
program to date and I'm not aware of any DLA procedures




I have not seen DCMC "Best Practices" incorporated. I
understand they are in the process of being formulated,
but to date we are operating under the old DLAM guidance
which does not fit a DPRO in many respects.
The "Best Practices" program was a hoax. DCMC simply
became DLA by another name with no concern for doing
anything other than the "DLA way". "Best Practices" was
lip service at best.
The Best Practices program is dysfunctional, it is used
only to validate decisions management has already made.
8. Question Eight: Alignment of Objectives
What further actions should be taken to bring Navy
and DCMC Contract Administration objectives into accord, while
keeping customer support in sharp focus?
a. Discussion: This question was following up on
feedback from early surveys which indicated that one of the
primary differences between the Navy and DCMC approaches to
Contract Administration was in the area of objectives. For
example, the Navy had given higher priority to objectives such
as reducing overall dollar values of UCAs, while DCMC was more
concerned with the quantities of UCAs definitized. Assuming
the Navy had good reasons for the objectives it had
established for the NAVPROs, any general deviation from these
objectives by DCMC could be expected to run counter to NAVAIR
interests. DCMC management has often stated that support of
PM and PCO customers is paramount, being in fact the purpose
of the DCMC organization. The researcher felt that working
level ACOs would be in the best position, as owners of the
process, to recommend further improvements toward
simultaneously satisfying customer and DCMC objectives.
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b. Results: ACO responses to this question are
graphically displayed in Figure 40.
metods
- Donl perceive a cfifTerence in objeciives
• DCMC oadle-tD-grave control of Navy contracts/Full adoption of DCMC
methods
• DCMC should write a manual and train personnel
•
Bring Navy into DW Network induding 'E-Mail
1
•
Pattern Navy Finance Offices after DLA Finance Offices
• DCMC should not ignore 'Best Practices' Program
Bar Coding contacts to expedite payments/improve deliverables
tracking
• NAVAJR should establish Contracting Officer's Technical
Representative (COTR) system to reduce constructive changes
• Navy should meet with DCMC to explain Reet needs/funding dnl
requirements
Figure 40 13 RESPONDENTS/ 18 COMMENTS
As Figure 40 shows, there were a wide variety of responses to
this question. Most felt there were improvements possible in
this area. The largest number of similar recommendations
involved educating PCOs on how to format a contract before
delegating it to the DPRO for administration. Along those
same lines, one suggested meeting with Navy personnel to
explain DPRO methods.
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There were several ACOs who felt Navy/DCMC objectives were
already in agreement.
Sample responses follow:
Continual emphasis of the need for DPRO Contracting to be
performed in accordance with all established guidelines
and educating Navy Contract Administration in the DPRO
way of Contract Administration.
I would hope there is continuous dialogue between the
Navy and DCMC on contract administration issues.
Perhaps, quarterly or semi-annual conferences between the
two organizations would serve to foster open
communication.
No further actions are required to bring Navy and DCMC
objectives into accord. Both are basically customer
oriented.
This is very difficult to answer because I do not
understand the DCMC objectives at the working man's
level. Their strategic plan sounds very similar to the
Navy's strategic plan at the macro level. No one has
translated these "broad" concepts into why I have been
directed to do my job differently. Also, each day we are
told to change operating instructions to fit DCMC
direction. DCMC is too nebulous right now to pin down.
The Navy had well organized instructions about how to do
the job. Where are the DCMC instructions? Actions:
Write a manual and train the people!
DCMC must understand that by ignoring the "Best
Practices" Program and insisting that the former Service
PROs adopt the old DCAS way of doing business that things
will not get better. They will only be different.
9. Question Nine: Suggestions to Enhance Relationships
What can be done to improve the relationship between
the Navy and DCMC Contract Management organizations?
a. Discussion: This question is similar to number
eight, but rather than focusing on synchronizing objectives,
it was intended to elicit views on whether improvements in
attitudes between the Navy and DCMC might affect the success
of the transition.
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b. Results: Figure 41 graphically displays the
responses to this question. Many respondents felt Navy
personnel need to be trained to integrate DLA regulations and
MOCAS into the contracts they write. They also felt it was
• Navy must accept CAS
changes/concerns samenrain
PCOs on MOCAS/DLA Regs
- Communicatons/Post-Award
Conferences
• Already a good relationship
• DCMC must compromise on
methods
- DCMC should be more responsive jju i __.i i i j i




Figure 41 13 RESPONDENTS/ 17 COMMENTS
time for the Navy to accept the fact that major changes in CAS
have occurred, and to realize that Navy/DCMC CAS concerns are
the same. The most common response suggested enhancements to
communication as the key to a good relationship. Several felt
the relationship was already good, with both parties
interested in customer support.
Sample responses follow:
DCMC must be willing to compromise and stop insisting
that everything be done their way because "that's how
we've always done it.
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The Navy also must accept the fact that localized
Contract Administration has changed drastically.
The Navy must craft contracts cognizant of MOCAS
reguirements . And DLA must loosen up its elaborate
administrative procedures.
Earlier dialogue between the two in the post-award stage
of major programs, in order to highlight customer
needs/expectations and CAO interpretations/reguirements
.
As in the previous question, communication is the key.
The customers view the new DLA ownership as a "hostile
takeover" and haven't fully gotten on board yet with how
to deal with the changes. DCMC frankly views its new
former-Service PROs as wayward children who need to be
weaned from the bad management/admin practices of their
former masters. The DPRO ends up caught in the middle
between the new boss and the old boss - who also happens
to be the customer.
10. Question Ten: Further Recommendations
Please give any other recommendations related to
enhancing the success of the transition.
a. Discussion: This question was intended to
elicit specific recommendations from process owners for
improving the success of the transition. This question allowed
ACOs to make recommendations which they may not have had the
opportunity to mention in responding to the previous
questions.
b. Results: Figure 42 graphically displays the
responses to this question. Most ACOs provided specific
recommendations, however, the largest response category was
from those who had no further input. The next largest group
felt more indoctrination was needed into the DLA way of
conducting business.
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One suggested ACO visits to DLA PROs which existed prior to
the transition (DCASPROs) to see how they operate. Some
noted that MOCAS training was needed.
- No other recommendations
•Formal training on DLA way of doing
business/MXAS/ACOs visit old DCASPROs
• Improve MOCAS/Adcpt Air Force MIS m \m of MOCAS
•Stop using term 'Best Practices'
• Implement 'Best Practices' in a more timely fashion
• Do not assign Military as PRO Commanders due to
confiicting pressures
• Al organizations use DLAM CAS Manual as operating
guidance




Figure 42 13 RESPONDENTS/ 15 COMMENTS
Sample responses follow:
I can think of none. I think time itself will help the
transition - as people accept the DLA organization.
Conventional wisdom has it that the entire way the
transition was handled was screwed up from the get-go.
A magic wand was waved and the Service PROs were
transformed into DPROs - only trouble is that the magic
wand didn't provide adeguate training on how to do DLA's
reports, do business the DLA way, etc. A good example is
MOCAS - which is a joke here at DPRO Sikorsky, as formal
training on the system has been almost non-existent and
we don't have the computer capability to deal with it.
The magic wand didn't help us get more people to do the
job (i.e., the normal workload plus all the new DLA
reporting reguirements) - we were simply told that if we
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did our work the DLA - way we would be working
smarter/more efficiently and wouldn't, therefore, need
additional personnel. Civilian personnel had to be moved
from one billet to another in order to fit the DLA
organization model as to who could do what, in the GS
rating, etc. . .And on and on. There has been a lot of
bitterness here at DPRO Sikorsky with all this, and
morale is rock-bottom.
I would like to see implementation of "Best Practices" in
a more timely fashion. We have been under DCMC
cognizance for approximately 1 1/2 years and continue to
operate under existing DLA guidance.
The MOCAS system is cumbersome. DCMC should consider
adopting the Air Force AMIS database which is easier to
use and much more versatile.
Update the MOCAS system making it user friendly.
Too much has happened too guickly. People identified
with the Navy; there is no identity to DCMC. To make
this transition successful, please consider the
following:
(1) Do not use the terms "best practices".
(2) Explain what guiding procedures DCMC uses besides
FAR, DFAR, and DLAM - make sure personnel are trained in
their use.
(3) Allow workers (not managers) to visit PROs who have
functioned under the DLA system and learn from their
experience.
(4) Do not make Commanders in the military, heads of PRO
offices - they are under tremendous pressure to be
responsive to the military for their career yet they also
have to answer to the District for priorities.
11. Summary
The latest ACO surveys revealed several important
points. One point considered very significant was that a
surprising number of ACOs were not familiar with the DCMC
"Best Practices" program. Significantly, most of the ACOs
who were familiar with the program had not seen any change
from what they believed to be traditional DLA management
practices.
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The remaining points may be categorized as factors
related to five general areas of change. These include
organizational structure/roles, operating guidance, reporting
requirements, MIS/Control systems, and organizational
priorities. These points are discussed below. The sections
which follow this summary provide the results of the surveys
of industry and PMs, respectively.
a. Structure and Roles
The role changes cited as most significant by
ACOs included the issuing of warrants and negotiation
authority to many more personnel, and, the fact that a new
Financial Services Branch had been established to perform
price analysis functions. Several indicated frustration and
confusion had resulted from the new distribution of
responsibilities. Some also made strong points concerning the
value of having one individual performing both the price
analysis and negotiation functions.
Surprisingly, several ACOs reported little
interaction with Program Integrators. Most who commented on
the support impacts of the Program Integrator position noted
either no change, or felt the only impact was the incurrence
of additional reporting requirements.
Another interesting finding was that several
ACOs felt it would be useful to train PCOs on how to format a
contract before delegating it to the DPRO for administration.
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b. Operating Guidance
Significantly, several ACOs listed DCMC's
structured, well defined guidance as positive changes. They
felt that whereas the NAVPRO often handled problems on an ad
hoc basis, the DCMC manuals provided them with ready guidance.
It was not clear, however, what positive impacts the
structured DCMC methods would have for Navy customers. Some
were pleased that they were under less pressure from
customers, and were better able to organize their own
workload.
ACOs reflected similar attitudes regarding the
possible benefits of CAS consolidation to industry. The
largest common ACO response indicated that the "One Face to
Industry" concept would most benefit industry.
c. Reporting Requirements
Several ACOs expressed negative opinions
regarding the impacts of DCMC reporting requirements on
customers. Some indicated that reporting requirements and
MOCAS maintenance were impinging on the time available to
support customers.
d. MIS/Control Systems
Some ACOs commented on difficulties and delays
in contractor payments under the DCMC payment system.
Significantly, this problem was noted in the latest PCO
responses as well.
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While some ACOs felt MOCAS maintenance to be
burdensome, other ACOs praised the ability of the system to
track deliverables and funds status.
e. Organizational Priorities
The most common ACO opinion regarding
differences in NAVPRO and DPRO organizational priorities
referred to workload sequencing. ACOs cited the fact that the
DCMC emphasis is on quantities of actions process, rather than
dollar values as the Navy had emphasized. They also pointed
out DCMC ' s emphasis on first-in, first-out work sequencing.
Several ACOs also felt that DCMC places more emphasis on
meeting statistical goals than on solving customer problems.
Many ACOs felt it was time for the Navy to
accept the fact that major changes in CAS have occurred, and
to realize that Navy/DCMC concerns are the same. These ACOs
suggested that the Navy begin training PCOs on writing





All of the questions in this section relate to the
subsidiary research question: "What impacts are DCMC ' s methods
of Contract Administration having on their Navy customers and
Industry?"
.
1. Question One: Primary Concerns
What are your company's primary concerns regarding
the change of your in-plant NAVPRO to a DPRO? Please explain.
a. Discussion: The transition from Navy to DCMC
Contract Administration carries the potential for concern on
the part of industry. They no longer have an arm of the Navy
customer within the plant. The company must now work through
an intermediary, with possibly less programmatic interest than
the NAVPRO had. This question was designed to elicit
contractor concerns regarding the new situation.
b. Results: The results of this question are
listed below. Each item listed was expressed only once as a
concern, with the exception of the first item, which was
reported twice:
PRIMARY CONCERNS
- Negotiation delays due to DPRO reporting requirements
and other added wickets.
The DLA Review Board critique of all negotiated
settlements could result in the overturning of the ACO
negotiated settlements.




- Communications between DPRO/NAVAIR now that they are
more distinct and separate organizations
- Lack of familiarity with DLA
- Impact of reorganization on ongoing work
- Confusion over greatly increased number of ACOs
- Concern over future rotation of DPRO Commander to a
Service other than the Navy
DPRO attitude about getting procurement business
accomplished
- What effect the lack of knowledge of DPRO procedures by
former NAVPRO personnel will have on business
- Whether ground rules/priorities will be different with
DPRO
The following are sample responses:
Will DPRO be as concerned about "getting procurement
business" accomplished as NAVPRO was?
Will the "ground rules" be different under DPRO?
Priorities?
Seems to be more rigid; less flexibility in working
problems. ACOs have indicated they have less latitude on
matters such as pricing analysis requirements or de-
obligating funds.
Our concern is that the DPRO's increasing reporting
requirements, as well as additional "wickets" to go
through to get things done, will take away from precious
time needed for negotiations and other contract actions.
Our primary concern is that increased administrative
duties of the DPRO have affected negotiation timeliness.
In general, we believe this change will have a positive
impact on all programs. While no particular examples are
given, we anticipate more consistent policies through
DLA/DPRO due to less agency related policies and
priorities. On the other hand, the DLA Review Board
critique of all negotiated settlements could result in
the overturning of the ACO negotiated settlements.
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...ACOs have indicated they have less latitude on matters
such as pricing analysis requirements or de-obligating
funds
.
Concerns dealt mainly with the potential impact to our
on-going work. The NAVPRO at Grumman was organized into
six divisions... The reorganization of these six groups
into three, impacted work flow and disrupted points of
contacts. There also were only four or five ACOs that
our contracts departments had to interface with
concerning the signature of contractual documents and now
its increased to over sixteen. This caused confusion as
to who was responsible and what were their limits. The
reorganization also set the stage for the elimination of
the local disbursement office. The conduct of normal
business was temporarily disrupted but has improved since
the reorganization one year ago.
2. Question Two: Effectiveness of Mechanized System
DCMC has incorporated the MOCAS (Mechanization of
Contract Administration Services) to administer contracts with
your company. Under MOCAS, progress payments are paid
automatically by the payment office. Is this a better system?
Is payment more timely? What improvements could be made in
this area?
a. Discussion: Early feedback from ACOs had
indicated contractors were concerned about DCMC capabilities
in handling progress payment billings. This question sought
to establish whether contractors were familiar with MOCAS,
and, what their opinions are concerning the effectiveness of
the system.
b. Results: The responses to this question are
graphically displayed in Figure 43. Many contractor responses
indicated significant delays had been experienced in invoice
payments since the transition to MOCAS payments. Several
cited the necessity for extremely accurate data in order for
prompt payment to occur. Others noted that if MOCAS was to be
useful, it would require intensive labor within the DPRO. No
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specific improvement recommendations were made, other than
stating that MOCAS would only be as good as the inputs made to
it by the DPRO personnel.
• An improvement. More
timely/Identifies problems
• Has delayed invoice
payments/appears less timely/billings
has reservations
• Useful, requires accurate input for
payment Not fully operational.
Should improve if good input.
- Had initial problems with payment
data
• No impact noted on timeliness of
payments. No major difference to date
- Not better at this time
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Figure 43 4 RESPONDENTS/ 15 COMMENTS
Sample responses follow:
...prior to MOCAS, Grumman received most of its payments
from the NAVPRO disbursement off ice. . .With MOCAS at
Boston and the lower level of detail reguired by MOCAS,
Grumman has been impacted. Numerous contractual
documents had to be modified so that they would be "MOCAS
COMPATIBLE". .
.
...Grumman is experiencing significant delays in payments
with average payment increasing from two days to a
current two weeks...
. . .Invoice payment prior to MOCAS implementation averaged
10-20 days, after implementation, the average was 80-100
days. Recently, a meeting between MCAIR and the
Government resulted in an agreement for payment in 27-30
days.
123
Payments are being made in a more timely manner. New
system allows on-line inquiry of invoice status...
MOCAS at this point is not an improvement. Only a
limited amount of MCAIR deliverables have been loaded
into MOCAS and that data has been found to be only 45%
accurate. The system will require DPRO to dedicate a
staff to maintain the system and keep the data current.
3. Question Three: Perceived Benefits
Did the consolidation of Contract Administration
Services benefit your company? If so, how?
a. Discussion: Many Government personnel feel
contractors stand to benefit from the transition. For
example, many point to the fact that contractors will have
fewer Service unique Contract Administration rules to
understand and comply with. This question was designed to
elicit contractor views regarding benefits they may have
experienced from the consolidation.
b. Results: Most industry personnel responding did
not note any perceived benefits to the transition. Some
expressed varying views regarding the dissolution of the Navy
Technical Representative Detachments (NTRDs) , which had
existed on a temporary basis in order to carry on the issuance
of PIO/BOA orders for NAVAIR after the DPRO took over. That
function has since been assumed by the DPRO. Figure 44
graphically displays the responses to this question.
Sample responses follow:
Grumman has Plants around the country and not every Plant
was administered the same by the Government. The NAVPRO
was different from the AFPRO which was different from the
DCAS
. Having all DPROs, standardizes the language and
the operating procedures/policies, making the conduct of
business more consistent.
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No change was noticed, unless the consolidation resulted
in the dissolvement of NTRD, then the answer is no. NTRD
was very responsive to NAVAIR priorities.
...If you mean the elimination of NTRD... then yes, the
consolidation of effort being handled by one Service vs.
two is always better. We have one individual to
coordinate with vs. 2 Gov't Reps. Priorities are not the
same for them.
Little or no change
Yes. Single face to Industry/Consistent policies and
irocedures
DhTicult to assess
Over time, should allow for further improvement
More equal emphasis to individual Military Branches
Should make it easier to get consolidated changes
2 3
Figure 44 4 RESPONDENTS/ 13 COMMENTS
4. Question Four: Impacts on Customer Support
Will this change affect your ability to support your
Navy Customer (NAVAIR)? If so, how?
a. Discussion: This question was designed to
obtain industry views on whether the contractor will be able
to provide the same level of service to the NAVAIR customer,
given the change in CAS organizations.
b. Results: The largest group of respondents said
they expected no noticeable effects on their ability to
support Navy customers.
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One contractor reported some temporary confusion early in the
transition with the new procedures and organizational
structure. Figure 45 graphically displays the responses to
this guestion.
- Should have no effect
- Possible effects
- No major/Long term
problems
- Should make it easier
Figure 45 4 RESPONDENTS/ 12 COMMENTS
Sample responses follow:
Overall, no major effect on ability to support NAVAIR.
There is some feeling that DPRO is not as compelled to
expedite Navy matters as NAVPRO was.
Closer coordination is reguired between DPRO and NAVAIR.
NTRD had a vested interest in supporting NAVAIR.
5. Question Five: Adoption of "Best Practices"
What functions were performed better by the NAVPRO?
What previous NAVPRO practices should DCMC consider adopting?
a. Discussion: As in the ACO/PCO surveys, this
guestion relates to the Best Practices program in that it
sought to elicit opinions from PCOs regarding the value of
using certain NAVPRO practices versus DPRO practices.
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Information obtained through this question was used in the
analysis and recommendations sections of this study.
b. Results: Figure 46 graphically displays the
responses to this question. Most observed no change. Some
commented on the NAVPRO emphasis on customer orientation.
No change/Not in position to compare
PM role was important to NAVPRO
NAVPRO was more prompt in payments
NAVPRO worked closer with NAVAIR
Too early to tell
Figure 4 6 4 RESPONDENTS/
11 COMMENTS
Sample responses follow:
Program Manager role in NAVPRO is important. DPRO
should, and is retaining this important function.
Too early to tell yet... Until the beginning of FY92 there
were few, if any, changes in the way of doing business
between being a NAVPRO and a DPRO.
6. Question Six: Changes in Government Performance
What functions are performed better by the DPRO?
a. Discussion: This question was intended to
identify, from the contractor point of view, any improvements
in PRO functions since the transition.
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b. Results: As in the previous question, the most
common response group reported no observed changes in how
functions are performed. Some did note greater consistency
and formality in the way DCMC does business. Figure 47
graphically displays the responses to this question.
- No/Not in position to make comparison
• Greater emphasis on Close-outs/status tracking
of deliverables and payments/analysis of systems
- Too early to tell
- DPRO has more consistent policies
• DPRO is more formal in handling business
- Improved timeliness in negotiations
Figure 4 7 4 RESPONDENTS/ 13 COMMENTS
Sample responses follow:
The DPROs now appear to have a more consistent, universal
application of policy which is also more easily
understood than the NAVPRO.
Contractor personnel are dealing with the same Government
Representatives we were dealing with before. We perceive
no difference in the performance of their representation
whether AFPRO, NAVPRO or DPRO.
7. Question Seven: Changes in Emphases
Have you seen a change in emphases by the DPRO
versus the NAVPRO? What are they?
a. Discussion: Early feedback from ACOs indicated
a greater emphasis by DCMC on such areas as contract close-
outs and deliverables tracking through the use of MOCAS.
128
This question was designed to determine whether such changes
in emphasis were affecting industry.
b. Results: Most industry respondents did note
some change in emphasis since the transition to DCMC. Figure
48 graphically displays the responses to this question.
- No apparent change
- Greater emphasis on record-keeping,
approvals, status, mechanization
- Greater emphasis on two-way
dialogue/TQM
- DPRO emphasis on numbers of











Figure 48 4 RESPONDENTS/ 12 COMMENTS
Sample responses follow:
It is our understanding that with DPRO, the emphasis is
on numbers of contracts negotiated rather than dollar
value negotiated.
One area of change is the increased emphasis on the
timeliness of negotiations. There is now a greater
emphasis on meeting the 180 day def initization cycle




8. Question Eight: Required Interaction
Are there situations where your company must
communicate with Defense Offices other than your on-site DPRO?
(e.g. an on-site Navy detachment) In what situations?
a. Discussion: This question was designed to
determine whether industry was dealing exclusively through the
DPRO (in the "One face to Industry" concept) , or still found
it necessary to interact with other organizations.
b. Results: The majority of industry respondents
reported communicating with a large variety of offices other
than the DPRO, primarily concerning business other than
Contract Administration. Respondents listed Defense Contract
Audit Agency (DCAA) , Navy Aviation Supply Office (ASO)
,
various Navy field activities, NAVAIR PCOs and other agencies.
Sample responses follow:
Direct interface with PCOs at NAVAIR, Aviation Systems
Command (AVSCOM) , ASO, Defense Industrial Supply Center
(DISC) , NASA, etc.
Directly with customers where delegation is not made to
DPRO, i.e. Ft. Eustis, NASA.
Sikorsky dealt with an on-site NTRD (Navy Technical
Representative Detachment) for approx. one year. The
NTRD shop was disestablished effective 1 December of this
year.
A high percentage of our contractual business is with the
Navy (NAVAIR), e.g.; technical change modifications.
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9. Question Nine: Impacts on Negotiations
What effects have you seen on your negotiations of
orders with the DPRO as compared with the NAVPRO? (e.g.
timeliness, priorities, personnel relationships)
a. Discussion: This question was asked to
determine if changing methods, roles, responsibilities, or
organizational priorities within the PRO organization (e.g.
increased emphasis on MOCAS) were having any effect on the
timeliness with which negotiations were being conducted.
b. Results: In the most common response group,
industry personnel expressed positive opinions regarding the
effects of the transition on various aspects of negotiations.
Figure 49 graphically displays the responses to this question.
• Improved timeliness, except low value
spares/DPRO more motivated to negotiate
• Timeliness has appeared to suffer
No change
- More requirements for contractor prior to
negotiating
- General improvement in personnel
relationships
- DPRO appears to be experiencing delays
in recurring Price Analysis
Figure 49 4 RESPONDENTS/ 9 COMMENTS
Sample responses follow:
The timeliness of negotiations appears to have improved
in all areas except for low value spares. The DPRO does
spend more time in analyzing these proposals than ASO
did. This might be due to the fact that the DPRO now has
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a separate Negotiation and Pricing section. With a
company as large as Grumman, I'm not sure there is a need
to separate these two functions...
Some high quality people, but it appears they have some
additional reporting responsibilities - timeliness has
suffered somewhat.
The DPRO now expects the following (all changes from the
previous methods of doing business)
:
1) Pricing updates prior to taking action on
proposals
2) 120 days for proposal pricing/negotiation
3) No acceptance of proposal packages without
funding from NAVAIR
4) No DD 250 sign off for aircraft not 100% in
compliance with contract
10. Question Ten: Further Recommendations
Please provide any other recommendations related to
enhancing the success of the transition.
a. Discussion: This question was asked of DPRO
ACOs as well as their industry counterparts. It was intended
to elicit specific recommendations from process owners for
improving the success of the transition. This question allowed
industry personnel to make recommendations which they may not
have had the opportunity to mention in responding to the
previous questions.
b. Results: There were several recommendations to
enhance the success of the transition. Most of the
recommendations were similar in that they emphasized some form
of communications. Figure 50 graphically displays the
responses to this question.
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Sample responses follow:
Make MCAIR aware of the differences in the way DPRO will
operate, as compared to NAVPRO.
The writer is not aware of any substantive briefing
provided the contractor by the affected Government
Agencies. Such a briefing would presumably indicate
differences in internal and external agency policies and
procedures. Without such a briefing the Contractor may
not be aware of such differences.
Sikorsky A/C hopes there will be few problems in the
future relative to disconnects in philosophy/business
between NAVAIR and DLA that could result in the company
getting mixed signals.
•None
• Government should brief industry on changes
Ensure NAVAIR/DLA do not send mixed signals
-Give DPRO flexibility
Open communications on areas of emphasis
•Share/help develop TQM ideas




Figure 50 4 RESPONDENTS/ 11 COMMENTS
11. Summary
The industry surveys revealed several important
points. It was interesting to note that, overall, most
industry respondents considered the NAVPRO/DPRO transition to
have minimal benefits for their company. Those who did
perceive the transition as generally benefitting their
companies cited the standardization of policies and procedures
as the primary benefit. Despite the perception that few
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benefits would accrue to the companies from the transition,
the largest group of industry respondents said they did not
expect the transition to affect their ability to support Navy
customers
.
The remaining points may be categorized as factors
related to five general areas of change. These include
organizational structure/roles, operating guidance, reporting
requirements, MIS/Control systems, and organizational
priorities. These points are discussed below.
The section which follows this summary provides the
results of the PM surveys.
a. Structure and Roles
The fact that industry personnel had concerns
about DCMC Contract Review Boards overturning ACO decisions
was considered significant. Industry personnel also expressed
concerns that DPRO ACOs may not possess the latitude which
NAVPRO ACOs did. Such situations could undermine the
credibility of the ACO and jeopardize timely negotiations.
Despite these concerns, the most common response regarding
timeliness of negotiations indicated improvements had
occurred.
There were related concerns about the increased
number of ACOs, and confusion over points of contact.
It was also considered significant that industry
would express concerns about whether a Naval Officer continued
to fill the role of DPRO Commander, since a Commander from
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another Service would have no ties to NAVAIR. Some expressed
a related concern regarding the quality of communications
between the DPRO and NAVAIR, since they work within different
organizational structures.
The industry recommendations for enhancing the
transition process were similar to the latest PCO
recommendations in the fact that they emphasized various
improvements in communications.
b. Operating Guidance
It was considered significant that some industry
personnel anticipated more consistent, uniform procedures, and
fewer agency unique priorities to have positive impacts on all
programs.
c. MIS/Control Systems
There were several complaints about the ability
of the MOCAS system to provide timely payment. One indicated
a five-fold increase in the time required for invoice payment.
Some of the invoice payment complaints seemed to relate to the
fact that on-site disbursement offices were being
disestablished, as part of the consolidation of Defense
Department financial systems.
Several expected MOCAS to improve the payment
process, although others felt that the system was still too
new to thoroughly evaluate. It was interesting to note that
only one of the four contractor facilities surveyed provided
entirely positive regarding MOCAS.
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Significantly, several respondents felt that the
DPRO was better than the NAVPRO in performing Contract Close-
out functions, and maintaining status of contract deliverable
and payments.
d. Reporting Requirements
The fact that industry personnel were concerned
about the effects of increased ACO reporting and other
administrative requirements was considered significant. Some
felt that this might cause timeliness of negotiations to
suffer.
e. Organizational Priorities
Some industry personnel were concerned about
whether the DPRO would have different priorities than the
NAVPRO had. Similarly, others were concerned about the
general DPRO attitude toward accomplishing procurement
actions.
Many industry respondents noted changes in
organizational emphases. Significantly, some referred to
DCMC s emphasis on maximizing the quantity of contractual
actions completed within prescribed timeframes (versus the
NAVPRO emphasis on dollar volumes)
.
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G. PROGRAM MANAGER SURVEY
The NAVAIR Program Managers with programs which had
previously been administered by the NAVPROs were surveyed.
The surveys were sent to NAVAIR Code AIR-1002, which
disseminated and subsequently collected and returned all of
the responses. The surveys were sent to eleven Program
Management offices (PMAs) . Ten PMAs responded. One reported
having insufficient information to provide an assessment.
Those which responded included: PMA-257, PMA-261, PMA-274,
PMA-265, PMA-241, PMA-234, PMA-273, PMA-244, PMA-231, PMA-266.
As important customers, who rely on the PROs in achieving many
program objectives, the Program Managers were expected to have
strong opinions on the quality of PRO support they have
received since the NAVPRO/DPRO transition. Program Managers
were asked to rate their agreement with a series of 16
statements on a Likert scale, with possible responses ranging
from Strongly Agree through Strongly Disagree.
1. Statement One: Program Support Services
DCMC has been pro-active in making DPRO Program
Management services known to my Program Office.
a. Discussion: There seemed to be an emphasis on
enhancing program support in much of the early DCMC
correspondence. This lead the researcher to presume that DCMC
would take steps to make customers aware of the transition,
and any changes in support services.
b. Results: Figure 51 graphically displays the
results of this statement. PMs were evenly split between
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agreement/disagreement on this statement. There was only one
extreme response, which strongly disagreed with the statement.
It appears that those who have received briefings on DPRO
services received them from the DPRO. This could indicate
that DCMC has directed the DPROs to perform such briefings,
however, if that were the case one would expect all of the PMs







Figure 51 NUMBER OF RESPONSES
Sample comments follow:
Have had no official notification of DLA emphasis in this
area; individuals at DPRO have been proactive.
We have not even talked to anybody from DCMC (other than
ROHR claim)
.
DCMC hasn't talked to us, however DPRO has. We receive
good support from DPRO but maybe because NAVPRO personnel
still there.
DPRO has been pro-active, not DCMC.
138
2. Statement Two: Leverage with Contractors
My leverage with the contractor remains at least as
strong as before the NAVPRO/DPRO transition.
a. Discussion: This statement explores the
possibility that some contractors may not feel compelled to be
as responsive to Program Managers, since they are no longer
required to deal with an on-site arm of NAVAIR. This
possibility was brought out in an early ACO survey which
reported that the contractor had taken advantage of the
transition by sowing confusion and playing Government offices
against each other.








Figure 51 NUMBER OF RESPONSES




In essence, its the same people doing the same job.
Service component leadership on-site provides more
accountability emphasis.
3. Statement Three: Reporting Systems
DCMC program reporting systems are at least as
useful as the former Navy systems were to my Program Office,
(e.g. deliverables status, funds status)
a. Discussion: NAVPRO reporting systems had been
developed by NAVAIR and the NAVPROs over several years. They
were likely refined to provide only certain information
considered necessary for NAVAIR use. This statement was
designed to determine how useful DPRO reports to customers are
in comparison to the previous NAVPRO reporting systems.









Figure 53 NUMBER OF RESPONSES
responses to this statement. Of those who responded, most
agreed with this statement. Of those who could not rate this
statement, one felt it was too early to comment, and the other
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indicated that there was little visibility of the reports at
the PMA level. The variety of responses indicated the
possibility of variance among the DPROs in reporting methods.
This could indicate that some DPROs are still providing




Have not seen any formal reports.
What DCMC reports?? I've never seen any. (They don't
even forward Sikorsky's reports in a timely manner)
4. Statement Four: Efficiency of Funds Obligation
The DPRO is at least as efficient as the NAVPRO was
in getting funds obligated.
a. Discussion: This statement was based on
information garnished from early ACO and PCO feedback
indicating that DPROs were more concerned with getting
quantities of actions accomplished on a first-in, first-out
basis, versus the former NAVPRO emphasis on dollar volumes.
b. Results: Figure 54 graphically displays the
responses to this statement. Most PMs either disagreed with
this statement, or reported that it was too soon to tell due
to insufficient information.
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- DONT KNOW/NO RESPONSE
Figure 54 NUMBER OF RESPONSES
Sample responses follow:
Not as much leverage as before, when NAVAIR set NAVPRO
priorities.
Can't say for sure. FY 91 was not exactly a normal year
- Judging from turn-around time and other items, I don't
think there will be any improvement.
5. Statement Five: Benefits to Industry
The contractor has benefited from the NAVPRO/DPRO
transition.
a. Discussion: This statement was intended to
determine whether PMs agreed that CAS consolidation would
benefit contractors, as some have predicted.
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b. Results: Figure 55 graphically displays the







DON'T KNOW/ NO RESPONSE
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Figure 55 NUMBER OF RESPONSES
statement. One who didn't know recommended asking the
contractor.
Sample responses follow:
No benefits, and some transition work from the
contractor's point of view (I think).
From what I've seen, the contractor experiences much
frustration in trying to do business with the DPRO.
6. Statement Six: Impacts on Government Flexibility
The DPRO ACO seems to have at least as much
flexibility in contractor dealings as did the NAVPRO ACO.
a. Discussion: This statement was designed to help
determine whether ACO role changes under DCMC have impacted
ACO abilities to act on PM priorities.
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b. Results: Figure 56 graphically displays the
results of this statement. Most PMs disagreed with this
statement, indicating they feel ACOs now have less flexibility







N ,-...,. .•.'i,\.\i,\ ...-.^ '
Figure 56 NUMBER OF RESPONSES
Sample responses follow:
Layers of bureaucracy between them and us, while not a
problem yet, are just problems whose time hasn't yet
come.
DPRO ACO is much more interested in going by the book
than in finding solutions and accomplishing tasks.
Has another layer of management - Boston office - outside
of Navy chain of command. Not as flexible! At least one
opportunity for innovative solution to a problem has been
sguelched.
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7. Statement Seven: Ability to Set Priorities
My ability to set action priorities for the ACO has
been degraded by the transition from NAVPRO to DPRO.
a. Discussion: DCMC ' s stated intentions were to
maintain a high level of program support. A key element
toward fulfillment of this goal is empowering ACOs with the
ability to act on PM priorities. This statement sought to
establish whether PMs feel their priorities are being given as
much attention as before the transition.








Figure 57 NUMBER OF RESPONSES
results of this statement. Most PMs agreed with this
statement, indicating their ability to set ACO priorities has
been degraded.
Sample responses follow:
For the most part, the reaction to requests for priority
actions is "If I can fit it in."
No change (maybe slightly worse)
.
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8. Statement Eight: Navy Detachments
Since the dissolution of the Navy Technical
Representative Detachments (NTRDs) , on-site customer support
from the DPRO has deteriorated.
a. Discussion: The Navy maintained NTRDs after the
transition, to continue performance of some tasks which the
DPRO would not perform. Under the November 1991 MMOA
amendment, DPRO picked up those tasks, allowing for
dissolution of the NTRD. This statement was designed to
determine if PMs feel program support will be as strong
without the NTRDs.









Figure 58 NUMBER OF RESPONSES
responses to this statement. PMs were evenly divided on this
guestion, although the more extreme responses were in
disagreement with the statement.
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Sample responses follow:
Only because of personnel change - NTRD person was more
aggressive.
NTRD dissolution was a good idea. Took out the "middle
man" in certain areas.
9. Statement Nine: Personnel Teaming Arrangements
The DPRO concept of ACO Teams is having beneficial
effects on my program.
a. Discussion: Under NAVPRO management, there
were separate personnel assigned to exclusively negotiation
functions, and others who did exclusively administration. The
Negotiators also did their own price and cost analysis. DCMC
has established an ACO teaming arrangement, which one DPRO
manager described as follows:
. . .With the various NAVAIR PMA shops operating
independently of each other and, indeed, in actual
competition with each other for the limited time and
personnel assets of Contracts Division, we were forced to
scatter proposal negotiations around the Division rather
than allowing a specific ACO Team to handle the work of
a single PMA Shop/Aircraft Type...DLA has instructed us
to: . . . (c) structure the ACO teams so that they work on
specific aircraft types, with a known workload schedule.
This is, in my opinion, a very good thing, although it
requires more planning and overall coordination on the
part of customers than bef ore. .
.
(Ref . 26)
Therefore, DCMC is trading an unstructured,
flexible organization, in which work could be shifted around
as necessary, for a structured organization which directs
certain types of work to specific personnel. This statement
was designed to determine PM opinions concerning the value of
this latest approach.
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b. Results: Figure 59 graphically displays the
results of this statement. The greatest number of PMs
disagreed with this statement. The responses seemed to
indicate that PMs saw (or were aware of) little difference












Figure 59 NUMBER OF RESPONSES
Sample responses follow:
...the NAVPRO had ACO teams - the only difference I've
seen is in who does the negotiations.
I have a team assigned to my program which is coordinated
by a Program Integrator, not an ACO.
10. Statement Ten: Importance of Naval Leadership
In order to maintain DPRO responsiveness to NAVAIR,
it is important that a Naval Officer remain in command of the
DPRO.
a. Discussion: This statement reflects the
researcher's assumption that, since the PROs have transitioned
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into a Joint Command, the Commander may not necessarily remain
a Naval Officer. Since the work in the plants concerned is
primarily for major Navy programs, it would seem essential to
ensure that DPRO Commanders are familiar with the technical
and operational nuances of the programs they administer. This
statement was designed to obtain PM opinions on the importance
Navy leadership.
b. Results: Figure 60 graphically displays the
responses to this statement. The vast majority of the PMs







Figure 60 NUMBER OF RESPONSES
The two comments received follow:
"Special" treatment (which we deserve) would evaporate
with a different Service CO
I think it is important to have an impartial Naval
Officer in command.
Our only managerial input to priorities!
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11. Statement Eleven: Memorandum of Understanding
The recent Memorandum of Understanding between the
Navy and DLA will likely ensure a high level of customer
support from DCMC.
a. Discussion: This statement was designed to
ascertain to what degree PMs felt the November 1991 amendment
to the Master Memorandum of Agreement between the Navy and DLA
would enhance customer support.
b. Results: Figure 61 graphically displays the
responses to this statement. Most PMs disagreed with the
statement, but only slightly. Their comments reflected some








- DONT KNOW/ NO RESPONSE
Figure 61 NUMBER OF RESPONSES
Sample responses follow:
Results will depend on people assigned.
I doubt if it will make a difference. I believe a large
percentage of the problem is attitude.
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Show me.
Unsure. Have not been on distribution; have not seen.
From what we hear, we are hopeful that this will be the
case.
12. Statement Twelve: Means of Improving Relationships
The most useful means of optimizing the NAVAIR/DPRO
working relationship would be through meetings during which
DCMC would explain their methods, and NAVAIR would explain
their needs.
a. Discussion: Feedback from ACOs and PCOs
indicated improvements in communications were essential in
order to improve the relationships between the DPRO and
customer organizations. Some suggested that DCMC methods
needed to be explained to customers, while also determining
specific customer requirements. This statement sought to
elicit PM opinions on whether this approach would be
worthwhile.







- DONT KNOW/ NO
RESPONSE
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Figure 62 NUMBER OF RESPONSES
responses to this statement. There was strong agreement that
the communications lines must be improved.
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Sample responses follow:
Communication is always the key to success.
Meeting of DCMC orientation definitely in order as
starting point; follow on meetings/correspondence likely
necessary.
We tried this with DPRO Contracts Division before, with
no noticeable results. I would be willing to try again.
13. Statement Thirteen: Adherence to Specifications
DCMC's insistence on 100% compliance with
specifications causes unnecessary delays in Government
acceptance of deliveries (DD 250 sign-off) .
a. Discussion: This statement was based on
industry feedback which indicated that DD 250s were not being
signed off by DPRO personnel, unless an aircraft was in
complete compliance with the contract. The researcher
speculated that the Navy might prefer to waive certain
specifications at times, in lieu of other considerations.
b. Results: Figure 63 graphically displays the
responses to this statement. Slightly more PMs disagreed with
this statement than agreed with it.
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Sample responses follow:
Some flexibility is needed.
Common sense items are handled well, but extensive effort
is needed to compute any technical waiver.
Have not seen any difference between DCMC and NAVPRO. We







- DONT KNOW/ NO RESPONSE
Figure 63 NUMBER OF RESPONSES
14. Statement Fourteen: Use of "Best Practices"
The DPROs appear to have retained many of the best
practices that were utilized in the NAVPROs.
a. This statement relates to the DCMC Best
Practices program. PM observations concerning the actual
retention of useful practices are used in the analysis and
recommendations sections of this study.
b. Results: Figure 64 graphically displays the
responses to this statement. Most PMs agreed with this
statement, indicating that some of the best practices are
being retained and are visible at the PM level. Two out of
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the three written comments, however, came from PMs who
disagreed with the statement. This could indicate that







Figure 64 NUMBER OF RESPONSES
Sample responses follow:
The DPRO appears to have discarded all NAVPRO practices
(as well as several people) in favor of the DLA way of
life.
Have not seen evidence of this, except we are pleased
with retention of order issuance and GFE management.
Seems to be.
15. Statement Fifteen: Program Integrator Effectiveness
The DPRO Program Integrators are effective at
motivating and getting program support from the DPRO matrix.
a. Discussion: This statement sought to obtain PM
reactions to the newly established position of Program
Integrator. Although the NAVPROs had Program Manager
Representatives (PMRs) , who performed similar roles as the
154
Program Integrators, the PMRs had two reporting seniors, the
NAVPRO and NAVAIR. The Program Integrators report exclusively
to the DPRO Commander.
b. Results: Figure 65 graphically displays the
results of this statement. Most PMs agreed with this
statement, indicating that Program Integrators are performing
effectively. Several indicated they had insufficient data to
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Figure 65 NUMBER OF RESPONSES
Sample responses follow:
Have not seen a major change as yet.
The PI is vital to the support of our program and
coordination of DPRO.
We don't have one.
Our military PI has always been effective and I am
strongly supportive of continuance.
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16. Statement Sixteen: Impacts on Program Support
Overall, Program Support has improved since the
NAVPRO has become a DPRO.
a. Discussion: This statement sought an overall PM
opinion of how program support has changed since the
transition. Reactions to this statement help answer the
primary research question, "How well is the Navy/DCMC
organizational relationship supporting the needs of Navy and
Industrial customers?" .
b. Results: Figure 66 graphically displays the







- NO CHANGE OBSERVED
Figure 66 NUMBER OF RESPONSES
agreed with this statement. Two PMs did not rate the




I can not think of any aspect of support that has
improved.
The levels of communication and feeling of teamwork have
decreased.
Transparent - No change.
17. Summary
The Program Manager surveys revealed several
important points. Most significantly, none of the PMs agreed
that Program Support had improved since the NAVPROs became
DPROs. Some indicated that the transition had been
transparent to them. One felt that:
The levels of communication and feeling of teamwork have
decreased.
It was also interesting to note that, overall, there
was strong agreement that communications lines must be
improved. Despite this consensus, only half of PMs indicated
that DCMC had been pro-active in making DPRO Program
Management services known to Program Offices.
Surprisingly, most PMs agreed that the DPROs appear
to have retained many of the best practices that were utilized
in the NAVPROs. This is surprising, since most ACOs who had
heard of the program indicated they had not seen any change
from what they believed were traditional DLA Contract
Management practices.
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The remaining points may be categorized as factors
related to three general areas of change. These include
organizational structure/roles, MIS/Control systems, and
organizational priorities. These points are discussed below.
The section which follows this summary provides an
overall summary of this chapter.
a. Structure and Roles
Most PMs felt that the DPRO ACO has less
flexibility in contractor dealings than the ACOs did under the
NAVPRO. They also indicated that their ability to set ACO
priorities had been degraded by the transition. Despite this
finding, however, and other role changes which have occurred,
most PMs agreed that their own leverage with contractors had
remained as strong as before the transition.
One PM made a comment which was similar to what
some PCOs and industry personnel had said regarding role
changes, stating:
Layers of bureaucracy between them and us, while not a
problem yet, are just problems whose time hasn't yet
come.
The vast majority of PMs felt it was important
that a Naval Officer remain in command of the DPROs concerned,
if they were to remain responsive to NAVAIR. This was a
concern with industry personnel, as well.
Most PMs regarded the Program Integrators as
effective in motivating and getting support from the DPRO
matrix. Unlike the latest ACO feedback, there were no
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negative opinions reflected regarding Program Integrators.
The similarity to ACO responses appears to be the fact that
some PMs seem to regard the Program Integrator position as a
continuation of the NAVPRO Program Manager Representative
function. This was evident in one comment, which stated:
Our military PI has always been effective and I am
strongly supportive of continuance.
Other PMs indicated, however, that they were not aware of
having an assigned Program Integrator.
b. MIS/Control Systems
Most PMs agreed that DCMC reporting systems were
at least as useful as the former NAVPRO systems, although some
reported not seeing any reports.
c. Organizational Priorities
Significantly, half of the responding PMs
indicated the DPRO was less efficient in getting funds
obligated than the NAVPRO had been. One attributed this to a
decrease in Navy leverage in setting PRO priorities.
H. CHAPTER SUMMARY
Together, the survey results described in this chapter
combine to reveal many significant points. The early ACO and
PCO surveys, conducted in May 1991, provided initial reactions
to the NAVPRO/DPRO transition. There was considerable
uncertainty among the Contract Administration process owners
at that time. The early surveys only provided limited
information, however, and some of the results probably
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reflected the "growing pains" of learning the new structures,
roles, methods and systems.
The latest surveys, conducted between November 1991 and
January 1992, were much more extensive. They were completed
by ACOs, PCOs, PMs and industry personnel. Many of the
guestions in the latest surveys were based on information
gathered in the early surveys. In addition to revisiting some
of the issues discovered through the early surveys, the
guestions in the latest surveys were geared toward answering
the subsidiary research guestions, ultimately, the primary
research question. The significant points revealed through
this extensive research are analyzed in Chapter IV, the
Organizational Comparison and Analysis.
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IV. ORGANIZATIONAL COMPARISON AND ANALYSIS
This chapter provides an organizational comparison and
analysis of the former NAVPROs versus the present DPRO
organizations. This chapter utilizes information gathered
through surveys of Contract Administration process owners,
telephone interviews, and information obtained through
literature research.
The key differences between Contract Administration
methods used by the Navy and DCMC, and the impacts of these
differences on Navy customers and industry are analyzed. Key
differences between Navy and DCMC organizational priorities ,
and the impacts of those differences on Navy customers and
industry are also analyzed.
Prior to examining key differences in Contract
Administration methods, a description of the structures and
charters of the NAVPRO and DPRO organizations is appropriate.
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A. DESCRIPTION OF ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURES AND CHARTERS
1. Naval Plant Representative Office Organization
The Management Manual for Naval Plant Representative
Offices Assigned to the Naval Air Systems Command Headquarters
prescribed the overall management structure and general
functional guidelines for the NAVPROs . The stated purpose of
the manual was to implement Navy, Federal and Defense
Department
:
...policies and directives. .. relative to the assignment,
organization, and performance of Department of Defense
(DoD) Contract Administration Services (CAS) function.
(Ref. 13, p.l)
It should be noted that the NAVPRO Manual included all of the
functions traditionally considered to be Contract
Administration, as well as such tasks as on-site Program
Management and Flight Operations Management in the list of
NAVPRO CAS functions. The manual made several general policy
statements. These included:
...to have a standard organizational structure with
defined functions and work tasks. The broad work tasks,
assigned to the division level of the NAVPRO, provide an
adequate guide to attain compatibility without
sacrificing the flexibility requisite to achieve the
objectives of each office. (Ref 27, p.l)
The manual essentially required adherence to the
divisional structure shown as figure 67, while allowing the
NAVPRO Commander some flexibility in how people were used at
lower levels. The NAVPRO Commander reported to AIR- 519, the
NAVAIR code responsible for the performance, personnel /budget
support, and CAS policies. NAVPROs were authorized to deal
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directly with the NAVAIR Program Managers (PMs) and Procuring


















Figure 67 NAVPRO MATRIX
The NAVPROs were required to adhere to:
. . .a concept employing the NAVAIR Program/Functional
Matrix Organization within a line and staff
structure. . .Routine work load is processed functionally
through both line and staff groups. Program management
organizations are superimposed on the basic functional
organization for execution of selected priority
programs. (Re f . 27, p. 6)
Essentially all divisions, including the Contracts
Division were considered line functions, while only the Safety
and the Program Manager Representative were labelled staff
functions. The NAVPRO Manual gives brief descriptions of each
Division Director. The manual tasked the Contracts Division
Director with:
...interpreting and implementing policies and procedures
concerning the administration of the terms and conditions
of contracts which affect the contractual obligation of
the Government under the FAR, DoD FAR Supplement, and
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other higher level policies. The Director shall
coordinate the implementation of these policies and
procedures with the contractor and other divisions within
the NAVPRO.(Ref. 27, p. 10)
The NAVPRO Manual was not the only operating guidance given to
the NAVPROs. Another, much larger (308 page) manual existed.
This was the NAVAIR Field Contract Administration Manual .
NAVAIRINST 4330. 16A. This manual provided specific "contract
administration policies and procedures that are not otherwise
available in written form." (Ref. 28) This was the primary
guidance (aside from the FAR, DFAR and Navy Acquisition
Regulations Supplement (NARSUP) ) referred to by CAS personnel
in making day-to-day decisions.
2. Defense Plant Representative Office Organization
Guidance on Contract Administration procedures is
published in the DCMC Contract Administration Manual (DLAM
8105.1) . A forward provided in the most recent edition of the
manual provides insight into DCMC's objectives:
The principal objectives of the Defense Contract
Management Command are to ensure that only materials and
services of the required quality are provided to end item
users on time and at reasonable cost to the Government;
perform such additional authorized Contract
Administration tasks as may be requested by contracting
activities and program managers; and achieve uniformity
in dealing with industry in the accomplishment of these
objectives. These procedures reflect internal DCMC
guidance. To provide the full scope of procedural
guidance, this manual should be used in conjunction with
the FAR and DFARS. .
.
(Ref . 29)
Figure 68 diagrams a DPRO organizational structure,
including the branches subordinate to the Contract Management
Division (Ref. 30, p.VI-2 through VI -5-2) . Within a DPRO, the
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ACOs work within the Contract Operations Branch. Cost and
price analysis is done within the Financial Services Branch.
The Program and Technical Support Division performs technical































Figure 68 DPRO MATRIX
Cost/Schedule Status Reporting and Program Manager Support
functions. Quality Assurance functions such as product
acceptance are performed by the Quality Assurance Division.
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B. KEY DIFFERENCES IN METHODS AND RELATED IMPACTS
In this section the key differences between Contract
Administration methods used by the Navy and DCMC are analyzed.
The impacts of DCMC Contract Administration methods on Navy
customers and industry are examined. This includes a
comparison of the respective organizational structures and
personnel roles, operating guidance, MIS/Control Systems and
reporting requirements of the NAVPROs and DPROs as a result of
the transition. Each of these areas are covered individually
in the following subsections.
1. Differences/Impacts of Changes In Structures and
Roles
a. Discussion and Analysis of Changes
Since transitioning from NAVPROs to DPROs, each
office has consolidated from five major divisions (Figure 67)
to only three (figure 68) . The roles of individual personnel,
as well as roles of the entire organization are changing.
One notable change is that previously, in some of
the NAVPROs the warranted personnel who were signing
contractual actions were the Contracts Branch Heads. For
instance, at NAVPRO Bethpage (Grumman) , there were only two
individuals (GM-13 Branch Heads) signing actions. Under the
new DPRO structure of DCMC, the Branch Heads are no longer
functioning primarily as ACOs, but are instead providing
management oversight of the branches. In most cases, the
warrants have been pushed down to the GS-12 level. This has
provided several more ACOs with signature authority than
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previously existed. Reportedly, "this provides more time for
management functions." (Ref. 31) This supports the stated
DCMC strategy of empowering more people. As ordered by the
present Commander of DCMC:
Functional decision-making will be driven to the lowest
levels of the organization . We must consciously strive to
empower the operational personnel to make decisions which
are in the best interest of the Department. To a
significant degree, this will require a relaxation of
restrictive control mechanisms and an enhancement in the
level of professionalism of the workforce. (Ref . 20, p. 2)
It appears that, primarily, DCMC is looking for ways
to perform with fewer personnel in order to achieve
approximately $450 million in savings (over five years) as
projected by the drafters of DMRD 916 (Ref. 15, p.l). As
the DCMC Commander states:
One of the driving forces in the implementation of the DMR
is the reduction of costs of doing business. In designing
the new DCMC, we have consciously sought to provide the
necessary resource requirements to perform mission
responsibilities while sharing in the budget reductions
mandated by the Secretary of Defense. (Ref. 20, p. 3)
Much of the DCMC expected cost savings are derived from future
plans to reduce contractor oversight and increase uniformity
of field offices, thereby reducing overall DCMC personnel
requirements by 2000 work-years (Ref. 20, p. 3).
Specific plans being considered for reducing
oversight include adopting more "systems approaches" to
contractor surveillance (i.e. expanding reliance on approved
contractor systems in lieu of Government surveillance)
,
raising threshold requirements and extending intervals for
Contractor System/Program Reviews and reliance on contractor
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self -governance through use of the Contractor Risk Assessment
Guide (CRAG) Program.
The DCMC plans are aimed at:
...expanding the use of the systems approach to contractor
surveillance, while at the same time placing more of a
"customer focus" on surveillance efforts
.
(Ref. 22, p. 5)
An important organizational change is in the tasking
of DPRO GS-1102 series Contract Administrators. As an
employee of DPRO Grumman puts it:
...in the NAVPRO days there were administrators and
negotiators (who did their own cost and price analysis)
outside the financial services arena. The DLA mindset is
to have 1102s who can both administrate and negotiate on
the contract operations side... Price analysts are deemed
important within DLA. . .The "cradle to grave" tracking
responsibilities are to be an all -hands effort, not just
farmed out to the procurement clerk (s) to handle. (Ref. 32)
A DPRO McDonnell -Douglas employee made similar comments:
It seems that there is a greatly expanded role for the
Pricing Branch that's called Financial Services under DLA.
(Ref. 33)
These differences in personnel utilization have several
potential implications. In the NAVPRO organization, no one
was strictly a "Price Analyst" (i.e. doing only price analysis
work) . Cost and price analyses were done by the same
personnel who negotiated/def initized various types of orders.
Under those conditions, the ACO was able to decide what work
his teams would give priority to, including price and cost
analysis. Since becoming DPROs, however, the PROs have
reorganized along functional , vice strictly programmatic
lines. DCMC places more emphasis on ACO teams with members
from several different functional areas such as Financial
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Services and Engineering advising the ACO, who makes the
ultimate decisions. Within the DPRO, price and cost analysis
is now the responsibility of Price Analysts working within a
functional branch (Financial Services) . It is no longer just
the ACO who sets priorities for price analysts, but their own
functional supervisors, who may have a separate set of
priorities for their subordinates than the ACO. According to
early feedback from NAVAIR representatives, this had also
impacted the Program Manager's ability to shift ACO work
priorities (Ref. 34). In an early survey, one ACO credited
the NAVPRO method of having negotiators do all of their own
pricing with keeping a manageable backlog of undef initized
orders. He stated however, that:
Under DLA, that function has been moved to a centralized
pricing branch which also performs pricing for FY buys as
well as field pricing for other cognizant offices. The
time it takes to get a pricing report will only delay
negotiations and increase the undef initized order backlog
again. (Ref. 35)
In a DPRO, if an ACO determines that a comprehensive field
pricing report is required, a request is forwarded to the
Financial Services Branch. According to DCMC guidance:
In the absence of specified due dates, it is general policy
to schedule cases for completion in 30 days if audit is not
required, or 45 days if audit input is necessary ... the
price/cost analyst will consider whether audit assistance
is required. . .The price/cost analyst will determine whether
technical assistance is required. (Ref. 29, sections
15.805-6 and 15.805-13)
Whereas the NAVPRO ACO was in complete control of all
cost/price analysis efforts, the DPRO ACO must submit a formal
request to another branch to perform this effort. Since the
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general policy is to complete pricing reports within 30-45
days, by passing the responsibility for cost/price analysis to
someone other than the negotiator, the negotiator may lose
some familiarity with the case. Definitization schedules may
suffer as well. On the other hand, by dividing up
responsibilities, personnel may become more specialized and
proficient in their specific area.
There is probably some merit to developing
specialists in certain Contract Administration functions. The
NAVPROs took that approach with regard to Contract
Administration versus pure negotiations. Within NAVPRO
contract sections there were some GS-1102 series personnel who
did purely Contract Administration and others who did
primarily negotiations/price analysis (Ref. 31). In many
ways that arrangement makes sense. Effective negotiating
requires a high degree of skill and experience. It probably
helps if the negotiator is free to concentrate on the
negotiations without undue interruptions. Pure Contract
Administration, however, includes many repetitive tasks more
suitable for performance by clerks. Such tasks as reviewing
files for physical completion of deliveries, and preparation
of statistical management reports are tedious and demand a
strong clerical aptitude. Some of the NAVPROs kept these
functions separate, however, DCMC combines them.
ACOs reported in early surveys that the NAVPROs were
previously required to obtain PCO approval of pre- and post-
170
negotiation business clearances for amounts exceeding $10
million. Under DCMC, however, all actions in excess of $500
thousand must pass a board of contract review. One ACO feels
that: "Since most cases (95%) at this contractor exceed that
amount, the board will be another inefficiency or slow down of
the process." (Ref. 35)
Some NAVPROs previously reviewed and approved
subcontractor plans. The DCMC Contract Administration Manual
considers this a PCO function, not to be delegated. (Ref. 29,
part 19-3 c) A PCO who deals with DPRO Bethpage reported
that, since the transition, subcontracting plans were being
sent to him for approval. (Ref. 36)
There does not appear to be much change regarding
coordination of contractual or programmatic issue resolution.
However, now, under DCMC, "...you'd not only coordinate it
with your program office, but also, if it's significant
enough, the DLA. District office may get involved." (Ref. 33)
On-site Program Integrators also are brought into certain
issues. Until publication of January 1991 update of DLA'
s
Organization of DLA Field Activities (DLAM 5810.1), there had
been little formal description of the role of the Program and
Technical Support Divisions (Program Integrators) . The
Program Support Branch, within the Program and Technical
Support Division is charged with serving "as the focal point
for DPRO technical support to program managers." (Ref. 30, p.
VI - 5 - 3
)
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The Branch is also tasked with ensuring " . . .effective liaison
within the DPRO with other contract management offices,
Program Management Offices, and DCMC. . . . " (Ref . 30, p. VI-5-3)
Liaison is accomplished on matters such as:
. . .assignment of weapon system and other program priorities
for DPRO support, . . .roles responsibilities, and assignment
of program integrators.
...DPRO representation at program meetings...
Maintaining liaison with end users regarding performance
of delivered products .... (Ref . 30, p. VI-5-3)
DPRO personnel say that Program Integrators have
always been in the PROs, but they were previously referred to
as Program Manager Representatives (Ref. 33) However, the
position of "Program Integrator" did not formally exist within
the old DCASPRO organizations. According to DPRO McDonnell
-
Douglas personnel, the Program Integrator "simply assumes the
same responsibilities/duties as the old PMR (Program Manager
Representative)." (Ref. 35) The PMRs, who were on-site
NAVAIR representatives to the NAVPROs, were chartered to:
...improve the organizational, business, and technical
relationships among the PMA, NAVPRO, and the contractor,
and to improve the ability of the PMA to deal directly with
problems at the contractor's site. ... (Ref . 37, p. 1)
Figure 67 shows the PMR reporting to the NAVPRO Commander,
however, in accordance with NAVAIR instructions, the PMR
actually received a concurrent fitness report from the NAVAIR
Program Manager. As stated in NAVAIRINST 5000. 10A:
The PMR will be responsive to the PMA and the CO, NAVPRO
and will act as the primary focal point in the NAVPRO for
all program matters. (Ref. 37, p. 3)
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It appears that a primary difference with the Program
Integrator function is that it reports exclusively to the DPRO
Commander.
According to the early surveys, most PCOs were
unaware of the existence of Program Integrators at the DPROs,
although one was and commented: "The integrators are effective
in motivating both NAVAIR to respond to the field and vice-
versa. A definite plus!" (Ref. 36) Another responded: "To
date, I have had no experience in using the 'Program
Integrator'. It appears to be a step in the right direction."
(Ref. 36) Still another felt the "DPRO Program Integrators
are well intentioned but will not be able to motivate/get
support from an increasingly insulated/detached DPRO matrix.
"
(Ref. 36) Interestingly, in cases where a DPRO is assigned
cognizance of Major Weapon Systems/Programs, the DCMC Contract
Administration Manual (DLAM 8105.1) suggests making the ACO
the primary point of contact on those contracts for the PCO as
well as the Program Manager. Additionally, the manual
suggests that the "Major Program" ACO work out a workload
prioritization in accordance with the PM' s needs. (Ref. 29,
p. 90. 13 -2) These are customer oriented policies, however, the
policy of establishing the ACO as the primary point of contact
for the PM conflicts with another DLA manual (DLAM 5810.1),
which, as discussed previously, states that the Program
Support Branch (i.e. Program Integrator)
:
Serves as the focal point for DPRO coordinated technical
support to program managers (Ref. 30, p. VI-5-3)
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This conflicting guidance may account for some ACO's feelings
that Program Integrators are an impediment. The manuals
should be brought into agreement.
Despite some early confusion over the role of
Program Integrators, DCMC's establishment of this function may
be viewed as an excellent application of their "Best
Practices" philosophy, in which one of the best practices of
the former NAVPROs (i.e. PMRs) have been incorporated into the
DPRO structure.
Another significant change in responsibilities was
that the DPROs serving NAVAIR ceased issuing Provisioned Item
Orders (PIOs) and Basic Ordering Agreement (BOA) orders for
such items as Spares and Repairables. Until the joint
Navy/DCMC Master Memorandum of Agreement (MMOA) (Amendment
One) of 22 November, 1991, (Appendix A) PCOs had to write
such orders themselves, or had to task the on-site Navy
Technical Representative Detachment (NTRD) to write them.
Formerly, the NAVPRO received requirements under PIOs and
issued orders against them. During early research, DPRO
McDonnell- Douglas indicated that this problem would have the
"biggest impact" on the PCO/ACO relationship . (Ref. 35) In
early surveys of PCOs, it was noted that:
DLAM 8105.1 part 42.2-3 provides that delegations of duties
not listed in FAR 42.302 as Contract Administration office
duties may not be accepted by Contract Administration
offices without Headquarters DLA approval. (NAVAIR)
Headquarters policy relating to NAVPROs had set out
additional functions not specifically covered under the
FAR.
174
These included: ....Issue orders under contracts for
provisioned and other items, and orders under BOAs;" . (Ref.
36)
The role change most frequently mentioned by PCOs
during early research regarded the issuance of Basic Ordering
Agreement (BOA) and Provisioned Item Orders (PIOs) . The EA-6
Program PCO, who works through DPRO Bethpage (Grumman) stated:
I am fearful that NTRDs will not be able to provide the
"coordinated" services that the ACO used to under NAVPRO.
Also, NTRDs are not dedicated to specific programs so there
could be a reduction in services due to conflicting
priorities. Under NAVPRO, the Contract Administrators were
dedicated to a specific program. (Ref. 36)
Another PCO noted similar concerns regarding BOA orders by the
NTRD: "I have noted several errors in these orders and I
believe it is due to lack of training. " (Ref . 36) A PCO who
deals with Sikorsky Corporation noted that the NTRDs, "Seem
not to have support from DPRO or NAVAIR. " (Ref . 36) The AV-8
Program PCO, who dealt with an NTRD and DPRO McDonnell -Douglas
reported "...not seeing an adverse effect to the PCOs role or
to the program. " The PCO goes on to say, however,
There is no guarantee the NTRDs are going to be
institutionalized. Program offices are hesitant to pay from
scarce program funds for a service which otherwise can be
provided by a DPRO or within NAVAIR. In the event the
NTRDs dissolve, the functions which the DPRO had once
performed as a NAVPRO will likely be burdened upon NAVAIR.
"
(Ref. 36)
There seemed to be common concern among PCOs that many of the
functions once performed by the DPROs would become PCO
responsibilities, particularly if the NTRDs could not handle
them or were dissolved. These concerns persisted until the
November MMOA amendment was signed.
175
The November 1991 MMOA amendment, signed by the
Secretary of the Navy and the Commander of DCMC apparently
settled many of the issues which had remained since the
transition of the NAVPROs into DCMC. Important agreements
made by the MMOA are:
- Transfer of 27 civilian billets from the Navy into DLA
(former NTRD personnel)
- Delegation of Contract Administration functions not
listed as normal delegations under FAR Part 42.302. These
include:
I. Issuance of Ceiling Priced and Fully Priced
Orders
II. Validation of MILSTRIP requisitions
III. Waivers and Deviations for Minor Nonconforming
Supplies or Services
IV. Concurrence in Classification of Class II ECPs
V. Monitoring and oversight of GFM
VI. Witnessing the Contractor Validation of
Technical Manuals
VII. Logistics Support
Referring to the accepted delegations, the MMOA states, in
part
:
These delegations exceed the traditional Contract
Administration Services (CAS) defined by FAR Part 42. They
are willingly accepted by the Defense Contract Management
Command (DCMC) in the spirit of customer support without
intending to establish precedent in a general expansion of
CAS functions. (Ref. 38)
The most commonly mentioned DPRO delegation issue in early
contacts with PCOs and ACOs was that of PIO/BOA order issuing.
The specifics of what the former NAVPROs will do in this
regard are detailed in the amended MMOA. Management personnel
with NAVAIR and with a major DPRO were contacted and asked
whether the order writing issue had been fully addressed by
the MMOA amendment. The DPRO manager felt it had fully
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Xaddressed the issue. He also felt that the agreement
accomplished everything that NAVAIR had wanted it to (Ref.
39) . The NAVAIR manager contacted said he thought the MMOA
amendment accomplished what NAVAIR had wanted it to. However,
he pointed out an interesting side effect which had occurred
from the issuance of the MMOA amendment. According to him,
the original MMOA had been vague enough, that some of the
DPROs which had formerly been DCASPROs, were performing some
of the non- traditional CAS functions despite the fact that no
MMOA existed addressing these functions. However, once the
November 1991 MMOA amendment was signed, some of these former
DCASPROs decided to cease performing these functions, citing
the fact that the MMOA amendment specified that it was only
the former NAVPROs which were bound to perform the non-
traditional CAS functions. (Ref. 40)
The following section discusses the impacts of the
changes in organizational structures and roles on Navy and
industry customers
.
b. Analysis of Impacts on Customers
1. Impacts on Navy Customers
Few PCOs reported current impacts from the
changes in PRO structure or roles. This is a change from the
early surveys. Previously, the largest PCO concern with regard
to changing roles and responsibilities involved the issuance
of Provisioned Item Ordering and BOA orders. Since DCMC had
not accepted responsibility for issuing PIO or BOA orders, the
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Navy found it necessary to maintain a contractual presence at
the contractor facilities in the form of the NTRDs . Early
feedback from PCOs indicated the NTRDs might be ill -prepared
for their duties, due to lack of training and experience in
issuing PIO and BOA orders. It appeared that the question of
whether the NTRDs would continue to exist, or the order
issuing responsibility would be passed to either NAVAIR or the
DPRO, would have a large bearing on the Navy customer's
perceptions of the success of the transition. That issue was
essentially resolved by the November 1991 MMOA amendment.
Some PCOs commented in the latest surveys on the
confusion over order issuing prior to the signing of the MMOA
amendment. Some indicated that order issuing was still a
problem. Some PCOs were apparently unaware of the MMOA
amendment, or what agreements had been made.
One PCO spoke positively, saying: "The recent
DPRO reorganization has also clarified lines of
responsibility, has facilitated communications by clarifying
lines of authority."
Despite the signing of the Navy/DLA MMOA, many
PCOs reported program unique Memorandums of Agreement being
drafted. This is a new development since the early surveys.
It is probably a positive indicator that the organizations are
attempting to further refine respective roles. It is also
indicative of attempts to improve communications, which were
lacking, according to early PCO surveys.
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Despite major role changes in price analysis
functions, few PCOs noted any change in the usefulness of
field pricing reports from the DPRO. The PCO consensus seems
to be that the usefulness of PRO pricing reports has not
changed. Despite early ACO predictions of delays due to the
new structure for price analysis, one PCO actually felt that
DPRO turn- around time was quicker. As another PCO speculated,
however, the negligible impact of role changes on PCOs may be
attributable to the fact that former NAVPRO personnel, with
loyalties to NAVAIR, are still in place.
ACOs listed the increase in contracting warrants
and the transfer of price analysis responsibilities as the
most key differences in roles and responsibilities.
Significantly, when asked what functions had been performed
better by the NAVPRO, the largest response category indicated
that price analysis by negotiators as a better practice.
Reasons given included the fact that by performing the price
analysis on a particular proposal themselves, negotiators
became much more familiar with the proposal. Others felt a
negotiation could be accomplished quicker when the same person
controlled the price analysis and the negotiation.
Several ACOs also noted that a key change was
requiring ACOs to become involved in performing Contract
Administration functions through the use of MOCAS . Referring
to learning to use MOCAS, one ACO stated:
. . .a new and time consuming dimension has been added to
existing duties ... (Ref . 41)
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The researcher's opinion is that certain repetitive Contract
Administration functions should be segregated, tasking them to
administrative specialists. This practice, which existed
within NAVPROs, allows the more highly skilled negotiators to
concentrate on negotiations . Under DCMC, however, negotiators
have taken on clerical administrative duties and
Administrators have been assigned negotiations. One ACO
noted:
The ACO was given many new duties and responsibilities with
none of the contracts reassigned. The workload is
staggering. (Ref. 41)
In the researcher's opinion, such tasking, without regard for
the skill level is certain to have deleterious effects on DPRO
morale. This philosophy also expects individuals to be
competent in too many separate disciplines. Feedback from
ACOs in the latest surveys indicated that the MOCAS system is
complex and difficult to use, particularly in processing
payments. One ACO commented: "...We are slaves to a rigid
mechanized system." (Ref. 41) Another ACO stated:
MOCAS requires too many data bits to be entered into the
mainframe. .. Extreme difficulties getting contractors paid
for delivered goods. (Ref. 41)
It is doubtful that an individual can be as competent at both
negotiating and MOCAS administration as an individual who
specializes in one or the other. Double-hatting personnel,
however, could help DCMC rationalize further personnel
reductions. Such actions would likely degrade customer
support as well.
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ACOs are possibly in the best position to predict
future impacts on their customers. Interestingly, ACOs
provided more feedback on possible impacts from role changes
than did PCOs . In recent surveys, some ACOs predicted
positive impacts on their customers, citing such factors as
"Clearer, more definitive guidance. . .provided in DLA manuals
and regulations." (Ref. 41) These ACOs also listed as
positive changes for their customers that DCMC administration
methods are: "...more defined and better structured than
NAVPRO methods..." (Ref. 41) Although several ACOs listed
such factors, they did not specify how these changes would
actually help their customers. It appeared that what many of
these ACOs were saying was that DCMC structures, roles and
responsibilities would have positive impacts for the ACOs
themselves. These responses could also indicate that since
ACOs will be less pressured with "crisis management" as many
NAVPROs reportedly were, the ACOs will be able to get more
organized, thereby enhancing their ability to support
customers
.
There were also many ACOs who felt that there are
negative impacts on customers due to DCMC structure, role and
responsibility changes. These ACOs were more specific as to
the impacts. A representative example is one who stated:
Increased paperwork and reporting requirements take more
time away from the support I can provide to my program.
(Ref. 41)
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Based on the types and numbers of responses,
there appear to be many more demonstrations of negative
impacts on Navy customers from changes in structure, roles and
responsibilities than positive impacts. Many PCOs do not seem
to be aware of the dramatic role changes which have occurred
within the PROs . Many had not perceived significant changes
in interactions with DPRO personnel since the beginning of the
consolidation. This may be due to the fact that many PCOs are
interacting with the same personnel within the DPRO as they
did prior to the consolidation. In the researcher's opinion,
PCOs have simply not yet felt the negative impacts of
structure and role changes due to the momentum from the
previous relationship. As one PCO put it:
None yet, NAVPRO personnel are still in place. Over time,
loyalty to NAVAIR will dissipate. (Ref . 48)
This "dissipation of loyalty" may be exacerbated by the fact
that, as DPROs load more of their contracts into MOCAS,
reporting requirements will demand increasingly larger shares
of an ACO's workday.
Perhaps if functions represented by the Program
Integrators continue to gain prominence, they can offset the
effects of personnel reductions. Early surveys revealed a
lack of PCO familiarity with the Program Integrator function
or doubts that the function would result in much change. ACOs
also noted little impact from the establishment of the
function, commenting that Program Integrators were essentially
Program Manager Representatives (PMRs) under a new name.
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Since finding that Program Integrators actually have little
interaction with PCOs, only ACOs and PMs were questioned about
them in the latest surveys. Again, many ACOs viewed Program
Integrators as a new name for PMRs . The largest response
categories characterized their interaction with Program
Integrators as minimal, and impacts of the function on program
support as minimal (or neutral) . Some actually discussed what
they felt were negative impacts of the function on program
support. The nature of the responses seemed to vary with the
individual DPRO. This may be due to the level of importance
historically accorded to the function in each PRO. Although
few ACOs discussed negative impacts regarding Program
Integrators, many of the "no impact" responses indicated
problems, as well. Some commented that under DCMC they are
required to submit additional reports to the Program
Integrators. The negative responses may arise from a feeling
that the Program Integrator is meddling in the ACO's area of
responsibility. As one ACO put it:
The program integrator in a sole source environment just
gets in the way of the ACO when he or she is taking
contractual action. (Ref. 41)
The Program Integrator fulfills an important role as a liaison
between the DPRO and the Program Manager. Many ACOs feel they
can fill this role themselves, but that may become
increasingly difficult as reporting requirements and
administrative tasks are increased. The liaison function
requires time to travel and attend meetings with Program
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Offices. Unlike the latest ACO feedback, the PM surveys
reflected no negative opinions regarding Program Integrators.
The ACO and PM responses were similar, however, in the fact
that both seemed to regard the Program Integrator position as
a continuation of the NAVPRO Program Manager Representative
(PMR) function. The important fact is, from the customer's
perspective, Program Integrators are having a positive impact.
But, until ACOs can view them as beneficial members of the
acquisition team, the overall impact to the customer can not
be viewed as entirely positive. Perhaps DCMC should implement
changes to the Program Integrator/ACO interface with this
objective in mind. There are other indications that the
concept of teamwork has deteriorated. When the Commandant of
the Defense Systems Management College was asked if the
consolidation of the NAVPROs into DCMC is going to impact
NAVAIR, he replied: "Absolutely." He had heard from PMs,
that: "Program teamwork is breaking down." His view is that
we may see some negative effects of the consolidation in a few
years. (Ref. 52) Significantly, one of the PMs surveyed made
a similar comment, stating:
The levels of communication and teamwork have decreased.
(Ref. 43)
To summarize this section, in the researcher's
opinion, the structure and role changes which have occurred
will inevitably result in negative overall impacts on Navy
customers
. Some of the impacts which have not yet become
apparent to customers will likely begin to emerge over time,
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especially as Defense Department resource levels continue to
decline. More negative impacts will emerge as former NAVPRO
personnel turnover, and new DPRO personnel give increasing
emphasis to DCMC management objectives. Navy customers will
likely also see support degraded as a result of DCMC
reductions in DPRO personnel levels, based on plans to reduce
contractor oversight. These negative impacts may be mitigated
if Navy customers and DCMC strive to communicate their
respective needs and constraints. Through cooperative
efforts, such as joint Process Action Teams, the roles of
available personnel assets may be optimized.
2. Impacts on Industry Customers
The new Commander of DCMC sees industry "...
dealing with one organization that offers uniform policies and
procedures ." (Ref . 4, p. 20) Despite this worthy goal, the
transition actually resulted in some contractors dealing,
temporarily, with more Government offices than before the
change. These offices were the Navy Technical Representative
Detachments (NTRDs) , which have since been dissolved.
Interestingly, one recent industry response alluded to the
possibility that the NTRDs had more of a "vested interest" in
supporting NAVAIR. This is significant, considering the
concern NAVAIR had with the functions which the NTRDs were
performing.
When industry personnel were asked whether the
CAS consolidation benefited their companies, the largest
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single response category reported no benefits. However, there
were several industry personnel who reported benefits, with
the largest category being those who indicated that dealing
with a single CAS structure is better than having to interact
with multiple structures.
Notable concerns expressed by industry which
related to structural and role changes included:
1) Greater use of Contract Review Boards by the DPRO;
2) timeliness of negotiations;
3) concern that ACOs have less latitude under DCMC;
4) possible replacement of the DPRO Commander with an
officer from a Service other than Navy.
Industry personnel were concerned that they may
be negatively impacted if DCMC Contract Review Boards
frequently overturn ACO decisions. That possibility seems
likely, especially since DCMC review thresholds are lower than
those of the former NAVPROs . The early ACO survey also
indicated that under DCMC rules, most actions would have to be
reviewed by a board, resulting in delays. Therefore, the
likely impacts to industry of overturned ACO decisions,
combined with delays in board decisions, will be increased
costs of updating and renegotiating proposals.
Industry also expressed concerns about the
timeliness of negotiations with DPRO personnel. This is
considered significant, since delays in negotiations may
result in the need for costly proposal updates. Delays may
also impact Navy program schedules. Industry concerns were
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also expressed that DPRO ACOs have less latitude than the
former NAVPRO ACOs. If ACOs actually are more constrained
under DCMC, this could also cause negotiation delays.
Despite these concerns, the most common industry response
regarding timeliness of negotiations indicated that
improvements had occurred. This was surprising, especially
since many ACOs viewed the separation of negotiating and price
analysis functions as a factor which delayed negotiations.
Perhaps the industry perception of more timely negotiations is
a result of the increased numbers of warranted personnel
within the DPROs . By empowering more personnel with warrants,
there is probably less delay involved in obtaining Contracting
Officer signatures on completed negotiations. Overall, the
impacts related to negotiations have been favorable.
Several industry concerns seemed to highlight the
importance of continuing communications between industry, the
Navy customer, and the DPRO. These concerns included the
eventual possibility of the DPRO Commander being replaced by
an officer of a Service other than the Navy. Significantly,
there was strong consensus among PMs that the DPRO Commander
should remain a Naval Officer. If this role change occurred,
communications between industry, the DPRO and Navy customers
could be degraded, causing some industry confusion. There
were related industry concerns regarding the quality of
communications between the DPRO and NAVAIR, since they are no
longer part of the same agency. One contractor was hopeful
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that the company would not receive "mixed signals" from the
Navy customer and DLA. There had not been any significant
impacts resulting from a lack of communications. Yet, one
industry respondent stated:
The writer is not aware of any substantive briefing by the
affected Government agencies. Such a briefing would
presumably indicate differences in internal and external
policies and procedures ... (Ref . 44)
Program Integrators, if used as liaisons, should help avoid
the potential negative impacts of communications shortfalls
between industry, the Navy and the DPRO. As one contractor
said, referring to the value of Program Integrators:
The Program Manager role in NAVPRO is important. DPRO
should, and is retaining this important function. " (Ref . 44)
To summarize this section, industry does not
appear to have suffered any significant negative impacts from
changes in structures and roles. Surveys of industry
personnel indicate a slightly positive impact on the
timeliness of negotiations. The potential for negative
impacts is greatest in the area of communications. A primary
role of Program Integrators should be as catalysts for
continuing communications between the DPRO, Program Office and
the contractor.
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2. Differences/Impacts of Changes in Operating Guidance
a. NAVPRO Operating Instructions
Prior to the transitioning of NAVPROs to DCMC, the
governing instruction for NAVAIR/NAVPRO interaction was the
Management Manual for Naval Plant Representative Offices
Assigned to the Naval Air Systems Command Headquarters . (Ref.
27) This instruction was not specific regarding PCO/ACO
relationships, except to list general work tasks expected of
the NAVPRO. Contracts Division tasks required by NAVAIRINST
5000. 6B included:
CAS functions under the assigned mission and
responsibilities contained in the FAR and Navy
directives,..., in addition to contractual terms and
conditions imposed by the procuring activity. (Ref. 27, p.
3)
The NAVPRO tasks also included on-site program management . One
particularly NAVPRO unique feature, as opposed to the former
DCASPRO type organizations, is that the NAVPRO Manual required
that NAVAIR Program Management organizations be "superimposed
on the basic functional organization for execution of selected
priority programs ." (Ref . 27, p. 6) The NAVPRO Manual seemed
to give NAVAIR authority to set priorities for NAVPRO
personnel, including the ACOs . It was geared exclusively to
the NAVPROs and their functions. The NAVPRO Manual attempted
to provide general guidance on most aspects of PRO Contract
Administration, including general procedures to follow in
performing technical evaluations of proposals and field
pricing reports. The key distinguishing characteristic of the
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NAVPRO guidance was contained in a policy statement which
stated that the purpose of work descriptions in the manual
were to:
. . .provide an adequate guide to attain compatibility
without sacrificing the flexibility requisite to achieve
the objectives of each office. (underline emphasis added)
(Ref. 27, p.l)
Allowing each NAVPRO the flexibility to deal with situations
unique to individual offices and programs was important to
NAVAIR
.
b. DPRO OPERATING INSTRUCTIONS
Under DCMC, all DPROs must operate within the
guidelines of DLAM 8105.1, the recently revised (Oct 1990)
DCMC Contract Administration Manual. In contrast to the
NAVPRO Manual, The DCMC Manual is intended for use by a wide
variety of DCMC Contract Administration activities, each
having different functional charters. These include DCMC
District offices, Management Area Offices, Plant
Representative Offices and Residencies. The DCMC Contract
Administration Manual only provides very general procedural
guidance in areas such as technical evaluations or field
pricing. The DCMC Contract Administration manual tends to
reference other, much more specific sources, such as the
Contract Management Engineering Manual (DLAM 8400.2) or the
Armed Services Pricing Manual (ASPM) . This differs from the
NAVPRO Manual, which seeks to provide general guidance in one
manual, without reliance on other manuals. The guidance
provided in the DCMC Contract Administration Manual can be
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characterized as primarily concerned with administrative
interactions between Contract Administration functional areas.
The DCMC manual concentrates on when certain actions are to be
taken, who is to be notified, how long specific reviews should
take and other systemic issues. As one PCO put it, "The
Contract Administration Manual used by DLA provides an
internal focus to the Contract Administration process." (Ref.
36)
Despite this decidedly internal focus, DCMC emphases
on customer support are evident. In one section, the manual
discusses the responsibilities of the ACO to maintain liaison
with the PCO and Program Manager. The manual strongly
emphasizes the requirement for ACOs to:
. . .keep the PCO advised of required contract status and
potential major problem areas as he is made aware of the
problem, ... (Ref . 29, p. 90.13-1)
It also requires the ACO to:
...ensure that all reports to be prepared by the
contractor, in accordance with the terms of the contract,
and other authorized reports are properly evaluated and
forwarded to the PCO in a timely manner. (Ref. 29, Ibid)
As noted previously, in cases where a DPRO is assigned
cognizance of Major Weapon Systems/Programs, the manual
suggests making the ACO the primary point of contact on those
contracts for the PCO as well as the Program Manager.
Direct and continuing rapport between the ACO and PM is also
recommended. (Ref. 29, p. 90. 13 -2)
To summarize, DPROs are guided by the DCMC Contract
Administration Manual (DLAM 8105.1). This manual focuses
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primarily on the internal activities of DCMC. It provides a
structured approach to Contract Administration by referring to
other DLA manuals for specific procedures. Unlike the former
NAVPRO manual, what the DCMC Manual seeks to achieve is not
flexibility, but uniformity.
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c. Analysis of Impacts on Customers
1. Impacts on Navy Customers
Several PCOs reported no significant impacts from
the operating guidance employed by the DPROs . They did note,
however, that the DPRO methods seemed more structured, and
less "ad hoc" than the methods formerly used by the NAVPROs
.
The most significant impact which related to
operating guidance concerned the frequency with which system
reviews are performed by the DPRO. DCMC has been evaluating
plans to significantly reduce oversight within plants (Ref.
21, p. 4). For instance, Contractor Purchasing System Reviews
(CPSRs) have been extended from annually to every three years
(Ref. 21, p. 4) According to NAVAIR management, this is not
frequent enough. NAVAIR had considered the annual CPSRs very-
important, since purchases accounted for 50% to 75% of total
costs (Ref. 45) Similar concerns over CPSRs were reported by
PCOs in the latest surveys. The fact that CPSRs will be
conducted less frequently may result in less efficient
contractor purchasing systems. This may result in the Navy-
customer paying more than necessary for purchased parts during
a period of rapidly declining resources. It may also require
PCOs to spend more time preparing for negotiations, since the
contractor purchasing systems may be suspect. Despite DCMC
intentions to maintain a high level of customer support, it
seems very likely that such actions could only degrade it.
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2. Impacts on Industry Customers
Several PCOs and ACOs surveyed felt that industry
would probably benefit from the fact that DCMC would operate
and administer contracts according to uniform rules and
procedures. Most PMs did not feel that industry had benefited
from the transition. Some of the industry personnel who
expected their companies to benefit from the CAS consolidation
cited the standardization of policies and procedures as the
primary benefit. These industry personnel felt that more
consistent, uniform procedures, and fewer agency unique
priorities would have positive impacts on all of the Service
programs they managed. As one industry respondent put it:
. . .The NAVPRO was different from the APPRO which was
different from the DCAS . Having all DPROs, standardizes
the language and the operating procedures/policies, making
the conduct of business more consistent. (Ref. 44)
Overall, industry appears to have experienced positive impacts
from the fact that DCMC's operating guidance will now be the
standard for all PROs
.
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3. Differences/Impacts of Changes in Management
Information/Control Systems
A very key difference exists between the way Navy
management tracked Contract Administration actions and "key
indicators" and how DCMC manages the workload. Behind the
difference is DCMC's automated information system called the
Mechanization of Contract Administration Services (MOCAS)
system and Management Information Reports (MIRs)
.
a. The MOCAS System
The MOCAS database was brought on line in 1965,
shortly after the creation of DCAS . MOCAS was developed as a
means of processing the internal transactions of DCAS Regions.
It provided detailed visibility of the status of a contract
from award through closeout. Prior to the development of
MOCAS, each military Service operated separate, unique
Contract Administration databases. These systems were
oriented primarily around the use of ADP punch cards. During
the process of consolidating most Contract Administration into
the DCAS organization, the separate Service systems were
evaluated for usefulness. The Air Force system (called the
Program for Improved Central Procurement) was chosen as the
foundation for the new DCAS system. Initial improvements
sought to convert from a card operated to a tape operated
system. (Ref. 9, p. 9)
The existing MOCAS tracks funding status, progress
payments, invoice disbursements, quality assurance information
and deliverables status.
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According to the management in one DPRO,
MOCAS forces the discipline of closing out a contract
within FAR-mandated requirements. If that doesn't happen,
DCMCN and DCMC will notice such deficiencies on monthly
Management Information System Reports (MIRs) and related
MOCAS reports. NAVPRO had no such database system you
have to play by the rules of MOCAS if the contractor is to
get paid. Unit prices, invoice/DD250 format and
unit/extended prices have to agree with what is in MOCAS
or no payment occurs. 42 such fields have to match up for
an invoice to be paid. . . .A contract is built into the
database by DCMDN, with Contract Line Item Numbers (CLINs)
,
Sub- Line Item Numbers (SUBLINs) , and Equipment Line Items
Numbers (ELINs) breaking down deliverables. Money is
attached to such items. Any monetary changes require a SF30
modification document to be cut. A labor-intensive
process .... PCOs have to understand how to cut a MOCAS
-
compatible contract from moment 1, lest the people in the
field have to cut endless mods to build in CLINs, SUBLINs,
and ELINs the proper way. (Ref. 46) (underline emphasis
added)
Similarly, a DPRO McDonnell -Douglas manager noted:
MOCAS is definitely a difference from our way of doing
business before... We have about 10,000 contracts here, on
hand. Prior to MOCAS everything had to be manually closed.
There was no way to close out a contract until somebody
manually touched it. Under MOCAS a large portion of the
contracts should automatically close through the MOCAS
system without any hands-on ACO effort. Currently we only
have about 2,500 contracts on MOCAS. Eventually all the
contracts will be in MOCAS. . .they are going into the MOCAS
system at the rate of 2,000 to 2,500 a year. But we have
some old contracts that will probably remain outside MOCAS
for a number of years. This will probably be some of the
older contracts and some of the big production contracts
that were let prior to us becoming a DLA or DCMC
organization. (Ref. 33)
Comments made by a DPRO McDonnell -Douglas ACO reflected
concern that DCMC has applied the MOCAS system without regard
to the differences in size and types of contractors previously
administered by NAVPROs:
...the DLA organization was designed and built over the
years around dealing with multitudes of small contractors
that might have high probability of going under before they
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could perform a contract .. .and I haven't seen any
accommodation in their system for the differences. There
have been many positive points discussed about MOCAS , but
on the down- side, it tracks every little nit. Things that
you would not normally have to know in the course of
administering contracts. We get reports out of MOCAS that
say, such and such contract has labor provisions. Under
the MOCAS system they've incorporated progress payments
being paid automatically by the payment office. In concept
that's very good, in reality it's very slow to take place.
We're having a lot of problems with it. (Ref. 33)
This same ACO sees the big change in Contract Administration
methods as being "MOCAS and the things you have to do to
maintain the MOCAS". He feels that the reason for the Navy
and DCMC having these different methods is:
The different environment these methods were established
under. DCMC being really, in essence DLA by another name,
grew up in the environment of having to deal with
multitudes of contractors, rather than focusing on just the
one. (Ref. 33)
A DPRO employee in charge of contract closeouts
seemed more positive, adding these comments on MOCAS:
...It has increased the workload . One factor is the
learning factor. The learning curve is pretty steep.
People are still learning how to use it. It is enhancing
in one aspect because of the fact that everything is loaded
into a database, whereas it wasn't always that case before.
So, from that standpoint it makes things a lot faster
because the contracts that are in MOCAS you have a lot
better visibility of. Whereas, on the other hand, when we
were under Navy, we still utilized computer systems for
some of the things we're doing now, but, we had a lot more
manual operations involved. MOCAS is one of the major
differences I think you'll find throughout the division.
What MOCAS will do for us as far as closeout is it will
maintain the visibility of the contract. Whereas before
there might have been a tendency because of the number and
because of the manual intervention that the contract could
be lost. But with MOCAS, the visibility of the contact is
maintained because all of the funding documents and
anything that has to do with funding. . .has to go through
the pay officer. So you won't have the funds tracking
problems that we experienced under the Navy .
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You also have visibility of the contracts that are not
being closed out within the FAR required t ime - f rame . (Ref.
33) (underline emphasis added)
In addition to increasing the workload at the PROs, MOCAS
evidently is also impacting the work of PCOs . As one PCO
reflects,
There are differences in processing acceptances through the
MOCAS system. We are also being forced to use ELINs for
our exhibits. (Ref. 36)
On the positive side, a DPRO manager notes:
The DLA mindset is to have an ACO team perform
cradle- to -grave contract management. A very good idea
since people tend to want to wash their hands of contract
closeouts and other necessary "dirty work" . . .MOCAS requires
and enforces that discipline. Delivery surveillance is an
area that NAVPROs were weak on. They would surveil the
big-ticket items but not the smaller buys. As a result,
contract closeouts were made all the more difficult. (Ref.
46)
The implementation and use of MOCAS seems to be one of the
most controversial changes facing the PROs. One reason for
MOCAS implementation in the new DPROs is that it had already
been used for many years by DCAS . The mandated rapid
absorption of the Service PROs into DCMC did not allow time
for development of new systems. An aggressive drive by DCMC
for uniformity among the PROs is evident in implementation
correspondence (Ref. 47).
Perhaps some consideration should be given to
whether the pre-existing MOCAS system is appropriate for the
large scope and type of operations of the former NAVPROs.
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b. Analysis of Impacts on Customers
1. Impacts on Navy Customers
There were very few comments from PCOs or PMs
regarding impacts from DCMC MIS/Control systems. Early PCO
surveys revealed the fact that accommodating MOCAS
requirements in writing contracts was causing PCOs some
additional work. PCOs were also becoming cognizant that MOCAS
maintenance was a priority within the DPROs . In the latest
responses, one PCO listed MOCAS as a negative impact, saying:
Key impact has been introduction/mandate of MOCAS in paying
contractor - has caused more work, confusion and little
value added. It also increases costs in re:
implementation. (Ref. 48)
Several ACOs reported in the latest survey
that they were able to provide better Contract Administration,
such as tracking the status of funds and deliverables, to
their customers through the use of MOCAS. They reported that
this results in better identification of excess funds for the
use of Navy customers. Conceivably, the identification of
excess funds may also benefit industry, although this was not
mentioned by industry personnel. In the same survey, several
ACOs expressed negative opinions toward MOCAS, indicating that
it required too much data entry, made contractor payment
difficult, and consumed time which could have been spent in
direct support of customers. They suggested that MOCAS was
not "user friendly" and should be updated or replaced by a
better system.
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Industry feedback suggested that if MOCAS were to become
useful it would require more intensive labor within the DPRO.
In summary, it seems that the only Government
personnel pleased with the MOCAS system are some of the ACOs.
Many of the ACOs feel that the system requires an inordinate
amount of their time. Some PCOs also feel there is little
value to the system. Although it has positive implications,
it also diverts labor to its own maintenance. It enhances
close-out efforts, but if that had previously been important
to the Navy, certainly they would have established a similar
system. In the researcher's opinion, due to the considerable
amount of DPRO time required for its maintenance, MOCAS will
cause Navy customers more negative impacts than positive.
2. Impacts on Industry Customers
Most of the NAVPROs could quickly process
progress payment requests on site, however the DPROs must now
process them through MOCAS. In the early surveys and the
latest surveys, ACOs expressed concerns regarding the impacts
of DCMC systems for contractor payment. Early feedback from
DPRO Grumman noted that Grumman had some concerns with DCMC's
"...ability to turn around progress payment requests and
invoice billings in a timely manner." (Ref. 32)
Early PCO surveys indicated that contractors were concerned
about prompt payments but had not yet had any complaints. (Ref.
36)
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In the latest surveys, PCOs did not mention
any complaints from contractors regarding payment by MOCAS
.
Although PMs did not specifically comment on the new payment
system, most PMs felt that contractors had not benefited from
the transition. One PM observed:
From what I've seen, the contractor experiences much
frustration in trying to do business with the DPRO. (Ref
.
43)
In the latest ACO surveys, some ACOs felt
that the payment office organization and service had improved
since consolidation under the Defense Finance and Accounting
Service (DFAS) , which is linked to the MOCAS system. One ACO
lauded the fact that progress payments, which were formerly
accomplished manually, may be automated through the use of
MOCAS. Several other ACOs, however, reported slowness and
difficulty in accomplishing contractor payments under MOCAS.
One ACO commented:
The payment process has been slowed. It takes longer for
a DLA payment office to process an invoice than their Air
Force/Navy counterparts. (Ref. 41)
Three of the four contractors surveyed reported some form of
payment problems related to MOCAS implementation. The fourth,
G.E. Aircraft Engines, praised the system, reporting that
payments were more timely and that the system allowed for
electronic invoicing. Other industry personnel gave specific
examples to illustrate the relative slowness of payments under
MOCAS, as opposed to the former NAVPRO payment system which
made disbursements on-site.
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The increase in payment processing time was dramatically
illustrated by one industry comment, which stated:
Invoice payment prior to the MOCAS implementation averaged
10 - 20 days, after implementation, the average was 80 -
100 days. Recently, a meeting between MCAIR and the
Government resulted in an agreement for payment in 27 - 30
days. (Ref . 44)
Another contractor commented:
. . .Grumman is experiencing significant delays in payments
with average payment increasing from two days to a current
two weeks. . .
.
(Ref. 44)
It is obvious that the implementation of
MOCAS has had negative impacts on some contractors. And, as
a DPRO manager pointed out:
. . .This contractor sweats bullets over cash flow and the
time value of money, as I'm sure others do.... (Ref. 32)
Cash flow problems can impact a contractor's
credit ratings, decreasing its attractiveness to investors.
It appears that the payment functions of the MOCAS system have
benefits to offer, however, for the most part contractors seem
to be viewing this new system as having negative impacts on
them.
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4. Differences/Impacts of Changes in Reporting
Requirements
a. Discussion
The NAVPROs were previously required to submit
reports similar to some of those required by DCMC. These
included such inputs as Contract Closeout Reports and Open
Audit Reports. According to NAVAIR management, however, there
was "...nothing as voluminous as DCMC has." (Ref. 45) in the
way of reporting requirements. One DPRO manager commented
regarding NAVPRO reporting requirements under NAVAIR: "They
required few management reports, all in all. The ACO Activity
Report was the key report they looked at." (Ref. 46) This
report consisted of three sections, which filled about three
pages. In short, the monthly report was a very brief summary
and showed a strong NAVAIR management interest in the dollar
volume of overaged Undef initized Contractual Actions (UCAs)
and negotiation decrements. The concern with UCAs is
explained in a 1988 NAVAIR instruction. The instruction notes
that:
The use of undef initized contracts is not good business
since the contractor bears minimum cost risk and operates
in a cost-plus mode until negotiations are complete. (Ref.
49, p.l)
NAVAIR was reacting to greater focus and direction from higher
levels on the issue of UCAs. DOD FAR Supplement 17.75 was
issued, requiring that limitations be placed upon the use of




When questioned about the present volume of
reporting requirements, DPRO personnel indicated that their
reporting requirements had:
. . .grown quite significantly under DLA. We have the MIR
(Management Information Report) that we never had to do
before. We have a CAR (Contract Administration Report)
Prime and Support Contracts report that we never had to do
before. These are all monthly, by the way. And then we
have follow-up reports explaining why we can't meet the
"bogies" on a monthly basis also, which have been
established by DLA. (Ref. 33)
DPRO McDonnell -Douglas personnel point out, however,
that much of the required reporting data is in fact generated
by the MOCAS system . However, since most of their contracts
were not yet in the MOCAS database, they were maintaining two
separate systems in order to provide the report data. This
had necessitated adaptation of a locally developed Contract
MIS system which they had used previously for NAVPRO internal
purposes. They use this old system to provide the reporting
data for the old contracts, and the MOCAS for newer contracts.
b. Analysis of Impacts on Customers
1. Impacts on Navy Customers
The MIR requires input of hundreds of types of
data on management functions in contracts, production and
engineering. The DCMC District Offices, which receive the
reports from the DPROs are apparently primarily concerned with
the numbers of contracts past-due for close-out (by FAR
standards) , unfinished pricing cases older than 45-60 days and
undef initized orders older than 180 days. Apparently, all of
these data reports help the District Offices manage the
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Districts. Early DPRO feedback contained little information
regarding the effects of increased reporting requirements.
However, in the latest ACO feedback, several ACOs indicated
that increased reporting requirements had in some way degraded
their abilities to support customers. One ACO summarized what
he viewed as an impact on customer support by stating:
Increased paperwork and reporting requirements take more
time away from the support I can provide to my program. (Ref
41)
Another ACO, referring to changes in his entire workload since
the NAVPRO became a DPRO, stated:
The ACO is now responsible to do everything. . .The workload
is staggering. (Ref . 41)
Another ACO commenting on Program Integrator functions,
stated:
. . .now they too have additional reporting requirements the
ACO must get involved in. (Ref. 41)
Another ACO added,
There are now more formalized reporting requirements which
provide more up-to-date information on the program. (Ref.
41)
A DPRO manager made a significant point, stating:
ACOs see themselves being taken away from their prime
functions in order to work on monthly reports to DLA. The
customer could care less about DLA.' s reports - they just
want Helos/parts. (Ref. 41)
Surprisingly, despite the significant impacts
indicated by some ACOs, there is little PCO or PM feedback
which directly identifies changes in ACO reporting
requirements as a problem.
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The only PCO feedback which directly commented on
DPRO reporting requirements was in an early PCO survey, in
which a PCO commented:
. . .The DLA management reporting systems "grade" ACOs on the
time required to accomplish various Contract Administration
actions and not on the level of support provided to PCOs
and Program Offices. (Ref. 36)
PMs were asked to rate their agreement level with
the statement:
DCMC program reporting systems are at least as useful as
the former Navy systems were to my Program Office.
Most of the PMs who responded to this question agreed with it.
However, some PMs indicated they had not seen any DCMC
reports. Others reported that there was simply no change.
This suggests that most of the DPRO reports, including Program
Integrator reports, are primarily for the purpose of providing
management statistics to DCMC, and, that PMs apparently
weren't seeing many reports from the PRO to begin with.
Indeed, one PM noted that there is little visibility of the
reports at the PMA level. The fact that there were a variety
of PM agreement levels expressed may also indicate some
variance among the DPROs in reporting methods. Interestingly,
one PM felt it was too early to rate DPRO reporting due to the
small amount of correspondence available to base an opinion
on.
It appears that DCMC has significantly increased
the amount of information routinely required from the PROs,
however Navy customers have not yet noticed a direct impact on
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their support. When asked how they manage to do all of these
reports with the same level of personnel, one DPRO manager
responded:
It's one of those things that you learn how to do it
regardless. Something else obviously suffers . It may be
one of those things that is a totally "domino effect" and
the thing that actually suffers is then tripped by several
other intervening activities. (Ref . 33) (underline emphasis
added)
As in the case of MOCAS maintenance, labor is
diverted from previous uses to assemble the reports. The
researcher expects an indirect degradation to the previous
level of customer support in the future.
2. Impacts on Industry Customers
The surprising fact that some industry personnel
were concerned about the effects of increased ACO reporting
requirements was considered significant. Some felt that this
might cause timeliness of negotiations to suffer, as well as
reducing the time available for other actions. This concern
may relate to one PM observation which stated:
From what I've seen, the contractor experiences much
frustration in trying to do business with the DPRO. (Ref.
43)
This "frustration" may stem from the DPRO emphasis on
definitizing all actions within the FAR prescribed 180 day
time- frame. DPROs must make periodic reports to DCMC
Districts on their achievement of definitization timeliness
goals. In the researcher's opinion, due to this emphasis,
DPRO management is probably exerting continuous pressure on
industry management to help keep average def initization
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statistics within these timeframes. At the same time, DPRO
negotiators may be unable to negotiate on a continuous basis,
due to frequent reporting requirements. Industry negotiators,
anxious to help meet the 180 day Government goal, must then
contend with conflicting reporting responsibilities on the
DPRO negotiator's desk.
In summary, the primary impact of increases in
Government reporting requirements on industry is frustration
in trying to meet DCMC definitization goals, while DPRO
negotiators are busy with new reporting requirements.
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C. KEY DIFFERENCES BETWEEN NAVY AND DEFENSE CONTRACT
MANAGEMENT COMMAND ORGANIZATIONAL PRIORITIES AND RELATED
IMPACTS
1. Discussion of Early Research Findings
The Commander of DCMC has issued a multitude of strong
personal policy statements emphasizing the importance of
customer support . In one such memorandum to the DCMC
Districts he stated:
I want each of you to be particularly sensitive to the
image that we project as a Command that is responsive to
the needs of its customers. Accordingly, when issues arise
concerning the appropriateness of CAS delegations, I
reserve the right to be the only one in DCMC who can turn
down such a customer's request. (Ref. 50)
It is obvious that the DCMC Commander is committed to
providing PCOs and PMs with the best service possible within
personnel and resource constraints. That philosophy, however,
may be in conflict with some DPRO policies which were carried
over from the DCAS organization.
Early feedback indicated that ACOs had seen a shift in
priorities since becoming part of DCMC. The number of
def initizations, rather than overall dollar value completed
seemed to be receiving more attention. DPRO feedback
indicated that NAVAIR had dollar goals for contract closeouts,
rather than numbers of contracts. DPRO McDonnell Douglas
reported a "drastic change in goals. "(Ref. 35) DPRO Bethpage
also reported seeing a "A big focus by DCMC on quantities
rather than dollar value of transactions." (Ref. 32) A DPRO
McDonnell -Douglas manager pointed out that the age of
undef initized actions was also important to DCMC's
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prioritization of work. He noted that,
...Under DLA's bogie system, a $500.00 order 181 days old
will receive more emphasis than an order worth
$5,000,000.00 that is 60 days old. (Ref. 35)
In referring to the DPRO priority system, one PCO stated:
The ACO is required to prioritize on a first- in first out
basis. Apparently all actions have the same importance.
(Ref. 36)
Early surveys revealed that other PCOs were also aware
of priority shifts within the former NAVPROs . One PCO stated:
In the short term, the DPRO workforce continues to have an
affinity for NAVAIR priorities, however this can be
expected to dissipate as DLA management asserts itself.
(Ref. 36)
Another PCO added:
The DLA management reporting systems "grade" ACOs on the
time required to accomplish various contract administration
actions and not on the level of support provided to PCOs
and program offices. The Contract Administration manual
used by DLA, DLAM 8105.1 provides an Internal focus to the
Contract Administration process ...
.
Meeting the DLA
management goals is now the primary focus ."(Ref. 36)
(underline emphasis added)
Still another PCO reinforced this attitude, affirming
that priorities have changed at the PRO and that "The MOCAS
input is definitely a priority". (Ref. 36) Early surveys also
revealed that reporting requirements were becoming a high
priority.
Early feedback revealed the emergence of three
fundamental DPRO areas in which priorities had changed. They
included the new emphasis on maintenance of the MOCAS system,
associated reporting requirements, and the DPRO method of
prioritizing workload. The MOCAS system and the new reporting
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requirements were discussed in the previous two sections,
along with their related impacts. This section focuses
primarily on another significant change in priorities, from
the perspective of Navy customers, which is how DPRO
contractual actions are prioritized. A comparison and
analysis are made of NAVPRO and DPRO areas of major emphases,
respectively. This is followed by a summary and analysis of
the impacts reported in the latest surveys.
2. Analysis of Naval Plant Representative Office vs Defense
Plant Representative Office Emphasis
Several months after the early surveys had been
completed, the question of how work was prioritized, and how
NAVAIR measured NAVPRO contract administration effectiveness
was discussed with a group of six ACOs and their Branch Head
at DPRO McDonnell -Douglas. According to these personnel,
prior to consolidation, the NAVPRO Commander made an annual
presentation to NAVAIR on the overall status of the PRO. In
presenting Contracts Division accomplishments:
. . .Def initizations of Undef initized Contractual Actions and
Close-outs . both in terms of dollars were the two key
measurements . It would depend, of course on the time of
the year, too. We also had as a secondary sequencing
measurement . the acre of the open item. (Ref . 33) (underline
emphasis added)
As for prioritization of def initizations
:
The big dollar ones were really the driver. So you could
have a big unpriced order for $60 Million, and that could
have been issued 90 days ago, and you could have another
unpriced order for $5,000 that may be sitting out there
undef initized for 24 months. But, the key thing was to get
the big def initizations done in order that we could show
overall that we were decreasing the total unpriced orders
here, what we called "The Swamp". With DLA, you have just
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the opposite. Their only focus is the age of the order,
regardless of the dollar amount
.
(Ref . 33) (underline
emphasis added)
A DPRO manager explained further:
...I think in fiscal year '84 the average days to
definitize the UCAs was something like 480. And that
emphasis, even though it was on dollars, drove that down
to somewhere around 200 in 1989. So, that was successful
in driving down the average time to definitize a UCA. (Ref.
33)
This manager reported that, since becoming a DPRO, they were
sequencing def initizations totally based on the age of the
UCAs. As far as emphasis on dollar values, he said:
We keep track of it a little bit, but there's no real
measurement of that. DLA doesn't even ask for a report on
dollars, strictly number of orders. (Ref. 33)
According to NAVAIR management, the primary reason for
Navy emphasis on UCA dollar volume was due to the fact that
Congress was exerting pressure on the Navy regarding what they
saw as excess money sitting around under UCAs which could
potentially be used elsewhere. (Ref . 45) In view of this
emphasis and the cost -risk problem of UCAs, total dollars
undef initized seems to be a much more valid yardstick than
simply the number of overaged UCAs. For example, a PRO having
one UCA for $50 million would have more of a problem in this
context than a PRO with 20 UCAs totalling $2 million.
As mentioned above, contract close-outs were also an
interest item with NAVAIR. An ACO responsible for Contract
Close-outs indicated that the Navy and DCMC reflect similar
emphases toward close-outs as they do toward UCAs.
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In the Close-out world, its the exact same situation.
Under Navy, the big emphasis was to close-out the older
contracts with the bigger dollars. Under DLA, its just the
opposite, its to close out those contracts that have not
been closed-out within the FAR required time- frame. (Ref
.
33)
The NAVPRO concern with close-outs appears to have been
primarily on an exception basis, emphasizing the large dollar,
overaged contracts. This approach probably left many smaller
contracts open long after physical completion. With MOCAS,
DCMC will likely systematically close-out many more overage
contracts
.
As pointed out by a DPRO manager, the key difference
between DCMC and Navy approaches appears to be in what is
emphasized. According to this manager:
. . .some of the things are more a matter of emphasis , rather
than methods. In other words some of the contracts that
under a NAVPRO would not have a high visibility, under DCMC
have a much higher visibility. . .1 think the DCMC system was
oriented toward small contractors . I don't think that
their system really has reconciled itself to a McDonnell
-
Douglas. Of course, we're at the opposite end of the
continuum if you have the small contractor to the large
contractor. So some of the things that work for the
majority of the DCASPROs and the Area Offices don't apply
so neatly to the large McDonnell -Douglas operation . . . It '
s
just that there are a different set of problems associated
with each. (Ref. 33)
This matter of emphasis may explain the way DCMC approaches
UCA and Contract Close-out bogies. The DCMC emphasis on
quantities of UCAs and Close-outs, rather than on the dollar
amounts which the Navy monitored may have some basis in the
types of contracts DCAS was previously responsible for. Under
DCAS, there was much more homogeneity in the dollar value of
contracts. They had some large contracts in the DCASPROs, but
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nothing on the scale of McDonnell -Douglas . Perhaps a strict
emphasis on quantities was the best approach to minimizing the
overall dollar amount of UCAs and maximizing the value of
Close-outs. This approach may not prove viable, however with
a McDonnell -Douglas or Grumman. A more rational approach in
these operations, where there is a great deal of heterogeneity
of contract sizes, is to attack the very large ones first.
That is apparently where the Navy emphasis on dollars versus
quantity originated.
3. Analysis of Significant Impacts on Navy Customers
In the latest surveys, the largest group of ACO
respondents listed the DPRO practice of processing contractual
actions on a first- in, first-out basis as a key difference
between Navy and DCMC organizational priorities. Many ACOs
ascribed negative impacts, such as conflicts with Navy
priorities, to this practice. As one ACO described the
situation:
Under DPRO it is first -in, first -out. Quantity rather than
dollar amount. Two small jobs done is now better than one
large job completed. Navy priorities revolve around
program needs and often conflict with the first- in, first-
out or quantity vs dollar thinking. They like the big jobs
done first. (Ref. 41)
There were several related comments which indicated that DCMC
is more concerned with maintaining its statistical measures of
success than solving problems for customers. As one ACO
stated:
As a NAVPRO we were solutions/results oriented, i.e. do it
right. As a DPRO we are "stat" oriented - get it off the
"run" before it is delinquent/overage. We are slaves to
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a rigid mechanized system. DLA is geared to commodities.
(underline emphasis added) (Ref. 41)
Interestingly, in the latest surveys, PCOs did not
specifically list the DPRO system of workload prioritization
as a significant problem, although many discussed general
organizational priorities. Some PCOs noted that Navy needs
were no longer the primary priorities of the PROs . One PCO
stated:
. . .DPRO priorities are far more likely to cause them to
decide in favor of solutions which make fewer waves in DCMC





NAVPROs - Buying activities set the priorities. Framework
was dynamic.
DPRO - DCMC establishes framework and buying activities set
priorities within this framework.
Organizational priorities remain set by the PCO; when
problems have arisen, the PCO's voice was heard; we are
seen as the person in charge. (Ref. 48)
Surprisingly, the largest group of PCO respondents
indicated they had observed little impact from changing
organizational priorities, although some indicated somewhat
negative impacts on Navy customers, such as less DPRO
responsiveness and cooperation.
Interestingly, some PMs raised the issue of
prioritization. PMs were asked to rate their agreement with
the statement:
The DPRO is at least as efficient as the NAVPRO was in
getting funds obligated.
Half of the responding PMs disagreed with this statement.
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This supports ACO statements that work is no longer
prioritized on the basis of dollar value. One PM expressed
concern over the issue of priorities, saying:




PMs were also asked to rate their agreement with the
statement:
My ability to set priorities for the ACO has been degraded
by the transition from NAVPRO to DPRO.
Most PMs agreed with this statement, indicating their ability
to set ACO priorities had been degraded. One PM responded:
For the most part, the reaction to requests for priority
actions is "If I can fit it in". (Ref. 43)
The lack of PCO comments regarding impacts from the DPRO
work prioritization approach may indicate that it is not as
much of a problem to PCOs as they originally thought. This
may also indicate that, despite DCMC's standard prioritization
methods, NAVPRO ACOs are showing some flexibility and
sequencing def initizations in accordance with PCO desires.
However, PMs seem much more dissatisfied with the
prioritization situation. This may mean that most PMs take
urgent prioritization issues directly to the ACO, rather than
trying to work them through the PCO. This would explain why
many of the PCOs saw the changes in organizational priorities
as having little impact on themselves as customers. It is
the PMs who are feeling the impacts.
It may be only a matter of time before a DPRO for a
large contractor such as McDonnell -Douglas will again have a
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high dollar backlog of undef initized orders under the DPRO
prioritization system. However, if a backlog of UCAs does
occur, it is no longer the Navy customer's responsibility.
The impact on the Navy, however, would be the fact that a
large amount of funding which might have been utilized, may
expire prior to def initization of the UCAs.
DCMC does have a vehicle for providing other than first
-
in, first out service. The guidance in the DCMC Contracts
Management Manual recommends that DPROs for major weapons
systems "examine and prioritize the prime and support
contracts that are important to the program manager." (Ref.
29, p. 90.13-46) Using this type of early cooperation between
the Navy and DCMC may help avoid some future crises.
4. Impacts on Industry
Industry survey responses made it clear that many
industry personnel were aware of DCMC's prioritization
methods, and the fact that DCMC was placing more emphasis on
meeting the 180 day goal for def initizations . As one industry
respondent stated:
It is our understanding that with DPRO, the emphasis is on
numbers of contracts negotiated rather than dollar value
negotiated. (Ref . 44)
Some industry personnel were concerned about whether the
DPRO would have different priorities than the NAVPRO had.
Although industry personnel did not speculate on any negative
impacts resulting from DCMC's prioritization methods, some
ACOs did. In addition to listing conflicts with Navy
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priorities as an impact of the first- in, first-out work
processing, some ACOs also felt there could be adverse impacts
on the contractor's cash flow from this policy, since the
largest value obligating actions (such as issuance of orders)
won't necessarily be accomplished first under the DCMC
prioritization method. Industry may also be negatively
impacted if funds are allowed to expire on large UCAs, since
those funds may have been reprogrammed for additional
contracts if they had not expired.
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D. SUMMARY
This chapter has presented an organizational comparison and
analysis of the former NAVPROs versus the present DPRO
organizations. A description of both the NAVPRO and DPRO
organizations was provided as background to the changes which
have occurred through the consolidation of Contract
Administration. The key differences in the Contract
Administration methods used by the former NAVPROs and the new
DPROs were analyzed. The impacts of the changes in Contract
Administration methods on Navy and industry customers were
also analyzed. These include differences in organizational
structure and roles, operating guidance, management
information system, and reporting requirements. The final
section of this chapter presented analysis of the key
differences between Navy and DCMC organizational priorities as
they relate to Contract Administration. That section also
presented analysis of the impacts which changes in
organizational priorities have had on Navy and industry
customers
.
Chapter V will review the primary and subsidiary research
questions, providing conclusions, recommendations and
recommended areas for further research.
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V. CONCLUSIONS, RECOMMENDATIONS, AND AREAS FOR
ADDITIONAL RESEARCH
A. GENERAL
Chapter II provided a background on the evolution of
Defense Contract Administration. The factors leading to the
birth of DCMC were discussed. Chapter III summarized the
results of ACO, PCO, PM and industry surveys regarding the
success of the new NAVAIR/DPRO/industry relationship. Chapter
IV compared the previous NAVPRO organization with the DPRO
organization. Differences between NAVPRO and DPRO methods and
organizational priorities were analyzed. This chapter returns
to the primary and subsidiary research questions, providing
conclusions and recommendations.
The relationship between NAVAIR procurement functions and
DPRO administrative functions has been steadily changing since
the transition of NAVAIR NAVPROs into DCMC as DPROs . The
transition has not only impacted ACOs, PCOs and PMs, but
industry, as well. During early research, the relationship
between NAVAIR PCO functions and DPRO ACO functions appeared
to be in a state of flux. Unresolved issues existed between
the Navy customer and the DPROs. These issues may be
classified within two broad areas, namely, the new methods
being used for DPRO Contract Administration, and differences
in organizational priorities. Within the area of methods, the
changes which had occurred in the roles of personnel were the
primary causes of concern within NAVAIR.
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Additionally, PCOs and ACOs cited changes in
organizational priorities, indicating dramatic differences in
the way the DPRO prioritized its contractual workload. This
change was driven by a heavy emphasis on the achievement of
UCA def initizations and contract close-outs within prescribed
time- frames
.
Since the beginning of this research, some of the major
issues surrounding the roles of personnel have been resolved.
Overall, however, other changes in Contract Administration
methods continue to limit the ability of the DPROs to support
NAVAIR customers. This is primarily due to the fact that
other new ACO responsibilities have consumed much of the time
which ACOs had previously had available to devote to
customers. Customer concerns also continue to exist with
respect to DPRO organizational priorities.
B. CONCLUSIONS
The primary research question posed by this study was:
How well is the Navy/DCMC organizational relationship
supporting the needs of Navy and industrial customers?
The primary conclusion is:
1. The new DPROs are supporting the basic needs of Navy and
industrial customers, but not as well as the previous
NAVPROs had.
There are significant indications of dissatisfaction
with DPRO service, as compared to that provided previously
through the NAVPROs. Several PMs and PCOs indicated that they
felt service would deteriorate as former NAVPRO personnel were
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gradually replaced. Significantly, PMs seem more dissatisfied
than PCOs . No PMs felt that program support had improved
since the transition of NAVPROs to DPROs . A significant
factor appears to be a decline in the amount and quality of
communications and teamwork between the PROs and their Navy
customers. This problem does not seem to be attributable to
DPRO methods, but rather to the fact that the DCMC agenda is
not identical to the Navy's agenda. Most PMs felt that ACOs
have been less flexible since the transition into DCMC. If
the new relationship prevents PMs and the DPRO from presenting
a cohesive "face to industry", it may result in confusion on
the part of contractors. Rather than receiving unified
direction from the Government, the contractor may receive the
"mixed signals" one industry respondent was concerned about.
The long-term impacts would include increased program costs
and schedule delays which would ultimately affect the end user
in the Fleet.
The first subsidiary research question was:
What are the key differences between DCMC Contract
Administration methods and those formerly used by the
NAVPROs?
Based on the analysis presented in Chapter IV, the second
conclusion of this study is:
2. The key differences in Contract Administration methods
are:
a. DCMC's more established, structured approach, versus
the Ad -Hoc approach employed by former NAVPROs
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b. DPROs have separated the Negotiator functions and
Price/Cost Analysis functions, which NAVPROs had
combined
c. DPROs have combined the functions of Negotiator and
Contract Administrator, which NAVPROs had kept separate
d. There are many more Contracting Officer warrants issued
to personnel within the DPROs than had been in the
NAVPROs
e. The implementation of the MOCAS system for Management
Reporting and Contractor Payment
f
.
Contractor Purchasing System Reviews (CPSRs) are
performed every three years, versus every year under
NAVPRO
The key differences in Contract Administration methods
were much more apparent to ACOs than PCOs . The PCOs who did
notice changes in methods referenced DCMC's more structured
approach to Contract Administration, as opposed to a more "ad-
hoc" approach by the NAVPRO.
The second subsidiary research question was:
What impacts are DCMC's methods of Contract Administration
having on their Navy customers and industry?
Based on the analysis presented in Chapter IV, the third
conclusion of this study is:
3. DCMC Contract Administration methods are having the
following impacts on Navy customers:
a. Due to DCMC's increased administrative coverage, there
will be better contractor adherence to contract terms in
the long-run
b. Less ACO time available to support Navy customers due to
increased reporting requirements, MOCAS maintenance
duties and difficulties in processing payments through
MOCAS
c. Increased costs due to less efficient contractor




The researcher predicts that there will be a fourth
impact on Navy customers. Although there is no hard evidence
as yet, the researcher theorizes that the following impact
will occur:
d. An increase in contract costs to the Government due to
less quality in negotiations. This is due to the fact
that Negotiators no longer do price analysis, making them
less familiar with the proposals, and therefore, less
proficient negotiators. Their proficiency will also be
reduced due to the fact that much of their time is now
spent fulfilling reporting requirements and making inputs
to the MOCAS system
The fourth conclusion of this study is:
4. DCMC Contract Administration methods are having the
following impacts on industry:
a. Currently more timely completion of negotiations due to
increased numbers of ACOs with signature authority.
Possible future delays due to decreased review board
thresholds and less ACO latitude
b. Currently benefiting from uniform operating procedures
c. Experiencing delays in payment through MOCAS system
d. Frustration in trying to conduct business with
Government negotiators who are also busy with reporting
requirements
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The third subsidiary research question of this study
was
:
What are the key differences between DCMC and Navy
organizational priorities and perceived roles concerning
Contract Administration?
Based on the analysis presented in Chapter IV, the fifth
conclusion of this study is:
5. The key differences in perceived roles and
organizational priorities are as follows:
a. Perceived Roles:
NAVPROs : The perceived role of NAVPROs was to react
flexibly, as an arm of NAVAIR, to provide whatever type of
support PMs or PCOs required for interaction with the
particular major systems contractor concerned. NAVAIR
invested in frequent systems reviews as a means of
indirectly reducing contract costs.
DPROs : The perceived role of DPROs places administrative
duties such as contract close-outs on the same level as
providing program support. DCMC will provide the Navy with
program support and additional Contract Administration
Services up to a certain level. This is done within a
rigid structure designed to achieve economies of scale and
uniformity in contractor relations, with the least direct
cost. All contractors are viewed as homogeneous entities,
each manageable under established, uniform policies.
b. Organizational Priorities:
NAVPROs: Keeping overall Undef initized Contractual Actions
(UCAs) below a certain dollar level was a top priority.
Another top priority was acting on whatever urgent
contractual actions were required by NAVAIR. Other than
for urgent actions, def initizations were sequenced on the
basis of largest dollar value. Contract close-outs were
a priority, however not to the extent that they are in
DCMC. Sequencing of close-outs was also primarily based
on largest dollar value, with the age of the items as a
secondary consideration.
DPROs: A top priority is to minimize the number of UCAs
more than 180 days old. This results in the performance
of definitizations primarily on a first- in, first-out
basis, regardless of dollar value.
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The other top priority is to minimize the number of




The fourth subsidiary research question was:
What can be done to bring DCMC and Navy Contract
Administration organizational priorities into accord?
Regarding this question, the following actions are
recommended:
1. The former NAVPROs should be allowed to return to
the practice of prioritizing actions, including contract
close-outs on the basis of dollar value and urgency to
customers. After one year, the overall dollar levels
of UCAs and open close-out actions at the former NAVPROs
would be compared with those of other comparably sized
former Service PROs. If results are favorable, this
system should be implemented within all comparably sized
former Service PROs.
This action would be a particularly easy to accomplish
at this time, since the personnel within the former NAVPROs
are still familiar with using this type of system. Feedback
from former NAVPROs indicates that this method of
prioritization was dramatically successful in reducing the
average UCA def initization time. The newly acquired Service
PROs are much different in size and scope than most of the
activities previously administered by DCAS . To be efficient,
they must be managed differently.
2. DCMC should inform all Major Systems PMs of the DLAM
8105.1 procedures which allow DPROs to "examine and
prioritize the prime and support contracts that are
important to the program manager . " (Ref. 29, p. 9 0.13-
46)
PMs may not be aware of the fact that DPROs are allowed
to give certain programs priority status. The DCMC Contract
Administration Manual suggests adjusting the ACO workloads so
that one ACO may be primarily responsible for the Major
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Program, while lesser contracts are distributed to other ACOs
.
Additionally, the manual suggests that the "Major Program" ACO
work out a prioritization of contracts workload in accordance
with the PM's needs.
Using this type of early cooperation between the Navy
and DCMC may help avoid some future crises.
3. DCMC should form a joint Process Action Team,
including ACOs, NAVAIR PCOs and industry customers to
develop an improved alternative to MOCAS for use in the
former NAVPROs.
A new, streamlined system could be developed which
provides the customer and DCMC with only essential
information. The Process Action Team would review each aspect
of the current system, weighing the effort against the value
added. Low value added efforts would be discontinued. The
clerical demands of MOCAS demand disproportionate amounts of
time from ACOs, which could be spent more productively
elsewhere (negotiating, for instance) . One ACO recommended
use of an AIR Force system in lieu of MOCAS. In the spirit of
TQM and "Best Practices" this alternate system should be
examined. MOCAS appears to have been the system of choice for
DCMC simply by virtue of its pre-existence in DCAS
.
4. DCMC should allow for more frequent Contractor
Purchasing System Reviews (CPSRs) (e.g., every 18
months) of certain contractors, if customers such as
NAVAIR make such a request. A Memorandum of Agreement
would be established, requiring the customer to provide
reimbursable funding to DCMC each year to pay for the
additional personnel necessary for more frequent
reviews.
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The fact that CPSRs will be conducted less frequently
by DCMC may result in less efficient contractor purchasing
systems. This may result in the Navy customer paying more
than necessary for purchased parts. It may also require PCOs
to spend more time preparing for negotiations, since the
contractor purchasing systems may be suspect if they have not
been inspected recently. If enough agencies sign up for more
frequent reviews, their annual investment in personnel costs
would likely be more than offset by the resulting cost
avoidances
.
5. DCMC should establish separate Branches within the
Contract Operations Divisions for Negotiations and
Contract Administration, respectively. The Contract
Administration Branch would have complete responsibility
for contract close-outs, MOCAS maintenance and other
statistical reporting. All other contractual actions
would be performed by the Negotiations Branch.
By separating these duties, personnel could become more
specialized and proficient in their respective areas.
Negotiator ACOs would not be caught between supporting
customers and performing administrative functions such as
contract close-outs and MOCAS maintenance. Accountability and
responsibility would be clear.
6. DCMC should establish the price and cost analysis
functions as ACO/negotiator responsibilities, as they
were previously in the NAVPROs. This will require
disestablishing the Financial Services Branches.
By taking control of the price analysis functions,
ACOs/negotiators will be able to provide much more responsive
service to customer priorities.
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They will also be much better prepared to negotiate, having
performed the proposal price analysis themselves.
7 . DCMC should ensure that the former NAVPROs remain
under the command of a Naval Officer.
The importance of keeping a Naval officer in command of
the former NAVPROs was emphasized by PMs and industry
personnel. To ensure that DPRO resources are equitably
applied to Navy priorities, it is essential that DPRO
Commanders are familiar with the technical and operational
nuances of the programs they administer.
8. As a modification to the Navy/DLA Master Memorandum
of Agreement (MMOA) , establish a joint NAVAIR/DPRO
Process Action Team to pursue the objectives of DCMC's
Best Practices Program.
The Best Practices Program, while showing great
potential as a concept, has apparently received little input
from the working level. To be a truly effective improvement
program, process owners should be involved. This includes
making PCO and PM customers participants in the program. The
Process Action Team should consist of PCOs, NAVAIR program
office personnel, and an ACO from each of the former NAVPROs.
The fifth subsidiary research question posed by this
study was:
What can be done to improve the relationship between the
Navy and DCMC Contract Administration organizations?
This, and the previous question are very closely related.
Both questions sought to determine the actions necessary to
provide optimum customer support within the practical
constraints of DCMC resources.
230
The following recommendations are made with consideration that
enhancing communications is the key to improving the Navy/DCMC
relationship:
1. A joint NAVAIR/DCMC Process Action Team should be
chartered to establish procedures whereby PCOs would
travel to the DPROs, and ACOs would travel to NAVAIR to
explain and discuss their respective roles, needs and
methods .
Many survey respondents indicated that there is a lack
of understanding of mutual roles and needs among ACOs and
PCOs. The transition of the NAVPROs to DCMC has increased
this confusion. Possible solutions to this continuing problem
may include implementation of mandatory ACO/PCO conferences on
a regularly scheduled basis.
2 . DCMC should send a team to each contractor location
to hold a joint briefing with local industry management,
outlining and discussing how the transition has affected
in-plant oversight.
Industry personnel indicated that they were still
confused as to how their relations with the PROs and their
customers would be affected by the transition. A formal
briefing from DCMC would be appropriate. Such briefings will
allow for more rapid industry adaptation to the new structure,
roles and procedures they will be dealing with.
3. Mandate, by amendment to the Navy/DLA Master
Memorandum of Agreement (MMOA) , that DPROs be given an
opportunity to comment on drafts of major contracts
prior to solicitation.
This would help prevent the need for rework of contracts
by ensuring they are written in compliance with the unique
requirements of the MOCAS system.
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It would also help forestall other potential Contract
Administration problems.
4. Mandate, by amendment to the Navy/DLA Master
Memorandum of Agreement (MMOA) , that PCOs travel to the
DPRO to conduct Post -award Conferences with ACOs prior
to delegation of administration of contracts above a
certain dollar threshold.
This would help ACOs and PCOs clarify any administrative
requirements unique to a particular contract. It would also
allow for discussions of any limitations in DPRO support due
to constrained resources.
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D. AREAS FOR ADDITIONAL RESEARCH
1. Research the possibilities for a more useful, less
labor intensive MIS system than the present
Mechanization of Contract Administration Services
(MOCAS) system.
2. Research the validity of emphasizing quantities of
Undefinitized Contractual Actions (UCAs) and contract
close-outs as measures of Contract Administration
success.
3. Research the effects of less frequent Contractor
Purchasing System Reviews (CPSRs) on overall contract
costs.
4. Research the possibilities for creating a common
computer network for military Systems Commands and DCMC,
which allow for Electronic Data Interchange (EDI) and




MASTER MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT BETWEEN
THE DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY AND THE DEFENSE LOGISTICS AGENCY
This agreement is executed this 22nd day of June 1990, by
and between the Department of the Navy and the Defense
Logistics Agency.
Authority to execute this agreement on behalf of the
Department of the Navy is vested in the Secretary of the Navy
and on behalf of the Defense Logistics Agency is vested in the
Director, Defense Logistics Agency.
I. REFERENCES:
A. Deputy Secretary of Defense Memorandum dated 6 Feb
90 Subject: Streamlining of Contract Management
B. Department of Defense Instruction 4105.59, DoD Plant
Cognizance Program, dated October 24, 1983.
C. DoD 7110. IM, Part IV, Budget Administration, dated
July 1938
D. Federal Personnel Manual, Supplement 296-33,
Subchapter 21, Subject: Realignment and Mass
Transfer
E. DoDD 1315.7, Military Personnel Assignments, Jan 87
F. FPM Supplement 351-1, Reduction in Force, 18 Sep 89
II. PURPOSE:
The purpose of this Master Memorandum of Agreement (MMOA)
is to transfer responsibility for performance on Contract
Administration Services (CAS) at the organization and
activities listed in Enclosure 1 as authorized by reference
IA. International organizations and contractor facilities
(OCONUS) will be addressed in a separate Memorandum of
Agreement. The plant cognizance transfer of CONUS activities
from the Department of the Navy to the Defense Logistics
Agency (DLA) is in accordance with the procedures outlined in
reference IB, IC, ID, IE and IF. The effective date for the
transfer is 24 June 1990, unless otherwise specified in the
Annex. Specific information and actions concerning each
organization and contractor facility being transferred are
contained in separate annexes at Enclosures 2 through 15.
234
III. SCOPE:
This MMOA governs the transfer of resources required to
perform CAS mission responsibilities specified in Federal
Acquisition Regulation (FAR) 42.302 and DoD FAR Supplement




(1) A total of 1,416 civilian manpower
authorizations and 80 officer and enlisted authorizations were
transferred from Department of the Navy to DLA for FY 91-FY 95
by Defense Management Review Decision (DMRD) 916.
(2) In addition, the Navy has identified 70
civilian authorizations for transfer to DLA. Authorizations
will be transferred for FY 91 and beyond. Funding for
salaries and attendant support costs, however, will be
transferred for FY 92 and beyond during the FY 92 Office of
the Secretary of Defense budget cycle. FY 91 will be funded
by the Navy via a Military Interdepartmental Purchase Request
(MIPR) which will be issued to DLA prior to 1 Oct 90. Amounts
in all years are subject to budget reductions by the Office of
the Secretary of Defense and the Congress. Further, funding
provided for FY 91 will be forwarded in concert with the
restrictions of Continuing Resolution Authority.
(3) It is agreed that approximately 1,456 civilian
personnel, and approximately 67 officer and approximately 22
enlisted personnel will be transferred from the Navy to DLA,
effective 24 Jun 90. (These numbers will be used for the
purposes of determining funding transfer for the period 24 Jun
90 through 30 Sep 90.) These totals include any CAS
authorizations which may transfer from the Navy to DLA prior
to 24 Jun 90. Navy interns are not part of this transfer and
will be absorbed by Navy activities by 24 Jun 90. The
specific civilian personnel and military personnel
transferring at each location are identified in the
organizational annexes 2 through 15. These lists will be
updated in accordance with subparagraph (5) below.
(4) Servicing Navy Civilian Personnel Offices
(acting on behalf of DLA Offices of Civilian Personnel) will
issue General Notices of continued employment with DLA to all
assigned Navy field personnel designated for mass transfer to
DLA. HQ DLA or Defense Contract Management Region (DCMR)
Offices of Civilian Personnel, as appropriate, will issue
Standard Form 50, Mass Transfer, to each continuing employee,
with an effective date of transfer to DLA of 24 Jun 90.
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(5) The Navy and HQ DLA will coordinate on actions
required to transfer civilian personnel and pay records. DLA
will be notified of any personnel changes taken after the
transfer of records. Proposed promotions, reassignments,
transfers or appointments into organizations moving to DLA
will be coordinated with the servicing DLA/DCMR Office of
Civilian Personnel from 1 May 90 to the effective date of the
transfer. Effective 24 Jun 90 all civilian personnel actions
involving transferring personnel will be the responsibility of
DLA Offices of Civilian Personnel.
(6) Servicing Navy Civilian Personnel Offices will
forward Official Personnel Folder (Standard Form 66) to the
gaining DLA Office of Civilian Personnel within five days of
receipt of the Standard Form 50 which reassigns the employee.
Standard Form 1150, Record of Leave Data, will be forwarded
from the Department of the Navy to the Office of the
Comptroller at the gaining DLA activity (DCMR or HQ DLA) not
later than 27 Jun 90. The Department of the Navy shall also
be responsible for outprocessing individuals to be reassigned
to DLA, including execution of security termination statements
and collection of civilian identification cards, by 23 Jun 90.
(7) The Department of the Navy will ensure that
all provisions of union agreements with Navy civilian
employees, including any requirements for advance
notification, are followed.
(8) The HQ DLA Office of Military Personnel (DLA-
M) will initiate all actions required to transfer all assigned
military field personnel from the Navy to either DCMRs or HQ
DLA, as applicable. DLA will be notified of any change in
military personnel from that provided in the data call. Any
military personnel action proposed by the Navy shall be
coordinated with DLA-M. Effective 24 Jun 90 all military
personnel actions pertaining to affected personnel will be the
responsibility of DLA-M. Reassignment of Navy personnel from
or to the Defense Contract Management Command (DCMC) will be
handled in accordance with reference IB.
(9) The Navy will provide by computer to computer
transfer to DLA the certified payroll master employee records
for all assigned civilian personnel who will transfer to DLA.
Any civilian payroll actions (i.e. allotments, W-4s, bond
authorizations) processed by the Navy after the transfer of




(1) The Department of the Navy will issue reimbursable
orders/Military Interdepartmental Purchase Requests (MIPR) to
DLA as soon as possible after the signing of this MMOA, but
not later than 10 Jun 90, for a total of $15,686 million TOA
($14,746 million DBA and $940 thousand RBA) for pay and other
operating costs for the period 24 Jun 90 to 30 Sep 90.
(2) All reimbursable workload through 23 Jun 90
pertaining to agreements between the Department of the Navy
and contract administration services customers (NASA, Coast
Guard, FMS, etc.) will be billed by the Department of the
Navy. DLA shall be responsible to enter into agreements with
the customers for workload to be performed after 23 Jun 90 and
directly billed for contract administration services rendered.
DLA will request additional unfunded reimbursable authority
from OSD as necessary to meet these commitments.
(3) On 24 Jun 90 the Navy Plant Representative Offices
will become part of DCMC, which is currently under a full
hiring and promotion freeze. The freeze should enable DCMC to
reduce
,
through attrition, the on-board civilian personnel in
order to properly align dollars transferred with positions
transferred. If attrition does not materialize by 1 Sep 90,
the Navy agrees to fund the shortfall between 1,439 and actual
on-board by 15 Sep 90.
C. Contract Administration:
(1) The Department of the Navy will officially notify
affected acquisition activities and contractors of the
cognizance transfer to DLA. Contract modifications will be
issued, pursuant to FAR 42.206 (a) and (c) , for reassignment
of contract administration for all affected contracts from the
Department of the Navy to DLA as modifications are made to the
contracts in the normal course of business, unless there is a
change in the payment office.
(2) The Department of the Navy will initiate action
to cancel contracting officer and plant clearance officer
warrants effective with the close of business on 23 Jun 90.
DLA shall be responsible for issuing replacement warrants in
accordance with its procedures, by 24 Jun 90. Quality
Assurance Representatives will continue to use stamps issued
to them by the Navy. Extra stamps will be destroyed by the
Navy at the time of the transfer to DCMC. Records indicating
stamp number, employee name and other applicable data will be
provided to the cognizant DCMR at the time of the transition.
The DCMR will then assume responsibility for the stamps.
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(3) The DLA Executive Director of Contract Management
(DLA-A) will incorporate the appropriate changes to the DOD
Directory of CAS Components (DOD 4105. 59-H).
(4) Responsibility for proposal analysis, negotiation,
and def initization of ceiling priced and forward priced orders
will reside with the Defense Plant Representative Office.
D. Contract Disbursements:
Contracts currently administered by the thirteen Navy
Plant Representative Offices will be reassigned for payment
and data base maintenance to the DLA Finance Center (DFC) or
DCMR specified in each annex, in accordance with the following
guidelines:
(1) All new contracts and ordering agreements issued
after 23 June 1990, and contracts for which there have been no
deliveries or payments as of 23 June 1990 will be assumed by
DLA on that date.
(2) Contracts on which either deliveries or payments
have been made will continue to be paid by the Department of
the Navy and will be transferred to DLA as they are
reconciled.
(3) Physically complete and unreconcilable contracts
will be retained by the Navy.
(4) Basic Ordering Agreements (BOAs) need to be
reconciled at the delivery order level before transfer to the
DFC or the DCMR specified in each annex. Delivery orders that
have delivery performance against them will be evaluated for
transfer based on remaining delivery schedule and ease of
reconciliation. Orders not conducive to transfer will be
retained by the Navy. Otherwise, all BOA payment
responsibilities should be transferred to the appropriate DLA
activity as soon as practically possible.
(5) At the three CAOs (Burbank, Bethpage, and
Stratford) where disbursement is performed by in-plant
personnel, the in-plant personnel will transfer to DLA on 24
Jun 90. They will continue to perform the disbursement
function for contracts included in categories (2), (3), and
(4) above.
E. Government-owned Equipment and Supplies:
Government office equipment (including ADP/T) , leased
equipment, and leased vehicles at CAS activities as specified
in the annexes to the MMOA will be transferred to the gaining
DCMR. ADO equipment assigned specifically to the collocated
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Navy Technical Representatives will be retained by the Navy
for use by on-site personnel and will not be included in the
transfer to DLA.
F. Facilities:
No real estate transfer will transfer from the
Department of the Navy to DLA as a result of the consolidation
of DoD CAS responsibility.
G. Support Agreements:
(1) Existing host-tenant support agreements between
Navy CAS units and host Navy installations will terminate on
30 Sep 90, absent specific DLA reguests to the contrary. DLA
shall be responsible for initiating action with proposed host
Navy installations to obtain continuing support on an "as
reguired" basis.
(2) DCMC organizations will provide administrative
support to on-site program/technical representative offices.
Examples of such administrative support include, but are not
limited to, mailroom functions, reproduction support, office
supplies, and forms management, receipt and destruction of
classified material, and services related to government
identification badges and visitors passes. Operational
relationships will be defined in separate memoranda of




A. Program Management Offices (PMO)
The Strategic Systems Program (SSP) will continue its
technical field organizations as necessary to meet program
management reguirements
.
B. Technical Representative Detachments
The DPRO Commander will assume management oversight
responsibility of the Technical Representative Detachment
located at each of the NAVAIR and NAVSEA plant representative
offices. The management oversight responsibility includes
administrative support (office space, supplies, mail service,
etc.), coordination and oversight of interfaces with the
contractor and CAO, and inputs to buying activities on
technical representative operations. Responsibility for work
performed and staffing will reside with the buying activity to
which the technical representatives are assigned. The
technical representatives will be rated by the buying activity
with inputs from the DPRO Commander.
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- NAVPRO Lockheed Missiles & Space, Sunnyvale,
- NAVPRO Lockheed California, Burbank, CA
- NAVPRO General Dynamics, Pomona, CA
- NAVPRO FMC, Minneapolis, MN
- NAVPRO McDonnell Douglas, St. Louis, MO
- NAVPRO Hercules, Magna, UT
- NAVPRO United Technologies, Stratford, CT
- NAVPRO General Electric, Lynn, MA
- NAVPRO General Electric, Pittsfield, MA
- NAVPRO Grumman Aerospace, Bethpage, LI, NY
- NAVPRO UNISYS, Great Neck, LI, NY
- NAVPRO VITRO, Laurel, MD
- CLASSIFIED UNDER SEPARATE COVER
General Dynamics Corporate Administrative
cting Officer
APPROVED
For Department of the Navy:








MASTER MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT
BETWEEN THE DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY AND
THE DEFENSE LOGISTICS AGENCY
This agreement is executed this 22nd day of November 1991
by and between the Department of the Navy and the Defense
Logistics Agency.
Authority to execute this amendment on behalf of the
Department of the Navy is vested in the Secretary of the Navy
or his designee, and on behalf of the Defense Logistics Agency
is vested in the Commander, Defense Contract Management
Command.
I. REFERENCES :
All references and provisions contained in the Master
Memorandum of Agreement (MMOA) dated 22 June 1990 are
incorporated into this amendment.
II. PURPOSE :
The purpose of this amendment to the MMOA is to transfer
responsibility for performance of technical functions and
responsibilities as specified in Enclosure 3 at the
organizations listed in Enclosure 1. The effective date for
the transfer is 24 November 1991.
III. SCOPE :
This amendment governs the transfer of Naval Air Systems
Command Technical Representatives at Contractors' facilities
who perform technical functions and responsibilities to the
Defense Logistics Agency (DLA)
.
IV. PROVISIONS :
A. Personnel /Authorizations :
(1) A total of 27 civilian manpower authorizations
and no officer or enlisted authorizations are to be
transferred from Department of the Navy to DLA for FY 92 and
outyears. It is agreed that it is in the best interest of
both DCMC and the Navy that the personnel transferred be
retained in their current positions. Retention provides a
continuity of service and support to the program management
offices.
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(2) Funding for salaries and attendant support
costs will be transferred for FY 93 and beyond during the FY
92 Office of the Secretary of Defense budget cycle. FY 92
will be funded by the Navy via a Military Interdepartmental
Purchase Reguest (MIPR) which will be issued to DLA prior to
24 November 1991. Amounts in all years are subject to budget
reductions by the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the
Congress
.
(3) It is agreed that approximately 27 civilian
personnel, and no military personnel will be transferred from
the Navy to DLA, effective 24 November 1991. The specific
civilian personnel transferring at each location are
identified by location in Enclosure 1.
(4) Servicing Navy Civilian Personnel Offices
(acting on behalf of DLA Offices of Civilian Personnel) will
issue General Notices of continued employment with DLA to all
assigned Navy field personnel designated for mass transfer to
DLA. Defense Contract Management District (DCMD) Offices of
Civilian Personnel will issue Standard Form 50, to each
continuing employee, with an effective date of transfer to DLA
of 24 November 1991.
(5) The Navy and HQ DLA will coordinate on actions
reguired to transfer civilian personnel and pay records.
Effective 24 November 1991 all civilian personnel actions
involving transferring personnel will be the responsibility of
DLA Offices of Civilian Personnel.
(6) Servicing Navy Civilian Personnel Offices will
forward Official Personnel Folder (Standard Form 66) to the
gaining DLA Office of Civilian Personnel within five days of
receipt of the Standard Form 50 which reassigns the employee.
Standard Form 1150, Record of Leave Data, will be forwarded
from the Department of the Navy to the Office of the
Comptroller at the gaining DCMD activity not later than 24
November 1991. The Department of the Navy shall also be
responsible for outprocessing individuals to be reassigned to
DLA, including execution of security termination statements
and collection of civilian identification cards, by 23
November 1991.
(7) The Department of the Navy will ensure that
all provisions of union agreements with Navy civilian
employees, including any reguirements for advance
notification, are followed.
(8) The Navy will transfer to DLA the certified
payroll master employee records for all assigned civilian
personnel who will transfer to DLA. Any civilian payroll
actions (i.e. allotments, W-4s, bond authorizations) processed
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by the Navy after the transfer of records will be provided to;
the servicing DLA/DCMC payroll office.
(9) No military personnel will transfer to DCMC as
a result of the transfer of technical representative
responsibilities. Military personnel currently assigned to
the Naval Technical Representative Detachments at McDonnell-
Douglas, St. Louis, MO; Lockheed Georgia, Marietta, GA; and GE
Lynn, Lynn, MA, will, to the extent possible, not be replaced
in the contractor's facilities upon rotation. In the interim
period, the Navy will follow the DFARS procedures for
establishing technical representatives for these positions
remaining in plant.
B. Funds :
(1) The Department of the Navy will issue reimbursable
orders/Military Interdepartmental Purchase Request (MIPR) to
DLA as soon as possible after the signing of this amendment,
but not later than 24 November 1991, for a total of $970,000
TOA for pay and other operating costs for the period 24
November 1991 to 30 September 1992.
C. Government-owned Equipment and Supplies :
Government office equipment (including ADO/T) , leased
equipment, and leased vehicles at NAVAIR Technical
Representative activities as specified in Enclosure 2 will be
transferred to the gaining DCMC. ADO equipment assigned
specifically to the collocated Navy Technical Representatives
will be retained by the Navy for use by on-site personnel and
will not be included in the transfer to DLA.
D. Functions and Responsibilities :
The Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) 42.202
permits the Contracting Office to delegate to the CAO
functions not listed in FAR 42.302. This agreement
constitutes advance notification of the delegation of specific
functions and responsibilities listed in Enclosure 3 to the
DPROs/CAOs listed in Enclosure 1. This agreement applies to
Naval Air Systems Command (NAVAIR) only and does not set a
precedent for other Navy or DoD Components.
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3 Enclosures
1. Personnel Transferred (Not included)
2. Inventory Listing (Not included)
3. Functions and Responsibilities Delegated (Included)
APPROVED:
For Department of the Navy For Defense Contract
Management Command:
(Signed) (Signed by Charles Henry)
H. LAWRENCE GARRETT, III
Secretary of the Navy
22 November 1991
244
FUNCTIONS AND RESPONSIBILITIES DELEGATED
(enclosure 3)
These delegations exceed the traditional contract
administration services (CAS) defined by FAR Part 42. They
are willingly accepted by the Defense Contract Management
Command (DCMC) in the spirit of customer support without
intending to establish precedent in a general expansion of CAS
functions. The functions being accepted by DCMC as part of
this transfer are the following:
I. Issuance of Ceiling Priced and Fully Priced Orders.
II. Validation of MILSTRIP Requisitions.
III. Waivers and Deviations for Minor Nonconforming
Supplies or Services.
IV. Concurrences in Classification of Class II
Engineering Change Proposals.
V. Monitoring and Oversight of Government ' Furnished
Material
.





A. Ceiling Priced orders:
1. The Administrative Contracting Officer will be
responsible for the issuance of all ceiling priced orders
forwarded by the requiring activity (NAVAIR) . Ceiling priced
orders are issued for either Basic Ordering Agreements or
provisioning items. Before the ceiling priced order can be
placed the following documents must be received by the ACO.
a) an implementation letter from the requiring activity
giving them authority to place the order.
b) a MIPR from the requiring activity funding the
requirement.
c) a Certificate of Urgency (COU) stating the requirement.
d) a Justification and Approval (J&A) for other than full
and open competition.
e) Pre-Award Synopsis
2. Upon receipt of the above documentation a
letter is prepared to notify the contractor that an
undef initized bilateral priced order has been written and is
being forwarded to them for their review and signature.
3. In addition, the ACO should assure that the
following items are included prior to issuance of either the
BOA or PIO order.
245
a) description of items ordered (complete statement of
work)
b) ceiling price
c) proposal submittal information
d) billing price (if appropriate)




h) "ship to" information
i) method of acceptance
j) inspection
k) acceptance point]
1) authorization to accept partial shipments
B. FULLY PRICED ORDERS
1. The Administrative Contracting Officer (ACO)
will be responsible for the issuance of all fully priced
orders. Fully priced orders are those where firm price and
other provisions have been established prior to the issuance
of the order.
a. The Requiring Activity is responsible for:
1. Requesting proposal from the Contractor
2. Screening the proposal for compliance with
requirement
3. Sending the requirement letter to the ACO
including:
a. Statement of Work: Direction to
accept proposal and/or work requested
changes /add it ions /deletions




b. The ACO is responsible for:
1. Performing cost price analysis
2. Negotiating Firm Price and Terms and
Conditions
3. Issuing priced orders
C. The ACO is responsible for the following actions
on all types of orders:
1. post award synopsis is prepared for all orders
over $25,000 in accordance with FAR 5.207(c).
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2. Public Announcement of contract award is
prepared for all orders over $5,000,000 and released when
order is signed by contractor
3. A certificate of procurement integrity is
required on orders or contract modifications in excess of
$100,000
4. Copies of the order are distributed to the
requiring activity, MOCAS input personnel and STARS input
personnel (AIR 802)
II. VALIDATION OF MILSTRIP REQUISITIONS
A. DCMC will be responsible for the validating of
contractor generated MILSTRIP Regulations or government
generated requisitions where the material will be shipped to
the contractor. The responsibilities of DCMC are as follows:
1. Ensure that contractor generated requisitions for
material to be accessed from the Department of Defense (DoD)
supply systems are reviewed to verify that they are within the
contractually authorized levels of each contract. When
requested by the Program Office and authorized by contract,
the contractor may requisition material for the DoD supply
system. Where the contract does not specify the type and
quantity of material to be requisitioned, the DPRO will use
other means (review material parts list, drawings, etc.) to
validate the need for such material.
2. Pass or refer validated requisitions to the
appropriate DoD supply source for action. Reject requisitions
which fail validation.
3. Maintain a data base on requisitions forwarded to DoD
supply system and those rejected.
4. Provide a quarterly status report to the buying
command on all requisitions processed. The report shall
include:




e. if rejected, the reason for rejection
5. Respond to MILSTRIP source of supply validation
inquiries.
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III. WAIVERS AND DEVIATIONS FOR MINOR NONCONFORMING SUPPLIES
OR SERVICES
A. Unless otherwise specified in the contract/ letter of
instruction, the Contracting Administration Office (CAO) will
accept/reject nonconforming supplies or services in accordance
with FAR 46.407. When delegated authority by contract or
letter of instruction, the ACO will accept or reject minor
deviations to contract requirements.
IV. CONCURRENCE IN CLASSIFICATION OF CLASS II ENGINEERING
CHANGE PROPOSALS
A. Unless specifically withheld by the buying command,
concurrence in the classification of Class II engineering
changes shall be in accordance with MIL-STD-480B.
V. MONITORING AND OVERSIGHT OF GOVERNMENT FURNISHED MATERIAL
A. Complete monitoring and oversight of all Government
Furnished Equipment (GFE) and Government Furnished Material
(GFM) to be incorporated into end items in support of
production, maintenance and repair contracts. Such monitoring
and oversight to include:
1. tracking of all deliverable GFE and GFM
2. researching and assisting in the resolution of
delinquent GFE
3. performing failure analysis on repetitive
defective GFE and providing such data to the
buying command
4. maintaining liaison with contractor production
management personnel on GFE issues
B. When the contract requires that the contractor perform
GFE/GFM failure analysis, DCMC will perform a review of this
analysis and comment on the contractor letter/report when
submitted through the Contract Administration Office.
VI. WITNESSING CONTRACTOR VALIDATION OF TECHNICAL MANUALS
A. DCMC will serve as the government representative when
witnessing the contractor's validation of technical manuals.
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VII. LOGISTICS SUPPORT
A. DCMC will provide support to the buying command's
Assistant Program Manager for Logistics (APML) . Act as the
APML on-site representative in all matters relating to
logistics support and maintenance engineering reguirements.
Support to the APML would include:
1. Provide on-site technical liaison and guidance to the
contractor.
2. Serve as coordinator on the technical issues between
the contractor and the government.
3. Perform continuous review and evaluation of logistics
support and maintenance planning data.
4. Identify deficiencies and verify implementation of a
corrective action plan.
5. Actively participate in the integrated logistics
support management team (ILSMT) and coordinate with
team members on their areas of responsibility.
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